By Abdoulahi Attayoub, consultant
Since its creation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has presented itself as a strategic turning point for the countries of the central Sahel, eager to step out of the shadow of neocolonialism and to assert a sovereignty that has often been proclaimed but rarely realised. Bringing together Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the AES appears to have been born of a shared determination among the juntas in power in these countries to equip themselves with an autonomous framework for action, outside the dictates of the international community.
While some see this initiative as a surge of dignity in the face of an international order deemed unbalanced, others regard it as a reflection of an alliance of convenience, designed chiefly to shield the military regimes in place, in a subregional context marked by diplomatic pressure, notably from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It should be noted here that this political construction has been accompanied by a discourse highly critical of liberal democracy, portrayed as the vehicle of a Western influence regarded as intrusive and predatory.
In this rhetoric, foreign powers and neighbouring countries often appear as external threats, thereby justifying the hardening of power and the centralisation of authority. This ideological shift, which readily draws on the mechanisms of populism, aims as much to consolidate the incumbent authorities as to divert attention from pressing social needs: education, health, justice and national cohesion.
Yet the ambition for a clean break is running up against the limits of its own implementation. The accelerated integration of the three states within the AES rests on political rather than socio-economic considerations, and casts doubt on its real viability. The recent history of ECOWAS, however imperfect, shows that no regional project can free itself from the cultural, linguistic and historical realities specific to each country. Without a robust and inclusive institutional foundation, there is a serious risk that this alliance will wither in the face of internal challenges.
Indeed, the initial promises of sovereignty are colliding with a continuing deterioration in the security situation and with a style of governance sometimes perceived as out of touch with popular expectations. The enthusiasm generated by sovereigntist rhetoric is gradually giving way to a form of disillusionment, as concrete responses to the multiple crises are slow to emerge.
The governance crisis in the Sahel is nothing new. It stems in part from a colonial legacy that post-independence elites were unable or unwilling to shed. The postcolonial state has all too often reproduced, without adapting them, the logics of exclusion, centralisation and domination that prevailed before. Lacking inclusive national projects and unifying collective narratives, Sahelian societies remain fragmented and vulnerable to the exploitation of communal divisions and to identity-based withdrawal.
The National Conferences of the 1990s, which were meant to rebuild the social contract, failed to take root in a genuine process of transformation. Current tensions, whether related to security, communities or language, largely originate in unresolved historical injustices. In Niger, for instance, the controversy over Article 12 of the Charter of Refoundation illustrates the persistent fragility of the national fabric. The debate over the status of national languages highlights a long-standing unease, fuelled by a language policy perceived as discriminatory.
The choice of Hausa, however rational it may appear in demographic terms, cannot dispense with a participatory and calm approach. It would be more appropriate to recognise the country’s linguistic diversity as an asset to be valued rather than an obstacle to be overcome. Keeping French as a working language while supporting the development of national languages could offer a more consensual middle way.
Furthermore, the absence of any explicit reference to the Tifinagh alphabet in the founding texts of the refoundation raises legitimate questions about how inclusive the process truly is. A genuine refoundation cannot ignore the historical cultural identities that make up Nigerien reality.
The process of appointing members of the Consultative Council, marred by disputes, notably over whether the results of local consultations were respected, adds a further layer of concern about the sincerity of the announced refoundation process. Citizen participation cannot be reduced to a formal procedure if it is intended to reconcile the people with their institutions.
It is possible that the current turmoil in the Sahel is, in reality, the necessary prelude to a deeper reassessment. An opportunity, admittedly a fragile one, to revisit the foundations of the Sahelian states and to imagine a political project both rooted in local realities and open to the demands of the contemporary world. To that end, any regional initiative, such as the AES, will necessarily have to be part of a long-term vision that places people, social justice and the recognition of diversity at the heart of the project.
For the central question remains: does the AES simply intend to break with the past, or does it aspire to build a common future capable of withstanding the tests of reality?
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






