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[ANALYSIS] Nasser, a ghost in every mind in Egypt

In his book Nasser in the Egyptian Imaginary, the author Omar  Khalifah explores how the former president became a central element of Arab  dreams and aspirations, of their defeats and their disappointments. In the  wake of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s landslide re-election, history  is weighing on Egyptians more than ever. 

By Olivier DELAGARDE 

Senior Lecturer & Lecturer-Researcher 

CAIRO UNIVERSITY 

Faculty of Economics & Political Science 

More than fifty years after his death, Gamal Abdel Nasser still lives on in Egypt’s collective  memory, and beyond.  

As 23 July marked the anniversary of the 1952 coup against King Farouk I  by the Free Officers Movement, led by Mohammed Naguib and Nasser, the latter’s name  is still widely invoked today. In Cairo and in a number of Arab countries, people debate his legacy, brandish his portrait and continue to spread his fiery speeches. 

Of all the Arab leaders of the last century, few apart from Nasser had such a lasting and far-reaching impact on the Middle East. His unrivalled standing, still felt today, has carried him from history into memory, from the realm of political scientists to the works of writers and artists  – in short, from the status of a real figure to that of a metaphor. 

Glorified or demonised, exalted or disgraced, hailed as a symbol of freedom,  anti-colonialism and social justice, or vilified as a ruthless dictator who  fostered a personality cult and popularised the model of authoritarian rule among Arabs,  Nasser remains a sensitive and divisive subject, a cluster of meanings that transcend the direct  effects of his rule and reach deep into the minds of successive generations of Egyptians and  Arabs, becoming a screen onto which they project their dreams and aspirations, their  defeats and also their disappointments.  

The Egyptian historian Sherif Younis concludes his attempt to analyse Nasserist socialist ideology by asserting that Nasser’s detractors, just like his eulogists, bear witness to  the president’s enduring omnipresence in Egyptian life. 

According to the historian, Nasser is the ultimate personification of the notion of the “saviour”, a dream so deeply rooted in the Egyptian imagination of the 1950s. Why, he asks, are even those who are aware of the falseness of this concept unable “to leave Nasser in his grave and move beyond him“? 

The absence of an alternative political model 

Sherif Younis believes that Egyptians have yet to produce an alternative political model capable of replacing Nasser’s, despite the vicissitudes of public life. Those who no longer believe in the “individual hero” have been freed from a great illusion, but are still unable to fill the  void left by Nasser, the supreme embodiment of that model.

In other words, for Egyptians to stop invoking Nasser, his successes and his failures, and  to be able to consign him to a distant past, a radical change must take place in the way they see themselves in relation to their reality, their history and their nation state – a transformation of  their social imaginary. 

“In my book, I seek to identify the exact space Nasser has occupied in the Egyptian imagination: its histories, its trajectories, its forms, its particularities and its vicissitudes. I try to show that Nasser’s image did not follow a smooth, uninterrupted and singular path towards glory or disgrace. Rather, it passed through a multitude of junctions and turning points, and was produced by  competing discourses, divergent opinions and contradictory sensibilities,” Shérif Younis continues. 

The largely positive, somewhat romanticised view of Nasser that has proliferated in Egyptian literature and cinema over the past two decades conceals a far  more complex and plural history: one of rise and then fall. 

In fact, Nasser’s survival as an object of nostalgia for many Egyptians is in itself a sign of the particular position in which he has been placed, given the coup de grâce he suffered in 1967, followed by the intense campaign of “de-Nasserisation” launched by his successor.  

A major contribution of this book lies in highlighting instances in which many Egyptians separate Nasser from his regime. While the latter may be regarded as oppressive, unjust and even brutal, Nasser is often detached from its excesses and thus absolved, on the assumption that he must have been unaware of or opposed to such measures. 

The age of disenchantment 

Egyptian literature and cinema abound with characters who claim Nasser as their own and  invoke him against his own regime, encouraged by a certain belief in his exceptionalism. 

One notable effect of this tendency is that, even in films belonging to the period of de-Nasserisation, Nasser himself was scarcely criticised, and, moreover, his portrait  only rarely appeared in the darkest scenes, such as interrogation rooms, not to say torture chambers. 

Whereas in the four years leading up to the Suez War of 1956 writers voiced  tentative criticism of Nasser and expressed concern at the repressive  measures he was introducing – while acknowledging his good intentions and his sincere efforts for the  good of the country – the period between 1956 and 1967 was strongly marked by a glorification of the  man, who had become a symbol and a hero of independence, anti-colonialism and social  justice and who, even if he presided over a regime that may have been tainted by torture, corruption and persecution,  could nonetheless be separated from these misdeeds and claimed by the people. 

