A specialist in Libyan affairs, Imen Chaanbi is a member of the academic board of the Geneva Geostrategic Observatory. In this interview, she unpacks Russia’s positioning in Libya. This article was published on Henri Weill’s blog “Ainsi va le monde !” https://ainsi-va-le-monde.blogspot.com/
Is Libya of great value to Russia?
Russia aims to strengthen its presence in North Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East. Access to the Mediterranean enables it to secure its supplies while bolstering its status as a power. Facing the European Union, Russia can conduct surveillance of NATO while carrying out military manoeuvres in deep waters. After the new Syrian government terminated its contracts, the Kremlin reoriented its strategy in the Mediterranean. By backing Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), Russia has been able to make use of strategic port and air facilities in Cyrenaica. These sites enable it to sell and deliver weapons while controlling the hydrocarbon trade.

Is Moscow also interested in Sudan?
The Kremlin is indeed pursuing another objective: access to the Red Sea. In 2017, Sudan and Russia signed an agreement on the establishment of a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. Despite the fall of Omar al-Bashir, the Kremlin chose to maintain its presence in Sudan, initially by backing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti”. In view of the converging interests of the various international players in the region, Russia also decided to provide logistical support to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This strategy of “dual military support” enabled it to finalise the agreement in February 2025*. The port will be able to accommodate several warships, including nuclear-powered vessels. The base will provide logistical support to the Russian navy, notably the resupply and repair of its ships. Located opposite the Bab al-Mandab, the port allows Moscow to monitor this strategic crossroads of global trade routes while safeguarding its strategic interests. Moscow’s aim is to have troops stationed in Sudan in the same way as the countries that have military bases in Djibouti.
Is one of Moscow’s aims to be able to monitor the Suez Canal?
That is obvious, and that is precisely the point of having access to the Mediterranean. Let me add that by negotiating a naval base in Sudan, Russia can monitor maritime traffic in the Arabian Sea. Beyond military activities, there is also a strategic interest in thwarting the Ben Gurion Canal project. By linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, the canal would compete with the Suez Canal while extending Israeli, and indeed American, influence in the region.
By positioning itself diplomatically and militarily in Libya, Sudan, Egypt and the Sahel countries, Russia is putting in place “a strategy of military and economic encirclement”, in order to control the strategic interests of other countries, including those of the BRICS members present in the region.
Does Russia want to be seen as a reliable security partner?
After the Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969, Gaddafi turned to the USSR. At the time, the Libyan government signed several economic and military cooperation agreements. Until Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, the Russians supplied the Libyan army. Its officers spent time in Russia to be trained in intelligence techniques. Gaddafi wanted to set up an equivalent of the Spetsnaz, notably to fight jihadists in the 1980s and 1990s.
Russia also took in many relatives of Colonel Gaddafi and former officials of the Jamahiriya after his death. Unlike other countries, Russia did not take part in the military operations. That stance remains an asset for Moscow among the Libyan population, which regards the Kremlin as a reliable partner.
As for the current situation, Russia, together with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, backed the troops of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in its offensive “Operation Volcano of Anger”**.
A few years ago, Field Marshal Haftar met Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ask for Russia’s help in his fight against the Islamists. Moscow delivered weapons and military equipment, then deployed forces (Wagner) to the Egyptian air base at Sidi Barrani, near the Libyan border. By providing logistical support, the Kremlin enabled the LNA forces to take control of Cyrenaica, part of Fezzan, as well as the Sharara oilfield and the Zawiya refinery. The LNA’s recent incursion, backed by the Africa Corps, to take control of Ghadames once again reveals the solid partnership between Russia and Khalifa Haftar’s government.
Was Haftar trained in Russia?
Yes, when he was one of Gaddafi’s officers. To this day, he regards the Kremlin as “a reliable and trustworthy partner”. It should be noted that Marshal Haftar is also in negotiations with Washington and has no wish to fall out with the Pentagon. Indeed, he holds an American passport and his family has business interests in the United States. Marshal Haftar remains an asset in the short term, but his illness and his pro-American stance weaken his standing with the Kremlin. Ultimately, Russia is pursuing a bilateral strategy with the Libyan governments in order to secure its resources and its strategic position in the Mediterranean.
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, has the Kremlin overhauled its military strategy by transferring its equipment and personnel to Libya?
