BY VICTORIA GUDZENKO
Russia, one of the world’s largest exporters of natural gas, has used its energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy for decades. For the Kremlin, gas was not merely a commodity but a strategic weapon for achieving political goals. In recent years, however, this tool has lost its effectiveness, reflecting a shift in the geopolitical landscape and a gradual weakening of Russia’s influence on the international stage.
A history of gas wars
Russia began actively using gas as a means of pressure after the collapse of the USSR, when the former Soviet republics and the countries of Eastern Europe began their integration into the European Union and NATO. The state monopoly “Gazprom” became a key player in this strategy.
As early as the 1990s, Russia demanded market prices for gas from post-Soviet countries, while some received discounts in exchange for their political loyalty. It frequently cut off supplies, citing debts that it had itself engineered through manipulation. In 1992, for example, Russia reduced gas supplies to Lithuania to force it to remain within its sphere of economic influence.
The company “Gazprom“ was created in 1989 following the reorganisation of the USSR Ministry of the Gas Industry. After a further restructuring in 1993, the Russian government partially privatised its shares (with more than 50% remaining under state control). Today, Gazprom is the largest gas company in the world, controlling more than 15% of global natural gas reserves and using it as a political lever.

Russia stepped up its gas wars in the 2000s after Vladimir Putin came to power, making energy resources a central element of its foreign policy. It was at this time that construction began on new gas pipelines (Nord Stream) designed to bypass transit countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and Poland. The aim was to strengthen control over the post-Soviet space, put pressure on European countries and curb the economic development of its adversaries by using the “gas tap”.
Ukraine: a key transit hub
In the decades following the Second World War, Russia actively exploited its own gas fields, notably in Western Siberia (Urengoy, Yamburg). By the mid-1970s, it had become the main supplier of natural gas to the USSR and Europe. However, because of limited storage capacity on its territory, Russia used Ukrainian storage facilities to secure supply and transit.
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Ukraine’s gas transmission system (GTS) and underground storage facilities came under Ukrainian control. Russia, which did not yet have sufficient infrastructure for storing and transporting gas on its own territory, continued to use the Ukrainian facilities. Ukraine provided storage services, but Russia often disregarded the appropriate compensation. During this period, Moscow “siphoned off” gas from Ukrainian reservoirs without adequately compensating for the losses, creating tensions between the two countries.
In the 1990s, Russia began actively developing its own gas storage and transport infrastructure in order to reduce its dependence on Ukraine. New reservoirs were built and pipelines were laid to bypass Ukrainian territory (notably Blue Stream to Turkey). By the late 1990s, Russia had fully integrated its new reservoirs in Western Siberia and was actively exporting gas to Europe via the Ukrainian GTS. Even so, the Ukrainian GTS remained crucial, as the new Russian pipelines were not yet capable of handling sufficient export volumes.

From the early 2000s, gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine intensified. Moscow accused Kyiv of “stealing transit gas”, while Ukraine complained of a lack of compensation for its transit services. Russia used these accusations to justify building bypass pipelines such as Nord Stream and South Stream.
In the early stages of the development of its gas infrastructure, Russia depended on Ukraine’s underground gas storage facilities and gas transmission network. Only over time, once it had built its own infrastructure, was Russia able to reduce this dependence. Nevertheless, its past use of Ukrainian storage facilities and pipelines was an important step in establishing Russian gas exports.
The gas wars of 2006 and 2009
The first striking example of gas being used as a weapon came in 2006, when Russia temporarily cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, accusing Kyiv of “unauthorised siphoning of natural gas”. The problem was above all political: after the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukraine had turned towards integration with the EU and NATO, which ran counter to the Kremlin’s interests. The reduction in deliveries affected not only Ukraine but also the European countries that depended on Ukrainian transit. Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic saw the volumes of gas they received fall by 30 to 40%. The dispute erupted in winter, when demand for gas was particularly high.
The 2009 gas war was even more serious. Russia once again suspended gas deliveries to Ukraine for three weeks, owing to a dispute over the terms of supply and transit to Europe. A new agreement was signed, introducing a pricing formula based on European market prices. The conflict had major consequences for Europe, which found itself without gas in the middle of winter. Bulgaria, entirely dependent on Russian gas transiting through Ukraine, suffered an energy collapse: factories closed and heating was cut off. In Slovakia, the government declared a state of emergency, and some companies had to reduce or halt production.
Hungary, heavily dependent on Russian gas, as well as the Czech Republic and Austria, also suffered cuts in supply. Some parts of the Balkans were left without heating. In response to the crisis, the EU stepped up its efforts to diversify its gas supply sources and routes. The European Union invested in new infrastructure projects (Nord Stream, South Stream) and in strategic gas storage. Russia’s reputation as a reliable supplier was seriously damaged.

