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Non-aggression pact: from open warfare to conflict management in the Middle East

The details emerging about the “memorandum of understanding” or “framework agreement” announced between the United States and Iran do more than hint at a new regional security architecture. They also reveal an attempt to redefine the rules of confrontation in the Middle East after one of the most dangerous wars the region has known in decades. A close reading of what has been disclosed, however, leads to an important conclusion: this is less about the formation of two opposing blocs than an attempt to contain the conflict and prevent it from turning into a new, all-out regional war.

Admittedly, the agreement remains shrouded in many grey areas, and major issues, notably Iran’s nuclear programme, remain unresolved. Nevertheless, some of the points raised suggest a different direction from the one that has prevailed until now. Among them is a reciprocal regional non-aggression agreement, under which each party would undertake not to attack the other or its allies.

Beyond two opposing camps

At first glance, this arrangement might give the impression of a Middle East split between two camps: Iran and its allies on one side, the United States and its partners on the other. The reality, however, is far more complex.

The “Iranian axis”, so often invoked in recent years, is no longer capable of acting as a cohesive and powerful bloc. The last war considerably weakened Iran economically, militarily and politically, while eroding a significant part of its strategic capabilities. The forces aligned with it in the region are also under unprecedented pressure. Hezbollah faces major internal and external challenges; the Houthis are confronted with mounting military and political pressure; and Iraq remains far from having regained full stability. Should this agreement actually be signed, it would mark not so much the rise of Iranian influence as the managed beginning of a retreat that avoids a chaotic collapse.

Conversely, the opposing camp cannot be described as a homogeneous axis either. Israel and the Gulf states may share a common concern over Iran’s behaviour, but their visions of the region’s future diverge widely. The Gulf monarchies prioritise stability, economic development, attracting investment and avoiding conflict. Israel, for its part, continues to rely on a security doctrine based on pre-emptive strikes and the elimination of potential strategic threats. The priorities of Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates or Qatar do not always coincide with those of Israel, or even with those of Washington.

Consequently, talk of two opposing blocs may prove misleading. What appears to be emerging is less a system of rigid alliances than a new system of conflict management. Its main aim is neither to unify the partners nor to make their differences disappear, but to set limits on escalation so as to avoid a repeat of a regional war such as the one the region has just been through.

Arab states, the main beneficiaries

The recent conflict demonstrated the fragility of regional security when a confrontation initially confined to the United States, Israel and Iran turned into a multifaceted conflict involving the Gulf states, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and international shipping lanes. All the actors understood that, were such a dynamic to continue, it risked becoming politically, economically and militarily unsustainable.

Seen from this angle, the agreement does not seek to establish a comprehensive peace but rather to manage the competition between the various powers. It resembles a new set of rules of engagement more than a peace treaty in the classic sense of the term. Its primary objective is to prevent the next war rather than to eliminate its root causes.

The Gulf states should be the main beneficiaries of this development. They found themselves at the centre of the threats during the last war, whether through direct attacks or through the risks to their energy, water, port and airport infrastructure. Any lasting reduction in the risk of military confrontation would offer them a valuable opportunity to return to their core priorities: development, modernisation and economic diversification.

At the same time, the agreement appears to reflect a growing conviction in several capitals: that toppling the Iranian regime was not necessarily the best option. Iran is not a small state whose political system could easily be replaced. It is a country of several tens of millions of people with powerful military and security institutions. A sudden collapse of the regime could have triggered internal chaos, civil wars and regional conflicts, with consequences potentially more serious than the current situation. The option of “containment” and regulation now appears more acceptable than that of complete collapse.

However, the end of the war does not mean the end of Iran’s isolation. Even if the agreement succeeds in ushering in a period of calm, relations between Tehran and its Arab neighbours will not quickly return to normal. Trust, eroded by decades of tension, wars and military operations, will take many years to rebuild. Iran could thus find itself in a new equation: less military confrontation, but without genuine political reintegration into its regional environment.

Another issue, just as important as the security arrangements, could emerge: that of reparations and compensation. The damage caused to individuals, businesses and institutions during the conflict could give rise to a wave of legal proceedings. Several lawyers and legal experts are already examining the possibility of claiming compensation from Iranian assets and funds frozen or held in the United States and other Western countries. If this trend is confirmed, it could become one of the most sensitive issues of the post-war period.

The road from political understanding to implementation will be long and fraught with obstacles

The agreement will also have to resolve complex questions about its implementation. Will it include an end to military support for armed groups? Will Israel be able to continue its pre-emptive operations against Hezbollah or against Iranian positions? How should an attack by the Houthis or by another non-state actor against ships or interests not belonging to the states party to the agreement be dealt with? These questions show that the road from political understanding to practical implementation will be long and fraught with obstacles.

The future of the American security umbrella in the Gulf is also one of the main questions raised by any new regional architecture. For several decades, Gulf security has rested on a strategic partnership with the United States, regarded as the chief guarantor of regional stability, freedom of navigation and the protection of vital infrastructure. Yet the last war exposed the limits of this model, when several Gulf states found themselves vulnerable to attack despite the substantial American military presence in the region. Any future US-Iranian agreement will therefore be judged not only by its ability to prevent a new conflict, but also by its ability to preserve the credibility of America’s security commitments to its Gulf partners.

It seems unlikely that the Gulf states will accept an arrangement that turns the United States from a strategic ally into a mere neutral mediator between the Arab capitals and Tehran, or that hands Iran and its allies political and security gains without addressing the sources of threat that have afflicted the region for decades. The Gulf countries support stability and an end to the wars, and could be their first beneficiaries. They will not, however, accept peace being used as cover for entrenching the influence of armed militias or for weakening the principle of deterrence, which is one of the cornerstones of regional security. The success of any agreement will therefore depend not only on its ability to silence the guns, but also on its capacity to reassure the Gulf states that their security, sovereignty and strategic interests will be protected.

Ultimately, the most apt comparison may not be the Cold War, with its two irreconcilable blocs, but rather the European balance-of-power system of the 19th century, in which the great powers were neither wholly allies nor wholly enemies, but agreed on certain rules to prevent the collapse of the regional order and the escalation of rivalry into general war.

The significance of this agreement therefore lies not in the creation of new geopolitical axes, but in the possibility it opens up of a new phase in the management of conflict in the Middle East. A phase in which differences do not disappear and contradictions persist, but in which they are contained by rules and limits capable of preventing the region from plunging back into full-scale war. The question nevertheless remains open: will these fragile balances withstand the test of time, or are they merely a temporary truce before a new round of tensions and conflict?

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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Les dernières analyses de nos universitaires et journalistes sur la Genève internationale, la diplomatie et les conflits.

Gratuit. Désabonnement en un clic. Voir notre politique de confidentialité.