The Tartus base enabled Russia to secure its supply of raw materials, maintain its military presence in the Mediterranean and support its operations in Africa. Some experts regard the loss of this strategic foothold as a major defeat. By concentrating their presence in Cyrenaica and Fezzan, the Russians are opening up a new corridor in the Mediterranean. At the same time, the revival of Gaddafi’s logistics programme by one of the marshal’s sons, Belkacem Haftar, partly financed by China, is intended to open up the landlocked countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The project includes the construction of railway lines, motorways and logistics bases. It should be noted that the Kufra free zone is controlled by Marshal Haftar’s forces and by Russian forces. In exporting raw materials, China will have to go through the logistics corridor. It will use infrastructure controlled by the Kremlin, namely the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi.
Does Moscow really have a foot in each camp: military activity in the East and diplomatic activity in the West?
Russia has adopted a multilateral, multifaceted diplomacy. It works with both the government in the West and the government in the East. The government in the West***, led by Abdelhamid Dbeibah, is backed by Qatar and Turkey, as well as being recognised by the international community. Russia reopened its embassy in Tripoli last year. The Kremlin wants to usher in a “new era of cooperation and mutual understanding”. The reopening also gave the Russian government an opportunity to negotiate oil exploration agreements. The recent resumption of activity by American and European companies in the hydrocarbons sector is one of the reasons that prompted the Russian government to reopen its diplomatic mission. Beyond the economic aspects, it is important to highlight the presence of former members of Muammar Gaddafi’s government within the current government.
Very active with Moscow…
It should be noted that since 2011, former members of Gaddafi’s government have maintained a “parallel diplomacy” with the Kremlin. Moreover, Russia wants to make its presence felt in North Africa in order to compete with the Turks, the Italians, the Chinese and the Americans. As for the self-proclaimed government in the East, Russia has announced that it will soon open a consulate in Benghazi.
Can we return to the military and logistical support provided to Haftar’s troops…
Yes, Russian military instructors are deployed across Cyrenaica and Fezzan. The air bases used by Russian military forces are Al-Khadim (eastern Libya), Al-Jufra (central Libya), Brak Al-Shati (west of Sebha) and Al-Gadarbiya (Sirte). Maaten Al-Sarra air base, on the border with Chad and Sudan, is a strategic point for the Kremlin because it opens onto the Sahel. By repositioning its military resources across the various Libyan military bases in the east, the Kremlin is pursuing several objectives. The transfer of personnel and the establishment of weapons stockpiles allow Russia to offer support to the Alliance of Sahel States in an attempt to combat terrorism. Following the termination of the military cooperation agreements between France and Chad, Russia wants to position itself as a reliable partner in the field of defence and security. The Russian government is working on both military and paramilitary activities. Africa Corps troops are stationed at the Haruba military base.
Is Moscow negotiating the transfer of its Syrian bases to Libya?
Russia is in negotiations with Marshal Haftar over the construction of a naval base similar to Tartus in Tobruk and Susah. The port city of Tobruk is strategic because of its location and its activities. It is the only deep-water port between Egypt and Tunisia. Used as a military port by the Italians during the colonial period, its management is seen as an asset by the Russians, who could thereby control oil exports, and even carry out military manoeuvres with their nuclear submarines in the Mediterranean. As for the management of the port of Susah, it would give Russia a deep-water container port. An American company had offered to invest $2 billion to build a container terminal, a grain terminal and berths for conventional cargo traffic. The project, currently on hold, is clearly attracting the Kremlin’s interest.
Is another of Moscow’s ambitions to win back contracts lost in North Africa in agricultural produce?
That’s right. It is important to mention Russia’s strategy in terms of economic diplomacy. Russia wants to take over Ukraine’s “black earth”, one of the richest soils in the world and of strategic importance in supplying wheat, oil and flour to the Maghreb countries. The geopolitics of wheat remains a major stake for Russia, which wants to establish itself as the indispensable trading partner, unseating European, Ukrainian and American firms. As in Sudan, Moscow has opted in Libya for a strategy of “dual military support”, backing both camps fighting militarily and politically for power. The strategic value of having bases there, energy resources and the management of migration flows are all assets that Russia would like to have at its disposal in Libya.
In a volatile Libya carved up among armed groups, is Russia’s main interest its energy resources?