Russia’s loss of influence
After the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, Russia continued its gas blackmail, not only against Ukraine (which, since 2015, has no longer bought Russian gas directly, replacing it with reverse flows from the EU), but also against Europe. Rising prices, a policy of discounts for loyal countries and the construction of new pipelines (Nord Stream 2) were part of a strategy aimed at deepening Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.
As for Ukraine, Russia was forced to change its methods of applying pressure. Gazprom sought to bring Kyiv to heel through the international courts, demanding compliance with the 2009 contracts. In 2018, however, the Stockholm arbitration tribunal ruled in Ukraine’s favour, ordering Gazprom to pay $2.9 billion to Naftogaz (Ukraine’s main energy company). The ruling dealt a serious blow to Russia’s strategy of blackmail, as it had been threatening to cut off transit via Ukraine entirely once the contract expired in 2019. The launch of Nord Stream 2 was meant to deprive Ukraine of $3 billion a year in transit revenue and to create an energy vacuum.
Belarus: an ally under pressure
Russia has repeatedly restricted gas supplies in order to force Belarus into political concessions, notably on integration into the “Union State” (a supranational entity created by Russia and Belarus on the basis of a 1999 treaty). In 2004, Gazprom cut its gas deliveries to Belarus to force it to accept market terms, whereas the country had until then enjoyed preferential prices. Subsequently, in 2007, following a fresh crisis, Belarus sold 50% of Beltransgaz (the Belarusian state-owned company responsible for transporting natural gas) to Russia, while the price of gas was partially raised.
In 2010, Belarus owed Gazprom around $200 million for failing to comply with the new pricing agreements. In response, Gazprom cut its gas deliveries by 60%. Belarus then threatened to block the transit of Russian gas to Europe. In 2011, Belarus lost Beltransgaz altogether: in November, Gazprom bought the remaining 50% for a further $2.5 billion, thereby becoming the company’s sole owner, and folded it into the structure of the Russian gas monopoly.