This long period of faith in Nasser was interrupted by the naksa (“setback”) of  1967, which split writers and film-makers over Nasser’s responsibility for this  defeat. 

Three years of disenchantment with Nasser followed, punctuated by harsh allegorical treatments of him in film and literature, some of which  called into question the earlier separation between Nasser and the regime. The high point was  unquestionably Hussein Kamal’s film Shey min el khouf (A Taste of Fear), released in 1969.

Critical portrayals of Nasser reached their peak under the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat (1970-1981), marked by systematic attacks on his legacy that reduced it to images of torture, fear and the oppression of the people. 

This offensive had only one aim at the time: to draw a stark contrast between Nasser and Sadat, with the effect of legitimising the radical changes the latter had initiated in Egypt’s economic, political and social direction. 

Yet a close study of the period shows that these portrayals appeared mainly in films, whereas most literary works (with the notable exception of Naguib Mahfouz’s Karnak Café ) were more reticent about reassessing Nasser’s image in  the 1970s. While most writers shared Nasser’s class orientation and his ideals of social justice and equality, films, produced largely by the private sector, were shaped by their producers’ political and economic positions towards Nasser. 

Unlike the writers, who witnessed the collapse of the Nasserist project under Sadat rather quietly, a considerable number of film producers found in that decade a  golden opportunity to give free rein to the hostility they had harboured throughout Nasser’s rule and towards his  socialist policies. 

However, the deterioration of the economic and social situation, keenly felt during the final years  of Sadat’s rule and persisting throughout Hosni Mubarak’s time in office, prompted the return of a positive image of Nasser in the early 1980s, which became dominant in the  years that followed and has remained so to this day. 

The fact is that Nasser’s return to favour all but erased any divergence that had arisen over the  previous decade between writers and film-makers, to the point of uniting them in invoking Nasser in the face of a reality that was foundering. 

Thus Nasser became at times a martyr in Gamal Ghitany’s Book of Epiphanies (Kitab al-Tajalliyat) , at others a refuge for poor Zeinat in Salwa Bakr’s Zeinat fi Janazat al-Ra’is, while young progressive directors began to revisit the cinematic image  of Nasser, rejecting the sensationalist treatment of their predecessors of the 1970s. 

The resurgence of a nostalgic view of Nasser over the past two decades tells us  more about the circumstances surrounding this return to favour in Egypt than about the president himself. 

The fact that many Egyptians still yearn for the same ideals, dreams and aspirations as those  that Nasser strove to realise clearly shows that the post-Nasser era has been experienced in Egypt only in a temporal sense. Poverty, social injustice and foreign hegemony have permeated the country so deeply that they have become enduring features of Egyptian life. 

Worse still, waves of Islamic extremism, sectarian clashes and the emigration of leading intellectuals, from which Nasser’s Egypt was largely spared, are just a few of the  symptoms of a reality being pushed forward under duress. 

Moreover, Nasser’s untimely death in 1970 struck a nation still traumatised by an  unprecedented and humiliating defeat in 1967, whose images and memories continue to haunt  the Egyptian imagination. 

Still legitimate in 2011 

Ahdaf Soueif’s story was written almost a year before the Egyptian revolution of 2011. 

The revolution itself, though it continues to this day, is still little represented in  written or visual narratives. Ahdaf Soueif (born in 1950) offers an analysis of this situation in an  article with a telling title, “In times of crisis, fiction must step aside”. Published in August 2012, the article argues that the time has not yet come to produce a mature fictional account of the revolution.  

While Egyptian novelists “produced texts steeped in criticism, dystopia and nightmare ” before the revolution, it would seem that they have all “given up – for the time being – on fiction”. The  2011 revolution cannot yet be “fictionalised” insofar as “the immediate truth is  too glaring to allow a subtler truth to take shape. For it takes more time  to process reality, to turn it into fiction”, Ahdaf Soueif explains. 

Another reason may lie in the fact that writing a novel requires a period of withdrawal from the  real world and of turning inwards, far from the crowds occupying the streets. 

And this is where Ahdaf Soueif, herself a leading novelist who has also joined the ranks of the revolution, puts political activism before the production of fiction, or the citizen before the novelist : “You, citizens, must be present on the ground to march, support, discuss, initiate, articulate.” 

Although written more than three years ago, Ahdaf Soueif’s view has largely been borne out; few major literary figures in Egypt have produced a significant work about  the 2011 revolution and its aftermath. 

Nasser’s presence in the 2011 revolution is, however, amply documented. “I began my introduction with a real event that bears witness to Nasser’s continuing presence in the lives of Egyptians,” Ahdaf Soueif continues. 

Indeed, among the images from Tahrir Square that flooded the world, groups of Egyptians were seen holding up photographs of Nasser, while live accounts reported several stalls in Tahrir playing his speeches and famous songs dedicated to him. 

