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End of the international coalition and the future of US troops in Iraq

After several months of joint talks, the United States and Iraq announced on 27 September 2024 the end of the international coalition’s mission in Iraq1, originally set up in 2014 to fight the Islamic State (IS) group. Under this mission, some 2,500 US soldiers are deployed in the country, providing advice and military assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in their fight against terrorism.

After assessing the military situation and the security environment, the US and Iraqi authorities agreed on how the coalition’s mission would evolve under a two-phase transition plan. The first phase, running until September 2025, involves ending the mission in Iraq so that bilateral partnerships, notably on security, can emerge. Coalition forces will therefore have to withdraw from certain Iraqi localities. The second phase, between September 2025 and September 2026, is chiefly aimed at preventing a resurgence of Islamic State in Syria and its spread to neighbouring Iraq. In this context, the coalition will be able to continue conducting operations against the group from Iraqi territory2.

A transition hastened by the regional security context and Iraq’s domestic political situation

The departure of coalition forces was one of the wishes expressed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who believes that their presence is no longer justified. He considers that the ISF are capable of defending Iraq and of fighting IS3, which, in his view, no longer poses a threat to the country’s security. However, the regional security context and the repercussions of the war in Gaza for Iraq have accelerated talks on ending the coalition. Since 7 October 2023, Iraqi Shia militias, grouped within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), have carried out numerous attacks, some of them deadly4, on US forces and infrastructure. In retaliation, one of the strikes carried out by the United States in early February 2024 killed a commander of Kataib Hezbollah5. As well as exacerbating tensions and the anti-Americanism of part of the Shia elite, Washington’s intervention increased domestic pressure on the Iraqi government over the withdrawal of US troops and the departure of the coalition6, which is regarded as a source of instability in Iraq.

With very little room for manoeuvre to control and limit the influence of the PMF, Sudani has also been weakened since summer 2024 by a phone-tapping affair that reportedly involves members of his office7. Weakened on the domestic political stage, he was therefore seeking a political victory ahead of the parliamentary elections in October 20258. This joint agreement, preceded by virulent rhetoric against the US military presence, thus serves not only to satisfy the Shia elites of the Coordination Framework, but also his own electoral ambitions.

A bilateral partnership with blurred contours

Washington and Baghdad want to strengthen their relations and their defence and security cooperation within the framework of a post-coalition bilateral partnership9. However, questions remain over the presence of US troops, their mission and the future of their bases in Iraq. The two countries have agreed on the timeline for the transition plan, but have given no details on how the troop withdrawal and the envisaged bilateral partnership will work. If the plan is adhered to, the departure should take effect in September 2026. For the Pentagon, however, it is less a withdrawal than a change of status: US troops would continue to operate in Iraq under a bilateral agreement and, at Baghdad’s request, to provide advice and assistance to the Iraqi services fighting terrorism10. Yet US assistance to, or even participation in, future joint operations against IS is not spelled out. And while the success of previous operations of this kind has demonstrated the improved capabilities of the ISF, they still benefit greatly from the technical support and intelligence of coalition forces11. Likewise, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), largely backed and funded by Washington and renowned for its large-scale counter-terrorism operations, is deteriorating significantly as a result of infiltration by pro-Iranian militias. Politicised and increasingly corrupt, the CTS risks falling permanently under Iranian influence without an urgent US response12, which could seriously weaken the country’s security.

Uncertain outlook for Iraq under the Trump administration

Donald Trump’s return to the White House raises questions about future foreign policy in the Middle East. While Iraq does not appear to be a major priority, it nonetheless represents a “theatre of direct confrontation between the United States and Iran”13, which has been isolated and weakened by the fall of the Syrian regime and Israel’s degrading of Hezbollah’s military capabilities. With pro-Iranian Iraqi militias remaining one of the last pillars of the “Axis of Resistance”, Iran may seek to tighten its grip on its neighbour, which provides it with vital economic support14. Indeed, substantial financial flows pass between the two countries, through the militias and through imports of Iranian gas permitted by Washington despite existing sanctions15. The likely return of a US policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, aimed at curbing its influence in the region and in Iraq, could thus take the form of tougher economic sanctions and wider use of financial intelligence16 to weaken its proxies, notably the Iraqi Shia militias. This would have serious consequences, all the more so if Donald Trump decided to limit the waivers allowing the purchase of Iranian gas and make them conditional.

As for US troops in Iraq, the agreement of 27 September requires the approval of the new Republican administration. An advocate of military disengagement from war zones in the Middle East, Trump could continue drawing down troops from Iraq if he considers that keeping them there, including under a bilateral partnership, no longer serves American interests. However, global rivalries and regional strategic realities must be viewed over the long term. A US withdrawal from Iraq could give room for manoeuvre to powers seeking to increase their influence there, such as China or Iran17. Above all, it would risk creating a security vacuum which, given the regional context and the instability in Syria, could heighten the jihadist threat. Indeed, defeated territorially but not ideologically, IS retains capabilities in Iraq and Syria18. The question of US disengagement is therefore central, as it will determine whether instability returns to Iraq and the wider region.

  1. U.S Department of State, “Joint Statement Announcing the Timeline for the End of the Military Mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq”, 27 September 2024.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Jared Szuba, “US, Iraq announce end of defeat-ISIS coalition, but troops may stay“, Al–Monitor, 27 September 2024.
  4. “Three American soldiers killed in Jordan: Joe Biden blames pro-Iran groups and threatens reprisals“, Le Monde avec AFP, 28 January 2024.
  5. “United States kills leader of pro-Iran militia in Baghdad“, Courrier International, 8 February 2024.
  6. “Iraq slams latest US airstrikes on Kataib Hezbollah sites”, Al-Monitor, 24 January 2024.
  7. “Iraq: weakened by a wiretapping scandal, Prime Minister al-Sudani stays the course“, RFI, 9 September 2024.
  8. Jared Szuba, op. cit.
  9. US Department of State, op. cit.
  10. U.S Department of State, “Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq“, 27 September 2024.
  11. “Islamic State leader in Iraq killed in raid“, Ouest France avec AFP, 22 October 2024.
  12. Michael Knights, “How Washington can salvage Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 December 2024.
  13. Firas Elias, “Iraq’s challenges in the face of Donald Trump’s second term“, Centre Français de Recherche sur l’Irak, 22 November 2024.
  14. Adel Bakawan, “Al-Sudani put to the test in the Oval Office“, Centre Français de Recherche sur l’Irak, 13 April 2024.
  15. Ibid.
  16. Michael Knights, “What prospects for Iraq under the Trump administration?“, Centre Français de Recherche sur l’Irak, 13 November 2024.
  17. Mohammed A. Salih, “Between activism and isolationism: what to expect from Trump’s Middle East policy”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 15 November 2024.
  18. Virginie Sauner, “What threat does Daesh currently pose?“, Centre Français de Recherche sur l’Irak, 6 September 2024.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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