A conference organised by the Geneva Geostrategic Observatory, in collaboration with the Cercle canadien francophone d’analyse géostratégique, sheds light on the geopolitical implications of a possible second Trump term. With Sébastien Boussois, General (retired) Gaston Côté and Colonel (retired) Jacques O’Keefe.
The potential re-election of Donald Trump marks a major strategic turning point. Beyond the media furore, several weak signals outline a structured ideological and operational project, rooted in a deliberate break with the foundations of the post-1945 international order.
It was with this in mind that the conference “How far can Donald Trump go?” was organised, on the initiative of the Geneva Geostrategic Observatory, in collaboration with the Cercle canadien francophone d’analyse géostratégique. Moderated by the journalist Alain Jourdan, it brought together the political scientist Sébastien Boussois, retired General Gaston Côté and retired Colonel Jacques O’Keefe, both former officers of the Canadian Armed Forces. A rigorous, transatlantic and cross-disciplinary analysis.
At the heart of the discussions, Project 2025 – a document of more than 800 pages published by the Heritage Foundation – emerges as the doctrinal foundation of a possible new Trump administration. Far from being a mere election manifesto, it is a manual for the complete overhaul of the state apparatus, with multiple objectives: centralising executive power by neutralising bureaucratic checks and balances, replacing senior career civil servants with officials appointed for their loyalty, reorienting public policy towards an openly conservative vision, rearming the American economy through an aggressive protectionist strategy, and breaking with multilateralism in favour of utilitarian bilateral diplomacy.
According to Colonel O’Keefe, the project is “not only conceived, but already being implemented through clear economic, monetary and diplomatic signals”. He points in particular to a strategy of targeted devaluation of the US dollar to boost exports, a bold but plausible hypothesis in the light of historical precedents such as the 1985 Plaza Accord. This monetary approach goes hand in hand with a vision of international trade centred on forced reciprocity, with tariffs used as a strategic as much as a political lever.
The conference stressed that Donald Trump embodies a form of radical realism in which international cooperation is seen as a burden rather than a lever. In Geneva, UN agencies are already feeling the effects of this stance: drastic funding cuts, stalled reforms and an atmosphere of institutional uncertainty. “Trump operates on a transactional logic: whatever does not pay off for America does not deserve to exist,” observes Sébastien Boussois. He adds: “Europe’s real mistake was not to take his return seriously. Yet it was all written down.”
A second Trump term would not merely weaken the transatlantic axis. According to the speakers, it would fundamentally redefine it. General Côté does not hesitate to speak of a “Yalta 2.0”, in which global spheres of influence would be redistributed de facto, with Russia and China benefiting from a Western strategic vacuum. Canada, on the front line of this reconfiguration, is worried. “Our value chains are integrated and our economic sovereignty is in danger. The prospect of a gradual absorption, economic rather than military, is no longer taboo,” the general warns. As for NATO, it could be directly targeted. Trump has repeatedly threatened to pull out of it. Budgetary pressure on member states could serve as a pretext for a partial or even total withdrawal, in the name of refocusing on the Asia-Pacific. A realistic option, according to Colonel O’Keefe, a former NATO officer, in the context of a strategic confrontation with China.
The fault line is said to be not only geopolitical but also ideological and normative. The Trump administration, drawing on Project 2025, intends to take on what it regards as a progressive drift: minority rights, environmentalism, immigration, gender equality, academic freedom. The offensive is cultural, legal and institutional. “Trump acts as a catalyst: he exposes the cracks in our democracies more than he causes them,” Boussois sums up.
The verdict is damning: the Old Continent underestimated the force of Trumpist disruption, believing that a return to “normal” was possible. Yet the Trump phenomenon is not an anomaly but a symptom of a world in upheaval. Since the European Commission only began to plan for this scenario in the summer of 2024, it already seems too late to build a unified response. For the speakers, what is now at stake is Europe’s strategic autonomy – military, industrial and normative – if it wishes to survive this tectonic shock.
The conference “How far can Donald Trump go?” did more than paint a political portrait of the former president. It shed light on the underlying coherence of a project of global reconquest, in which America is no longer content to dominate but intends to impose its own rules. More than ever, Europeans’ ability to respond with a cool head, to anticipate rationally and to reinvent themselves as an autonomous power may well be the only bulwark against what some no longer dare to call the unthinkable.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






