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Pierre Conesa: what lies beneath conflicts

Understanding the decision-making processes that lead to war requires a careful analysis of history over the long term. To convince public opinion that a war is just, the “military-intellectual complex” studied by Pierre Conesa builds a case around moral values that can often be called into question. Unpicking a range of crises, from the American invasion of Iraq to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Pierre Conesa explains the mechanisms by which an enemy is manufactured, with clarity and without mincing his words. 

A former senior official at the Ministry of Defence, Pierre Conesa was director general of the Compagnie européenne d’intelligence stratégique from 2005 to 2011. He also founded the consultancy Homid. The author of numerous books on geopolitics, in 2017 he won the best book prize at the Grenoble Geopolitics Festival for Docteur Saoud et Mister Djihad.

La Tribune des Nations (LTDN): Given the active expansion of nuclear arsenals, notably those of China and North Korea, the expiry in 2026 of the New START treaty between Russia and the US, and the potential for European nuclear sharing, what can we expect from the new nuclear landscape in the coming years?

Pierre Conesa (PC): The treaties were about limiting the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. Some countries, including Israel, refused to sign those treaties, so one country’s logic is not necessarily another’s. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is unequal by its very nature. Take the case of Iran, for example, whose long history has always been mistreated by the West. For several decades, Iran endured the regime of the Shah, whose police went so far as to assassinate his opponents abroad. During the 1979 Revolution, Islamist students stormed the American embassy. Secret American documents were shredded at the time. When they were later pieced back together, they revealed the full extent of American interference in the Shah’s government. Which of the two violated the Geneva Convention? This unequal treatment, which we applied out of solidarity with the West, ends up silencing the Iranian point of view. The second episode took place in 1979. Saddam Hussein, the great democrat, toured Western capitals seeking arms supplies. The victim of aggression was then placed under embargo while the aggressor was supplied with weapons. That conflict, which left 800,000 dead in Iran, has of course left its mark. The concept of “good guys versus bad guys” no longer works.

In 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed, the five members were the French and the British, the greatest colonisers on the planet, the United States, racist and segregationist, Stalin’s Russia, and China. When it comes to nuclear proliferation, we are to some extent witnessing the consequences of this unequal balance of power. A government facing a nuclear threat cannot ignore it, and that is the case of the Iranian government. As for North Korea, there is indeed cause for concern…

LTDN: Which direction should French strategy take in this context of proliferation? Should it develop a degree of autonomy from the Americans?

PC: In 1917, the United States was pushed into entering the war. In 1941, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it took a decision by Congress for it to stand alongside the Europeans. So the Americans never came of their own accord, except in 1945 with the NATO charter, because the Soviet Union was then in full expansion. As regards nuclear weapons, Charles de Gaulle’s position was always clear: France must be autonomous. It should nonetheless be remembered that there is an enormous stain on French history: the defeat of 1940. In 1946, rebuilding solidarity and legitimacy was no simple matter. De Gaulle was defeated in 1945 and left power, still pursuing the same objective: protecting France’s freedom of decision. There has always been this debate within the French school of doctrine: should the nuclear guarantee be limited to France, or should forms of solidarity be envisaged? The fact that Emmanuel Macron raises it is the result of this long history: if Russia threatens to use nuclear weapons, we have no guarantee of being protected by Washington, all the more so since the spread of a very strong isolationist current. I think the French president is testing the waters, that is to say that the arrangements for an extension need to be considered, but many questions remain, notably the positioning of nuclear forces.

LTDN: The Russian army has at times been portrayed as technically weak during the conflict with Ukraine. What is the history of this army, and how should its supposed weakness on the battlefield be understood?

PC: The history of the Red Army is an interesting one. During the Cold War, East and West alike always had an interest in inflating the threat posed by the other side. I wrote a book on the manufacturing of the enemy, and the Red Army was certainly portrayed as a vast array of red tanks poised to pour onto the plains of Central Europe. The first defeat the Red Army suffered was in Afghanistan. Convinced that the war would be short, the Russians eventually withdrew after 10 years, and the Americans after 20. The model of conventional warfare is one in which both adversaries agree on the terms. Afghanistan, however, is what geopolitics calls a borderland, where all the peoples hunted down by the surrounding empires took refuge. Moving from one mountain to the next, you change identity. Taking the capital achieves nothing, since it is not defended; you have to take every valley. At the time of the Soviet war, Olivier Roy, one of the few to have gone to Afghanistan, was one of the only people to show that the supposedly mighty Russian machine did not work.

LTDN: In your book Vendre la guerre, you discuss political decision-making processes. Can you define what you call the “military-intellectual complex”?