Since 2011, three major phases have underlined Nasser’s legitimacy in current events in Egypt. The first phase gave rise to heated debate over Nasser’s position in relation to the 2011 revolution. 

The main question dominating these debates was whether the 2011 revolution marked a break with the three decades of Mubarak, with Sadat’s Egypt or with the entire regime of July 1952 – in other words, whether or not today’s Egyptian revolutionaries were following in Nasser’s footsteps. 

The Egyptian journalist Nagla’ Bidir, for example, warned, at the time when Egypt was ruled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), against homogenising the Egyptian army and viewing it as a single entity since Nasser, arguing that he had not been part of the “military regime” against which the revolutionaries were protesting. 

The Egyptian film-maker Khalid Youssef, for his part, suggested that the positive image of Nasser would gain fresh momentum in Egyptian cinema after the revolution, while the novelists Sonallah Ibrahim, Ibrahim Abdel Meguid and Gamal Ghitany unanimously declared that the revolution was a  major event against the Nizam Yulyu (the “July regime”). An exhibition that opened a few days before Nasser’s first post-revolution anniversary  also attracted a great deal of attention and highlighted a divide in public opinion  over the memory of the former president. The exhibition, entitled Nasser, the Dream, whose  opening was attended by his family, featured old and recent paintings, some of them produced after the 2011 revolution, but all of which showed “the  bright side of the picture”, as the title of one review put it.

Published in the weekly al-Ahram, the review criticised the organisers for trying to link Nasser to the 2011 revolution, raising the following question:  

“If Nasser is to be the symbol of the dreams of justice, freedom and equality in Egypt, for rich and  poor alike, then why on earth do we still suffer injustice and a lack of freedom within  Egyptian society? And if the principles of the 1952 revolution have not survived, then why  are we still celebrating the dream? A dream which, in other words, has turned out to be a nightmare“.  

Similarly, Nasser features in two of the earliest literary responses to the 2011  revolution. The title Mi’at Khatwa min al-Thawra (A Hundred Steps from the Revolution), written in the manner of Gabriel  García Márquez, introduces a diary that takes an ambivalent stance on the relationship  between Nasser and the revolutionaries of Tahrir. 

The writer, who recounts his personal observations of the eighteen days of protests that brought about  the fall of President Mubarak, oscillates between describing the masses in Tahrir who “cry out the  wounds inflicted on their dignity by thirty years of the dictator’s rule” and an unequivocal  declaration: “The regime of the July Revolution is 62 years old […] This revolution is a complete break  with it”. 

Far more  meaningful is the comparison between Nasser’s resignation speech in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat and Mubarak’s second speech on 1 February 2011, framed as a conversation between a mother and her son Khalid in Hisham al-Khishin’s novel 7 Ayyam fi al-Tahrir (Seven Days in Tahrir). 

Known for its powerful emotional impact on a great many Egyptians during the revolution – it created a rift between those who believed in Mubarak’s concessions and promises and those who did not – the speech persuaded Khalid and his friends to leave Tahrir and grant Mubarak the reprieve he had asked for. 

Khalid’s mother, however, reminds her son that she sees in it a manipulation of Egyptians similar to that practised by Nasser, thereby establishing a continuity between the two presidents: 

“Your enthusiasm, Khalid, reminds me of the time Nasser resigned. A single speech was enough for those good people to fill the streets and beg the man who had led them to defeat and dishonour to stay. Every Egyptian leader understands how emotional Egyptians are and seeks to exploit it  to serve their own interests”. 

A new Nasser: Sabahi or Sisi? 

The second phase coincided with the meteoric rise of Hamdeen Sabahi, who undeniably revived questions about the place of the charismatic leader in post-2011 Egypt. A Nasserist from the very beginning, Sabahi, the outsider of Egypt’s 2012 presidential election, took a surprising third place, just a few points behind the Muslim  Brotherhood’s winner, Mohamed Morsi, and Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik. 

Described by many observers as a pure product of the Nasserist school, Sabahi made no secret of his political ambitions, drawing on his hero’s appeal among the masses. He nevertheless sought to maintain a more personal vision of how the office should be exercised, trying to avoid what he saw as Nasser’s pitfalls: “I would uphold Nasser’s principles on social justice while advocating a fully democratic system that clearly defines and limits the role  of the president, which Nasser did not do.” 

The wave of popularity enjoyed by Sabahi cannot be explained solely by Egyptians’ desire for a Nasser-like leader – fear of a return to the old regime and to Muslim Brotherhood rule certainly led many voters to consider a third way. Yet his presence served as a reminder, if not a foreshadowing, of the image of Nasser and his enduring appeal among  middle-class Egyptians.  

