
What has just happened at the apex of Iran’s power structure marks a major strategic break in the history of the Middle East. The targeted elimination of central figures of the regime – starting with the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, but also the chief of staff, the Iranian defence minister and the former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – the methodical weakening of senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, and the direct or indirect involvement of the United States alongside Israel have pushed the confrontation into a new phase. After weeks of fruitless negotiations, war has returned. This new conflict represents an explicit attempt to decapitate the regime – in the hope of its collapse, or at least with the aim of profoundly and lastingly weakening Tehran’s power structure.
It is also a dangerous gamble on an internal implosion, in the expectation that opposition forces will take over. Donald Trump, who had promised not to drag America into prolonged conflicts in the Middle East, appears to have crossed a threshold, probably under strategic pressure from Benjamin Netanyahu. Iran now seems disoriented, struck at its heart, but certainly not annihilated. History counsels caution: removing leaders does not mean dismantling a system. This is not pessimism, simply historical awareness.
Decapitation is not dissolution
The lure of “regime change” has long held Western powers in its thrall. Iraq in 2003 was supposed to collapse automatically after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Post-Taliban Afghanistan was meant to stabilise once its leaders had been neutralised. We know what followed: division, civil war, resilient networks and the resurgence of even more radical insurgencies. Iran is not a one-man regime. It is a deeply entrenched ideological, security and bureaucratic edifice. The Supreme Leader was neither an isolated piece nor merely the icing on the cake; he was embedded in a dense network made up of the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia, a loyal judiciary and a vast para-state economic system. At this stage – and this is what is most worrying – no major defections are visible. Weakened though it may be, the regime’s hard core remains organised, is hitting back and has already launched unprecedented reprisals across the region. In recent months, fearing targeted strikes, the leadership had dispersed its military assets and decentralised decision-making and security processes. Decapitation is not dissolution. A regime with its back to the wall does not necessarily fall; it often becomes more radical – and may turn even more violently on those Iranians who might now consider moving from peaceful protest to force. But how, without resources and isolated inside the country?
Meanwhile, calls for a popular uprising — amplified in recent hours by Netanyahu and Trump — are running up against political reality: the ambiguity of outside support, and suspicions surrounding a possible all-out bet on Reza Pahlavi, son of the Shah and reluctant heir to a brutal dictatorship, who has nonetheless worked on a serious transition plan backed by hundreds of experts and has lived in exile in the United States for decades. The Iranian people risk finding themselves alone in the face of a regime fully aware that no Western ground intervention is likely to come to their rescue.
A power backed into a corner may choose escalation.
Since December, the protests have revealed an Iranian society that is courageous but exhausted, and determined to challenge the established order. Women, students and the urban middle classes have defied a brutal apparatus of repression. But a moral uprising must be distinguished from the seizure of political power. Historically, changes of regime have rarely come about through peaceful mobilisation alone. They require splits within the elite, a shift of allegiance within the armed forces or the capture of key centres of power: state media, the presidency, government headquarters, military barracks, parliament and the security structures. None of this is visible today. The protesters fill the streets but control neither the institutions nor the armed forces. They lack a unified command, an agreed programme and an operational leadership capable of organising an immediate transition. Encouraging Iranians to rise up without offering them protection or a transitional structure exposes them to even harsher repression. A regime under siege can become infinitely more violent. That is the risk now facing a country of 90 million people.
The regional dimension adds further to the danger. Iran now feels encircled and has made the strategic error of striking neighbouring states that had initially opposed the intervention. Qatar hosts a major US military base. The United Arab Emirates has made Israel a major political, military and economic partner since the 2020 Abraham Accords. Bahrain also hosts a significant US presence. The Shia arc – long seen as Tehran’s instrument of regional influence – has collapsed, leaving only the head of the octopus. But a power with its back to the wall may choose escalation. Retaliation against Israel is already intense, with casualties reported, notably in Beit Shemesh, in central Israel. The implicit threats against the Gulf states clearly reflect both a survival strategy and a form of strategic self-destruction: striking out to prove that its deterrent capability endures. In this context, a regional conflagration is not theoretical – it is a real possibility.
Between a weakened but structured regime and a divided opposition, a political vacuum is a credible scenario.
The central question remains what comes next. Reza Pahlavi stands ready, calling for an orderly transition and promising to unite the opposition forces in order to avert chaos. Yet the opposition in exile, fragmented between Europe and the United States, has been cut off from Iran’s internal realities for decades. There is no guarantee that it can unite, let alone govern a country as complex and fractured as Iran. Between a weakened but structured regime and a divided opposition, a political vacuum is a credible scenario. History shows that a vacuum rarely produces stability.
One can understand the strategic logic of Israel and the United States: to put an end to a Republic seen as the breeding ground of a persistent regional threat. But destroying is always easier than rebuilding. The fall of one man is not the fall of a system. Iran can hold out for months, perhaps longer, in a militarised survival mode. Meanwhile, it is the Iranian people who will pay the highest price: heightened repression, internal purges, the radicalisation of the security institutions and the relentless logic of the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards. We are therefore far — for now — from a guaranteed collapse. What lies ahead is not yet the end of a regime, but a period of deep instability whose outcome no one can predict. The hardest moment for Iranians is not behind them. It is just beginning. And they have already proved their resilience. What now remains to be built is organisation.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