PC: During the Cold War, the process of strategic production was one whose intellectual landscape was fairly limited. The industrial mechanism for producing weapons was based on monitoring what the enemy was doing in order to know whether we could keep our technological edge. Once the USSR disappeared, people began to question the point of building new generations of military technology. What is more, we entered conflicts that no longer fitted the Cold War criteria, notably the war in Yugoslavia. Large federal states at odds with Moscow were then seeking a balance. I discussed this personally with Hubert Védrine, who told me that François Mitterrand reasoned like a historian, that is to say he asked himself where the greatest risk lay: in shoring up the Yugoslav Federation or in letting it break apart. Two doctrines then came into conflict: the right of peoples to self-determination and the preservation of states. The crisis continued, revealing Serbs convinced that they were the true bearers of Slavic identity (even though Tito was Croatian, he had the idea of the Kingdom of the Serbs, of Greater Serbia, etc.). British and French troops under a UN mandate arrived in Sarajevo to prevent the ultimate tipping point in this war of reconquest waged by the Serbs. At that point the issue concerned neither military equipment nor the nuclear threat; we were facing a new situation. I went to Sarajevo myself, and there was what was known as “Sniper Alley”, a thoroughfare through the city lined with snipers who regularly shot passers-by. The conflict was being kept alive; it did not resemble a conventional war but rather a war of terrorism. We did not have the means to act, but we managed to persuade the Americans to act at the time of the annexation of Kosovo. Once again, this is a situation of military dependence.

LTDN: How did the West’s moral duty to act become a right to interfere? 

PC: In the Yugoslav crisis, there was a UN mandate, so it was not interference. After 11 September, however, the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was a case of interference. 11 September was an unprecedented crisis whose circumstances are well known : the Americans knew Bin Laden, and they had not experienced war on their own soil since the Civil War. That trauma, shared live by the entire planet, gave rise to the desire for revenge that would lead to war. History was not enough to prevent the invasion (despite the difficulties posed by Afghanistan’s territorial organisation). Moreover, George Bush junior had made only one trip, to Mexico, as a student, so he knew nothing of the world. When he decided on this intervention, the results were immediate, and he went straight on to the intervention in Iraq, even though nothing was happening there. In his 2002 speech, he named the countries of the axis of evil – Iran, Iraq and North Korea – without including Saudi Arabia, even though 15 of the 19 terrorists responsible for the 11 September attack were Saudi. His strategy, which reflected the Republicans’ worldview, led to that extraordinary lie before the UN assembly : Colin Powell holding up a vial supposedly containing anthrax. I have always wondered what was in that vial and what would have happened if he had dropped it. The only coherent explanation I have found for that session of lies is this : Colin Powell was the ideal candidate to run against George Bush, since he was a victorious general who could be called upon, as Eisenhower had been after the war. And so the only way to sideline him politically was to trap him in a lie, even though all the intercantonal agencies maintained that Iraq no longer had a nuclear programme.

The problems involved in monitoring these weapons of mass destruction are many. Nuclear weapons pose relatively few difficulties, because the facilities are large and can be seen by satellite. Monitoring biological weapons is far more complex, because they can be developed in hospitals. By cutting off supply channels during the embargo, the thinking was that even if laboratories were set up, the Iraqis would not manage to build such weapons. They had shown that they were capable of it, since they had used chemical weapons against the Kurds. The Americans’ accusations could therefore be given a degree of credibility, but trusted agencies were denying them. Chirac, who was the antithesis of George Bush, had a broad knowledge of international affairs. He knew that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake. If we look back over the long sweep of history, the Middle East is one of the only regions in the world where borders are straight lines. Under Western direction, these borders were drawn with a ruler, without regard for geographical reality. Iraq was one of those composite countries in which the majority is Shia, power is Sunni and the Kurds stand apart. Chirac, unlike Bush, had a geopolitical vision.

LTDN: In wars like these, how does one manage to manufacture an enemy and get public opinion to accept it?

PC: Indeed, after the crisis in Yugoslavia we began to see what I have called the “military-intellectual complex”. These people claim to understand conflict situations, claim to know who the good guys and the bad guys are, and apply the logic of “we cannot not act”. That double negative was enough to say that the West was facing up to its moral responsibilities. In Yugoslavia, there was a continental proximity that pushed people to act and justified a military presence. At that point Bernard Henry-Levi succeeded in persuading Mitterrand to go to Sarajevo, which was a powerful political gesture. BHL would go on to lead this complex, which brings together media intellectuals, humanitarians, journalists, assorted thinkers and NGOs. Media coverage is essential in determining how important a crisis is deemed to be. Political debate has shifted to television studios. The arrival of 24-hour news channels is part of the political landscape that has to be taken into account. These channels’ programming consists of 15 minutes of news and the rest is debate. Each time, four or five people have to be found to discuss the subject, and quantity comes at the expense of quality. People become experts by appearing on television, not the other way round. In the end, it is fairly easy to lecture others on morality around a television studio table. That is what I have called the “military-intellectual complex”: what we see on television every day, particularly with the conflict in Ukraine. These people are not the most warmongering, but they change the political decision-making process. Politicians are now called to account by television studios, and their decisions are taken with the media world in mind.

LTDN: Could you go back over the stages that led to the war in Ukraine?

