Home / Conflicts / Drones: the new weapon of the poor?

Drones: the new weapon of the poor?

By Anthony TRAD, security analyst and president of STRADEGY Advisory *

In a world where global power relations remain deeply asymmetric, drones are changing the game. Cheap, adaptable and remarkably effective, they now enable long-marginalised actors – state and non-state alike – to challenge – and sometimes even defeat – traditionally superior adversaries.

At once the scouts, messengers and cavalry of modern warfare, drones pierce defences, guide action and confer a tactical advantage. From real-time intelligence to precision strikes, they are redefining access to power and reshaping the tools of deterrence.

By upending traditional hierarchies, drones are transforming warfare and, with it, the very nature of power. Ubiquitous on the battlefield yet absent from treaties, they have become the asymmetric weapon of choice and a major strategic and ethical headache.

Welcome to the era of low-cost warfare.

Does deterrence still cost billions? Not any more, thanks to cheap drones.

The drone is not the weapon of the poor; it is the weapon of those who must do more with less. Striking without declaring war. Deterring without dominating. Threatening without appearing excessive. In a world where stealth fighters, satellites and ballistic missiles remain the preserve of the great powers, these unmanned machines are breaking the monopoly on air superiority. Accessible, effective and precise, they are reshuffling the deck. And at an unbeatable price.

Today, for a few hundred dollars, a modified commercial drone can knock out a tank, disrupt supply lines or target a general hidden miles behind enemy lines. The imbalance no longer lies in firepower, but in the cost of entry. Drones “symmetrise” without equalising: they do not restore the balance, but they give weaker, more agile actors a strategic margin that conventional warfare once denied them.

Turkey grasped this before anyone else. In less than a decade, Ankara has become one of the world’s leading drone exporters thanks to its Bayraktar TB2, now sold to more than 30 countries. At under $5 million apiece – twenty times cheaper than an F-35 – the TB2 offers 24 hours of endurance and proven effectiveness in the field: Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine… and many others. In 2024, Turkish drone exports exceeded $2 billion. Ankara has not merely built a rugged drone nicknamed the “Kalashnikov of the skies”; it has created an entire market and, with it, a strategic model that other middle powers are now trying to replicate.

Drones do not replace traditional armies. They complement them, augment them and redirect them, synchronising strikes and reconnaissance with artillery and infantry. Above all, though, they democratise capabilities once reserved for the powerful: real-time surveillance, precision targeting, reduced human exposure. A state with limited military resources can now slow down, wear out or destabilise a stronger adversary, without a massive army or costly, constraining alliances. Drones have not made war any fairer, nor its conduct any nobler. They have simply changed the list of those who can wage it or resist it.

Are drones redrawing the balance of power between states? More than ever.

Drones have made possible a form of resistance that asymmetry once rendered unthinkable. Confronted with one of the world’s largest military arsenals and denied the direct involvement of NATO troops, Ukraine, heavily dependent on Western funding and lacking heavy equipment, turned to an improvised but deadly doctrine of drone warfare. For less than 1,000 dollars, locally 3D-printed FPV drones have been turned into kamikaze units, fitted with improvised explosive devices and capable of destroying costly T-90 tanks, Pantsir air defence systems and Russian logistics platforms.

By 2024-2025, more than 10,000 Russian vehicles had reportedly been neutralised by drones, which accounted for more than half of Russian battlefield losses. By 2026, Ukraine aims to produce 5 million of these low-cost weapons. Simple to manufacture yet tactically devastating, these drones have enabled a traditionally weaker state to hold firm and resist the world’s second-largest army for three consecutive years.

Azerbaijan had already demonstrated the disruptive power of drones during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. In just 44 days, Baku retook 90% of the disputed territories it had failed to reconquer for three decades, without air superiority and with far fewer losses than Yerevan. The key? A dual drone strategy: Turkish TB2s provided real-time intelligence and coordinated near-instantaneous artillery strikes, while Israeli Harop drones carried out targeted decapitation missions against Armenian tanks and air defence systems.

Taiwan, for its part, is already preparing. Like Kyiv before 2022, the island faces a more powerful and expansionist neighbour: China. Aware that American military support may not be guaranteed for ever, Taipei is investing in a decentralised defence doctrine inspired by recent asymmetric wars. Drones, distributed strike capabilities and saturation tactics are part of a strategy in which every square metre of territory is turned into a zone of attrition – not to win quickly, but to make any invasion slow, costly and strategically untenable.

And for non-state actors: effective or illusory?

Drones are no longer the preserve of states. Their effectiveness on the battlefield, low cost, commercial availability and tactical adaptability have made them the weapon of choice for non-state actors seeking to strike behind enemy lines. But with mixed results.

