The 63rd session of the Human Rights Council opens amid deep uncertainty. US withdrawal, tactical rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, the United Nations’ financial crisis and the arrival of artificial intelligence in the standard-setting arena: for a month, Geneva will try to preserve common rules in a world that now seems intent on breaking free of them.
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The Human Rights Council will open its 63rd regular session in Geneva on 7 September. Until 7 October, representatives of its 47 member states will examine more than 80 reports covering some forty countries and hold around 35 interactive dialogues. The last three days will be devoted to adopting the resolutions and decisions negotiated during the session. (UN GENEVA)
This succession of reports, dialogues and votes might give the impression of an unchanging diplomatic machine. Yet behind the institutional ritual, the Council is approaching one of the most political sessions in its recent history.
For the real issue will not simply be the list of crises under review — Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Russia, Venezuela, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Myanmar and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It will also be the ability of the multilateral system to keep producing common rules at a time when several major powers are openly challenging its authority.
The American disquiet
The main unknown lies in Washington.
Since February 2025, the United States has officially ceased to take part in the work of the Human Rights Council and has abolished the diplomatic posts specifically dedicated to that body. The Trump administration has also decided to stop funding the share of the United Nations regular budget that corresponds to the Council’s activities. (The White House)
The American withdrawal is not merely an empty chair. It calls into question the very idea of universality on which the Geneva system rests.
Washington has thus refused to take part in its Universal Periodic Review, a mechanism to which all states had until now been expected to submit their human rights record at regular intervals. Should this position be maintained until the end of the fourth cycle, the United States would become the first country to opt out of the exercise entirely since its creation in 2008. (Cambridge Core)
The precedent is a significant one. Once the world’s leading power considers that it can pick and choose which mechanisms it is prepared to submit to, other governments may be tempted to claim the same freedom. The Council would then risk shifting from a universal system, admittedly imperfect, to a forum of voluntary engagement in which each country would abide by the rules only when they serve its interests.
This American policy goes hand in hand with an essentially transactional view of multilateralism. International institutions are no longer judged primarily on their capacity to uphold collective norms, but on their immediate usefulness to American interests.
Washington and Moscow: convergences that upend the old landmarks
Compounding this absence is an even more destabilising development: the emergence of occasional convergences between the United States and Russia in certain international forums.
This is not a structured alliance. Washington and Moscow remain deeply at odds on many issues. But their tactical rapprochement in certain deliberations is enough to disorient the United States’ traditional partners and to shift the balance of power.
The shift became visible in February 2025, when the United States voted with Russia against a General Assembly resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine. At the Security Council, Washington had meanwhile secured the adoption of a text calling for a swift end to the war without naming Russia as the aggressor. Moscow had welcomed this change in the American position. (reuters.com)
A year later, in a fresh General Assembly vote on Ukraine, the United States abstained on a text reaffirming the country’s internationally recognised borders, while Russia voted against. (reuters.com)
The two powers also found common ground in opposing the renewal of Volker Türk’s mandate as head of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In July, the General Assembly nonetheless reappointed the Austrian for four years by 144 votes to 10, despite objections from the United States, Russia and Israel. (reuters.com)
These convergences do not mean that Washington and Moscow share the same world view. Rather, they reflect a shared mistrust of international mechanisms capable of limiting the sovereignty of the major powers, scrutinising their practices or imposing on them a binding interpretation of international law.
It is this shift that is now upending diplomatic reference points. Traditional coalitions are becoming less stable. Europeans can no longer take American support for granted. States of the Global South have new room for manoeuvre in negotiations. And texts dealing with the most sensitive violations may now give rise to unexpected alignments.
Volker Türk takes on the major powers
Volker Türk’s address, expected at the very opening of the session, will therefore be watched particularly closely.
His reappointment gives him a new freedom. He no longer has to tread carefully around the states on which the renewal of his mandate depended. But that independence will immediately be put to the test by a mounting series of crises and by the hostility of several major powers towards him.
His authority will depend on his ability to apply the same principles to all: to Russia in Ukraine, to Israel in the Palestinian territories, to the United States on migration policy, but also to China, where the situation in Xinjiang continues to haunt the credibility of the Office of the High Commissioner.
The Council will consider, among others, the situations in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The report on the latter will be the subject of an enhanced interactive dialogue on 2 October. (UN GENEVA)
The difficulty no longer lies solely in establishing the facts. It lies in whether a common reading of the law can be maintained when the most powerful states seek to impose their own hierarchies among violations.
Artificial intelligence moves to the heart of the Council
This session will also be marked by the arrival of artificial intelligence in the field of human rights.
A group of states including Bangladesh, Egypt and Nepal has announced that it will table a draft resolution entitled “Implications of artificial intelligence for the promotion and protection of human rights”. Its stated aim is to recognise the potential of AI for development and for the exercise of fundamental rights, while regulating its risks on the basis of existing international law. (transcripts.un.org)
The stakes, however, go beyond this single resolution. Artificial intelligence is expected to feature in several texts dealing with freedom of expression, the protection of privacy, discrimination, women’s rights, the documentation of violations and transitional justice.
At the previous session, the Office of the High Commissioner had already been asked to prepare a study on emerging threats to freedom of opinion and expression, including those arising from the misuse of digital technologies and artificial intelligence. (The United Nations Office at Geneva)
The question facing Geneva is now a very practical one: how can existing standards on accountability, non-discrimination, transparency and remedy be applied to algorithmic systems?
In conflict settings, another concern is growing: the authentication of images, the preservation of digital evidence and the detection of synthetic content. Artificial intelligence can help to document crimes, but it can also falsify traces, weaken chains of evidence and leave victims and witnesses more exposed.
The Council could thus become one of the forums in which an international human rights doctrine applied to AI gradually takes shape. This development will take on particular importance in the run-up to the global summit on artificial intelligence scheduled to take place in Geneva in June 2027.
A financially weakened institution
This normative ambition, however, runs up against a more prosaic reality: the United Nations is short of money.
Late payments and defaults by member states have plunged the organisation into an acute liquidity crisis. The United States and China, which together account for nearly half of all assessed contributions, are among the main states accused of failing to pay the sums they owe on time. (Human Rights Watch)
At the end of August, Washington was considering a payment of $725 million, far below the roughly $5 billion that the UN estimates it is owed. The situation has already led to budget cuts and is fuelling a sweeping restructuring of the UN system. (reuters.com)
In Geneva, the consequences are plain to see: job cuts, scaled-back activities, the relocation of administrative functions and a diminished capacity for institutions to carry out investigations on the ground. The paradox is a cruel one. Violations are rising, crises are multiplying and technologies are creating new risks, yet the resources available to document them and respond to them are shrinking.
Geneva: the last workshop of compromise?
It is against this backdrop that the September session takes on its full significance.
Geneva will prevent neither power struggles nor the return of power politics. But it remains one of the few places where adversaries still talk to one another, where the states of the Global South can influence the drafting of norms and where civil society organisations can still bring facts and expertise to the negotiating table.
The Human Rights Council is neither a court nor a world government. Its resolutions are often non-binding and its debates vulnerable to double standards. But weakening it would not produce a fairer system. It would simply leave more room for the powers able to impose their own definition of the law unilaterally.
The 63rd session will therefore reveal far more than the state of human rights in several dozen countries. It will show whether multilateralism still has the capacity to set common benchmarks — or whether it is becoming the powerless stage of a world in which the rules apply only to those willing to abide by them.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