PC: Let us return to the long view of history. When the USSR collapsed, administrative borders became international borders. Stalin had decided to create these borders when he was People’s Commissar for Nationalities. The way they were drawn resulted in a total lack of homogeneity, which allowed Moscow to intervene with legitimacy. After 1991, 15 new states emerged; some were homogeneous, others were not and were merely paper states. We find ourselves in a situation in which there are still minority populations within states. In Ukraine, the east, notably the Donbas, was inhabited by Russian speakers. At first, those in power were still apparatchiks from the Soviet era. But with the Maidan Revolution, Ukraine began to be rethought. Ukrainian became the official language, which in particular angered Russian speakers in the eastern region. When the Russians intervened, there had already been 14,000 deaths on the border, which showed that there was already an internal conflict in Ukraine. The West did not really want to see it, despite the French attempt to launch a peace process with the Minsk agreements. When a country’s nationals are massacred, the state intervenes. The Russians intervened notably because the Ukrainians had not respected the spirit of the Minsk agreements. Putin is continuing the Soviet method. He is no madder than, say, a George Bush. When Emmanuel Macron decided to keep in contact with him, the other Europeans condemned him. But to resolve a conflict, maintaining dialogue is essential ! The pressure of public opinion, which is influenced by thinkers who, unlike Regis de Bré or Malraux, are not warmongers, is very important.

The case of Libya is also instructive in explaining how this military-intellectual complex works. Libya’s borders are a product of colonisation. After independence, Gaddafi quickly became the official dictator. He ensured a degree of redistribution; the landscape was not the same as that of the Gulf states. During the insurrection that led to his overthrow, there was a popular movement in the eastern part of the country, as there was in many Arab countries at the time. The French and the British knew that the major military risk was Gaddafi’s aircraft taking off to bomb the insurgents. A no-fly zone was requested at the UN. Such a resolution led to the permanent presence of UN-mandated aircraft to prevent one of the belligerents from using its air force. It did not, however, authorise bombing on the ground. An important phenomenon in contemporary wars is rumours, or fake news. A rumour spread: a column of tanks was said to be heading towards Tripoli to fight the insurgents. At that point the French and the British decided to launch a ground operation. Since going through New York to obtain authorisation would have taken too long, they used the first resolution. This intervention led to Gaddafi’s death. BHL played an important role in this conflict by pushing the French to take part in these UN resolutions. Libya is in a disastrous state today.

LTDN: Do you think Western interventionism played a role in the creation of Daesh and of terrorism as we know it today?

I don’t think that is the right way to put it. Since the end of the Cold War, we Europeans have carried out some twenty military interventions. Politicians do not ask themselves about the nature of the crisis but about the consequences of their decisions for their re-election. Some of these interventions are completely surreal. Take the example of Somalia. That country, made up of the parts colonised by the Italians and by the British, was ruled by a dictator who emerged after independence. He was overthrown by a revolution and the country sank into a kind of disintegration. What is interesting is to analyse how the crisis was perceived here. NGOs were trying to supply the camps. But a rumour quickly spread that warlords were looting the humanitarian aid. I myself discussed this with Rony Brauman, who explained to me that the looted goods were not being resold but redistributed. Some tribal chiefs felt that there was not enough aid for their people. The solution was therefore to increase the volume of aid in order to reduce the conflict. But Bernard Kouchner decided to intervene militarily, against the advice of the humanitarians. The Americans also intervened, taking the port of Mogadishu, held by the warlord Aidid. The Americans sent two helicopters to kill him at his headquarters, but Aidid hit back by shooting down both helicopters. The toll was 20 dead, and so the Americans decided to leave the coalition without even warning us. Domestic political considerations prevailed. During the crisis in Rwanda, they refused to take part. It is these domestic political considerations that drive the choices, with total contempt for what is happening on the ground. Twenty years on, conditions have not changed, but Somalia no longer interests the West. There has nevertheless been one development : Somaliland has become independent, but the principle underpinning the organisation of African countries rests on the recognition of the territorial integrity of states. Nobody recognises the integrity of Somaliland, because that would mean recognising a principle that is incendiary in Africa, namely the recognition of a regionalist secession.

LTDN: The US election is drawing closer and Donald Trump has a chance of winning. What can we expect from his potential return to power in terms of geopolitics?

PC: It is very hard to tell. In his first election campaign, he denounced Saudi Arabia, yet his first official trip was there. He is clearly highly unpredictable. He came after the disaster that was Bush junior. He had the argument of novelty, presenting himself as the man who was going to change the rules. In France, his profile as a billionaire businessman would not have gone down well, but it has great appeal in the United States. He came across as extremely excessive during his first term. Biden had the honesty to step aside, and it is not impossible that the Kamala Harris formula will work. Nothing guarantees a Trump victory, but what is certain is that populist rhetoric has spread to many countries. These populist politics denounce being run by international bodies, whether Europe, the UN or others. The influence, credibility and legitimacy of international action have declined considerably. The integration of former satellite states into the European Union could have calmed things down. But a number of European countries, sometimes legitimately, are challenging the European order. Their characteristics are not easy to analyse, and we were not prepared for these forms of dissent within the European community.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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