Nasser’s legitimacy in the country’s history, coupled with the power of his image, is nonetheless nowhere more evident than in the rise to power of the former Minister of Defence, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

The Egyptian army’s renewed omnipresence in the political sphere after days of  mass demonstrations against President Morsi is a well-known episode. On 3 July 2013, Abdel  Fattah al-Sisi, then head of the army, drove Islamism from power. It was a contested event, described either as a coup d’état or as a second revolution. 

Almost a year later, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi reversed his initial decision not to run for the presidency and, unsurprisingly, won the presidential election against none other than Sabahi. This time, however, it was by a  far wider margin and with a staggering score of 96.91% of the vote. With the emergence  of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the birth of what Juan Cole calls “Sisi mania”, the  Nasserist ideal has resurfaced in Egyptians’ daily lives in a way not seen in the past decade. 

News channels around the world have broadcast images of thousands of Egyptians  waving posters bearing the faces of both Nasser and Sisi. The  country’s leading intellectuals, such as Sonallah Ibrahim and Gamal Ghitany, have praised Sisi, casting him as Nasser’s successor and worthy heir. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi himself, at various moments and in a number of interviews, has made the most of this flattering comparison. 

This recent mirroring of the two figures, though incomplete in reality, nonetheless compels us to  consider Nasser’s place in the Egyptian imagination. The blatant  resurrection of Nasser’s image and legacy over the past two years says more  about the hopes of Egyptians than about Sisi himself. 

Until his intervention in July 2013, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was virtually unknown to ordinary Egyptians. The appearance of his portrait alongside Nasser’s after he came to power more than  probably reflects Egyptians’ longing for a Nasser-like figure who could galvanise the masses and offer hope of solutions to the many difficulties overwhelming them. As described earlier, the first months after the 2011 revolution had led  Egyptians to move beyond the desire for a charismatic leader, shaping a new social contract and  leaving the army a very limited role in public life. 

“Sisi mania”, on the other hand, offered a more definitive answer to that dream. Whatever  the orchestration by the state media and Egyptian politicians, it remains undeniable that the  Sisi-Nasser comparison struck a chord of popular nostalgia. 

Moreover, the way in which the Egyptian state media, businessmen and Abdel  Fattah al-Sisi’s inner circle have laid claim to and appropriated Nasser’s image is telling. Made up largely of figures whose social, political and economic leanings ran rather counter to Nasser’s at the time, this influential segment of Egyptian society was nonetheless able to select specific aspects of him that allowed them to present Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as his true heir. The most important of these was undoubtedly the fact that  both men had held the Muslim Brotherhood in check. 

As many observers have noted, with gentle irony, “the upper class and upper middle class who currently regard Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as the new Nasser and herald him as such will not tolerate Nasser’s social and economic policies being  applied in Egypt once again”. 

Finally, let us remember that the 2014 presidential election in Egypt had already been a fresh demonstration of Nasser’s legitimacy in today’s Egypt and the high point of invoking the  latter as a means of appealing to ordinary Egyptians. 

While the two candidates at the time had both drawn on Nasser’s image and legacy as a means  of legitimising their projects, backed, albeit disproportionately, by legions of media outlets and public figures, each had opted for the Nasser that best suited his interests. In the end, it was the powerful and virulent enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Nasser embodied by Abdel  Fattah al-Sisi, who triumphed over the socialist version of Nasser championed by Sabahi.  

Yasir Abu Hilala, then director-general of Al Jazeera, set out in an opinion piece published in 2014 his  list of nine differences between Nasser and Sisi, arguing that the only thing the two  men had in common was the military uniform.  

The spectre of Nasser since 2013 bears witness to the power of his image and its ability to haunt  the Egyptian imagination at such a crucial moment in Egypt’s history. 

Whether Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s final record will affect the way  Egyptians remember Nasser is open to all manner of speculation. If the failures of the Egyptian rais at the dawn of his third term lead ordinary Egyptians to abandon the notion of the saviour and to detach it from their hopes for a better future, they could nonetheless reinforce Nasser’s exceptional status, raising him to a rank that neither Abdel Fattah al-Sisi nor any other political figure has been able to reach.

This would prove once again that, in the minds of many Egyptians, Nasser is not merely  a historical figure – a leader who ruled Egypt at a certain point in their distant past, marked by successes and many falls – but also a notion synonymous with  social justice, dignity and equality. Will the Nasserist dream eventually die out in Egypt? Perhaps. But in the meantime, the strongman of the 1950s remains, to this day, an essential part of the Egyptian imagination.  

This text contains extracts from “Nasser in the Egyptian Imaginary” (2016) by Omar Khalifah, reproduced with  the author’s permission.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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