Absolutely. Libya is of strategic interest to Russia because of its energy and mineral resources. Libya remains one of the richest countries in North Africa. In terms of hydrocarbons, it holds 3% of the world’s oil reserves. Its natural gas reserves are estimated at 1,600 billion cubic metres, making the country the fourth-largest reserve holder in Africa. The Russian company Taftnet recently obtained a concession to build a refinery. Rosneft, for its part, has signed an agreement with Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to develop oil production. It is worth noting that the export terminals are controlled by the eastern government, which is an advantage for the Russians, who are established in that area. Moreover, the vast gas and oil reserves of the Ghadames, Sirte and Murzuq basins are coveted by groups such as ENI, Total and Tafnet. The Ghadames basin is of strategic interest to the Russian company, which recently discovered an oil well with a production capacity of 1,870 barrels of oil per day.
The country is rich in gold, copper, uranium, lead, zinc, iron, phosphate and coal. As yet unexploited, its mineral resources form part of the Libyan state’s strategic reserves. American investment funds and Israeli and Chinese companies are taking a close interest in its gold reserves. Russia could benefit from these resources thanks to the military support it has provided to both governments, as well as through the economic investments made after 2020. In the long term, Russia would like to export oil and its derivatives to African countries and also to Europe, which runs counter to Giorgia Meloni’s Italian strategy in Libya and to the American vision of the famous “Greater Middle East”.
Africa Corps is on the front line in Libya. How many Russians are there?
There are more than 2,000 Africa Corps personnel spread between Cyrenaica and Fezzan. In Tripolitania, the organisation is in principle persona non grata because of its support for Marshal Haftar. However, the Russian government, through state institutions, provides civilian instructors and military equipment to the government in the west. Libyan officers frequently travel to Belarus and Russia for further training, particularly in intelligence. The Libyan Ministry of Defence draws on the expertise of Russian companies, notably in cybersecurity. As mentioned earlier (see part 1 of the interview), most Libyan officers were trained in Russia.
General Surovikin, one of the Russian commanders of the “special military operation” in Ukraine, who fell from favour over his ties to the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, has reportedly been seen in Libya on several occasions?
General Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin, known as the “butcher of Syria”, was in charge of the special military operations in Ukraine. Indeed regarded as close to Prigozhin, he was in a sense “demoted” when he became the Kremlin’s military adviser on Africa. There is no confirmation of any official presence in Libya, but we know that he has travelled to North Africa and to the Sahel countries. Russia’s strongman in Libya is the Russian Deputy Minister of Defence, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. He has succeeded in reorganising Africa Corps and currently enjoys the confidence of Vladimir Putin.
After Syria, has Russia’s word not lost its value?
Russia knows how to bounce back. This situation gives it the opportunity to reshuffle its cards in Africa, or even to legitimise its presence there. The fall of Bashar al-Assad, who was backed by Russia and Iran, is the result of a compromise between several countries. Turkey is taking over Syria in order eventually to encourage the Kurds to settle there. In return, Turkey is not interfering in Russia’s affairs in Libya, until Russia withdraws its troops to redeploy them to the Sahel. The Kremlin’s strategy is that of the Adversary Paradigm. By attacking Europe, notably France, and by fanning anti-French sentiment in Africa, Russia wants to establish itself as the “leader of anti-colonialism”. However, Russia has faced a loss of credibility on the ground, notably in Mali and Mozambique.
Will the Kremlin not seek to exploit migration as leverage in Libya, as it has in Belarus?
The instrumentalisation of migrant populations is a weapon for any state wishing to put pressure on the European Union. Russia, like the Maghreb countries and Turkey, instrumentalises migrants in Belarus by pushing them towards the Polish border. In Mali, migrants have been transferred on Russian military aircraft. They are first sent to Belarus. They are then pushed towards Europe’s borders, including Poland’s. In Syria, jihadists captured by Russian military forces are reported to have been sent to Europe via Turkey. On their capture, they were given several options, including prison and exile (outside Syria). Wagner had at the time built up a genuine people-smuggling network. In Libya, Russian mercenaries had recruited former members of Libyan militias to form an “army of 15,000 men”. Controlling migrant flows, as well as being a lever and a threat to the security of the European Union, constitutes a genuine influence strategy for the Kremlin.
*An agreement stipulating that Russia holds a 25-year operating lease
**On 4 April 2019, Marshal Haftar called for a march on Tripoli to free the country from the Islamist and foreign presence, notably Turkish and Qatari. The war ended following the ceasefire of 21 August 2020
*** The GNU – Government of National Unity.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