As part of the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Russia had promised Belarus that it would maintain preferential terms on gas. Disputes persisted nonetheless. Minsk demanded that its prices be brought into line with those charged to Russian regions, but Moscow refused, arguing that the EAEU did not entail unified tariffs. Belarus then ran up a debt of $700 million by refusing to pay the price set by Russia. The dispute ended in a compromise: a cut in the gas price in exchange for Minsk paying off the debt.
The Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, has consistently argued that his country deserves preferential tariffs as a “sister nation” and ally of Russia. He has used its membership of the “Union State” to justify his demands, insisting that the Belarusian economy could not compete on an equal footing with Russia without access to cheap energy.
After the protests in Belarus in 2020, Russia continued to use energy as a means of pressure, propping up Lukashenko’s regime in exchange for further political concessions.
Georgia: gas as an instrument of punishment
After independence in 1991, Georgia remained wholly dependent on Russian gas supplied by Gazprom. This dependence allowed the Kremlin to exert control over the country’s domestic and foreign policy. In the 1990s, Moscow kept prices artificially low, but from the 2000s onwards it sharply raised tariffs and used energy debt as a means of putting pressure on the Georgian government. Moreover, most of the country’s gas infrastructure was under Russian control.
The situation changed after the Rose Revolution in 2003, which brought the pro-Western president Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Georgia then began a shift towards European integration and set about seeking alternative sources of gas supply. In January 2006, two explosions damaged a gas pipeline in Russia, cutting off gas deliveries to Georgia in the depths of winter. Moscow officially blamed the incident on an “attack” carried out by unknown saboteurs, while Tbilisi saw it as a deliberate act of energy blackmail orchestrated by Russia.
At the same time, Russia sharply increased gas prices for Georgia. In 2005, the country paid $63 per 1,000 m³. In 2006, the price rose to $110, then to $235 – higher than the price charged to many European countries. This crisis forced Georgia to speed up the diversification of its energy sources. From 2007, it began importing gas from Azerbaijan via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. In 2009, Gazprom was pushed out of the Georgian market for good. Today, Azerbaijan supplies almost 100% of the gas consumed by Georgia, while Russia plays a marginal role.
Thanks to this strategy, Georgia became the first country in the post-Soviet space to free itself entirely from its dependence on Russian gas. After the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, the situation became even more complicated. Russia occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, bringing the gas pipelines running through those regions under its control. Faced with this threat, Georgia stepped up its energy cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Moscow tried to use Gazprom to regain influence, but to no avail. In 2017, even Gazprom had to concede defeat in Georgia. Since then, the country has stopped buying Russian gas, except in emergencies and in very limited quantities. Its main supplier remains Azerbaijan, which meets more than 90% of its needs. Georgia now plays a key role as a transit country: it enables gas to be carried to Turkey and Europe, thereby strengthening its strategic position in the region.
Russia’s gas wars against Georgia reached their peak in 2006, when Moscow tried to cut off the country’s supply entirely in order to force it into political concessions. However, thanks to its cooperation with Azerbaijan and the West, Georgia managed to break free of its dependence on Russian gas and establish itself as a key energy player in the region.
Moldova’s gas dependence
After the collapse of the USSR, Moldova remained almost entirely dependent on Russian gas. Russia’s political influence held back its attempts to diversify its sources of supply. Moreover, the lack of its own energy resources and the limited scope for diversification owing to weak infrastructure left the country directly dependent on Moscow. All gas deliveries went through “Gazprom” and its Moldovan subsidiary, Moldovagaz.
The breakaway region of Transnistria, in eastern Moldova, has played a particular role in this situation. Russia supplied gas there free of charge, creating a situation in which Chișinău had to bear the financial cost, while Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria) was able to develop its economy on the back of these cheap resources. The region has not paid for its gas for more than 30 years. In 2024, its gas debt exceeds $7–8 billion (according to various estimates). Moscow is demanding that Chișinău repay this sum, even though the gas is consumed by the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), an unrecognised state. Moldova officially maintains that it is not responsible for this debt and refuses to recognise it.

This situation gives the Kremlin a means of exerting pressure: it can manipulate the debt to blackmail Chișinău and demand political concessions. In the autumn of 2021, the gas contract between Moldova and “Gazprom” expired. Moscow immediately seized the opportunity to resort to blackmail, demanding political concessions: suspending European integration, recognising the Transnistrian debt as Moldovan debt and signing a long-term contract on unfavourable terms. Faced with an emergency, Moldova had to accept a new agreement with “Gazprom”, but Russia deliberately cut deliveries, forcing Chișinău to seek support from the European Union. The Moldovan government turned to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), securing emergency financing to buy gas from other suppliers.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the situation deteriorated further. Moscow drastically cut supplies, forcing Moldova to buy expensive gas from the EU. The Kremlin used this energy crisis to destabilise Maia Sandu’s government, while Transnistria continued to receive free gas, thereby keeping its industrial production going.
It was not until the end of 2022 that Chișinău truly began to break its dependence on Russia, buying gas via Romania and on European markets. Alternative infrastructure was developed, enabling gas to be imported from the EU. The Moldovan government also stepped up its investment in renewable energy and strengthened its cooperation with Brussels to modernise its energy system. In 2023, Moldova stopped buying Russian gas altogether for the right bank of the Dniester (the area under Chișinău’s control). Transnistria, for its part, continues to receive gas from “Gazprom”, but this no longer affects the energy security of the rest of the country.
For years, Moscow used gas as a means of exerting pressure on Moldova, threatening it with supply cuts and forcing it to shoulder Transnistria’s debt. However, following the invasion of Ukraine, Chișinău succeeded in significantly reducing its energy dependence on Russia, diversifying its sources and moving closer to energy independence.
The Kremlin’s attempts to use gas as a tool of political blackmail have failed: Moldova received the EU’s support and was able to diversify its supplies. It is a further example of the waning effectiveness of the “energy weapon”.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