In Yemen, the Houthis were among the first to strike distant strategic targets using Iranian drones such as the Qasef-1 and the Shahed-136. The emblematic 2019 attack on Aramco’s oil facilities in Saudi Arabia – which temporarily crippled 50% of the kingdom’s oil production – demonstrated the disruptive power of a terrorist group. Since 2023, the Houthis have also been deploying kamikaze drones to target commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea, disrupting up to 15% of global maritime traffic. In 2024, they even struck Tel Aviv, 1,500 kilometres away – a clear demonstration of their destabilising reach.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah has been developing a drone unit since the early 2000s, initially for reconnaissance and later for offensive purposes. Their effectiveness has nonetheless remained limited owing to Israel’s technological superiority in electronic warfare and pre-emptive targeting. Hezbollah’s drones have frequently been intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome. Meanwhile, Israeli forces use killer drones on a daily basis to carry out surgical strikes on Hezbollah commanders and systematically decapitate the group’s chain of command.

Easy war? Miracle weapon? Unbeatable? Not quite.

The lesson is twofold: the drone is indeed an asymmetric weapon, but an imperfect one. It does not guarantee victory. Its effectiveness depends on a clear doctrine, tactical coordination and precise intelligence. Without these, for all its power, it remains vulnerable to jamming, weather conditions and human error.

Its worldwide proliferation is already raising the question of how to respond. Against swarm or stealth attacks, traditional air defence systems are no longer enough. Today’s challenge is not merely to possess drones, but to neutralise them. Israel is developing Iron Beam to complement its Iron Dome. The United States is testing microwave weapons. Russia, for its part, uses electromagnetic jamming to neutralise Ukrainian FPV drones. The irony is glaring: this cheap weapon is now forcing the major powers to devise costly antidotes.

But the real break with the past lies elsewhere. Drones have drastically lowered the cost of going to war. Anyone can now strike without a pilot, without leaving a trace and without an official declaration of war. Conflict becomes more accessible, and therefore more likely. A drone strike can be denied, disowned or drowned out in the media noise.

Artificial intelligence also promises further upheavals. Systems combining facial recognition, thermal imaging and deep learning are already being tested to automate targeting. Strikes carried out without human intervention? On paper, fewer errors. In practice, far less accountability.

What next? Regulate before it is too late

The main challenge ahead is political. Unlike nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, which prompted swift international responses, it is astonishing that no global framework currently exists to regulate the military use of drones. No treaty, no red line, no accountability mechanism for targeting. The decade’s most widespread weapon is also the least regulated. It is not the machine that kills; it is the absence of rules.

It is time to act. The laws of war remain too vague to regulate the technical, strategic and ethical realities of modern drones. As with nuclear and chemical weapons, the world urgently needs an International Drone Regulatory Agency – modelled on the IAEA or the OPCW – to set and enforce global standards. Four key pillars could guide its mandate :

  • Transparency : allow targeted inspections, including the analysis of post-strike imagery, in the event of credible violations of jus in bello ;
  • Accountability: ban fully autonomous lethal strikes; guarantee a “human in the loop”, even where targeting is AI-assisted;
  • Certification: require states to train drone operators in international law and certify them, so as to instil moral responsibility and ethical restraint;
  • Control: restrict drone exports to authoritarian regimes, non-state entities and conflict zones that fail to comply with international standards.

If drones are the warfare of tomorrow, their use must be regulated today, before accessibility turns into chaos.

In short, drones are neither good nor bad. They are powerful. And that power, precisely because it is so accessible, must be carefully considered, restricted and owned.

They are the weapon neither of the poor nor of the rich. They are the weapon of the present. And the means of countering them still belong to the future.

Drones now enable vulnerable states to survive, to strike and sometimes even to win. They mark the dawn of an era of remote, dehumanised and asymmetric warfare. And that may be the real watershed: the great powers no longer set the rules of the game on their own.

If the 20th century was defined by the nuclear and space races, the 21st may well be defined by unmanned and lawless wars.

Except that this time, the competition is no longer the preserve of the superpowers. The weapon is already in the hands of those who refuse to abide by the rules of war.

*Original article in English published at https://europolitik.org/

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

La Tribune des Nations dans votre boîte mail

Les dernières analyses de nos universitaires et journalistes sur la Genève internationale, la diplomatie et les conflits.

Gratuit. Désabonnement en un clic. Voir notre politique de confidentialité.

La Tribune des Nations

La Tribune des Nations dans votre boîte mail

Les dernières analyses de nos universitaires et journalistes sur la Genève internationale, la diplomatie et les conflits.

Gratuit. Désabonnement en un clic. Voir notre politique de confidentialité.