Diplomacy: “With Macron, it is more the illusion of action than action itself”
Le déclassement français, co-written by Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot (1), takes us behind the scenes of French foreign policy through a detailed account of what he has witnessed over the past five years.
Fild: Why choose the term “downgrading” rather than “decline”?
Georges Malbrunot: Because you can always climb back up a ranking, and nothing is lost for good. It is important to understand that it stems from France’s economic weakening. When you have fewer resources to provide aid or invest, you carry less weight than neighbouring countries such as Germany. Today, French diplomacy is in retreat. We saw this clearly in the Australian submarine affair, in Mali and in Lebanon.
Fild: At what point did France’s voice begin to carry less weight?
Georges Malbrunot: At the end of Jacques Chirac’s second term, around 2005-2006. After France’s “no” to the American intervention in Iraq in 2003, he was obsessed with the idea of the international community splintering. He did everything he could to reconcile with the United States. But in doing so, he caused France to lose its distinctiveness. After him, Nicolas Sarkozy and then François Hollande confirmed this return to an openly embraced Atlanticism. Today, in the Middle East and the Maghreb, France is no longer viewed in the same way. In many regions, if we come across as a pale copy of the United States, we are of no interest. In the past, our independence allowed us to act as mediators. Regaining that position requires a return to the roots of Gaullism.
Fild: What has done the most damage to France’s image?
Georges Malbrunot: The lack of clarity and the zigzags in its diplomacy. Before 2011, France backed dictators, including Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad. When the Arab Spring uprisings began, it rushed to drop them. To make people forget its closeness to contested leaders, it decided that it needed to change its position radically. But in the end, this about-turn and the support it gave to the wave of revolutions created confusion and hastened its decline.
Fild: You explain that when he took office, Emmanuel Macron wanted to restore France’s standing in the region. Why did he not succeed?
Georges Malbrunot: From the moment he arrived at the Élysée in 2017, Emmanuel Macron worked very hard, on European affairs as much as on Iran, Algeria and Lebanon. He showed great determination, but the results were rather meagre. As a rule, he makes the right diagnosis. He grasps complex international issues quickly and has a strategic, pragmatic vision. But his method sometimes leaves something to be desired. It is more the illusion of action than action itself. In Lebanon, he wanted to shake up the chessboard and impose an agenda. He failed because he plays too much as a soloist and not enough as part of a team. Today, France is a middle power that can act only in concert and in cooperation with other countries.
Fild: Does Emmanuel Macron’s foreign policy boil down to media stunts?
Georges Malbrunot: When he travelled to Israel in January 2020, he asked his ambassador what he could do to make an impression. He was told that a visit to the Western Wall would make headlines, as no French president had ever been there. Afterwards, he rebuked the Israeli security forces accompanying him near the Church of St Anne. Everyone remembers Jacques Chirac’s outburst during his visit to Jerusalem in 1996; it seemed spontaneous. Emmanuel Macron fooled no one. This hunt for media coups goes back to Nicolas Sarkozy. Foreign policy is seen as a mere lever for improving one’s standing in the polls. It was not the same in the days of General de Gaulle, or even of Jacques Chirac. Back then, there was depth, a strategic vision and patience too. Emmanuel Macron acts in haste to get quick results. In the Middle East in particular, things take time.
Fild: What did he lack?
Georges Malbrunot: Emmanuel Macron is cordial but not necessarily warm, and his somewhat brusque methods have backfired on him. I have always been impressed by his ability to understand problems, but he would do well to listen more to his advisers to avoid falling into traps. He sees himself as disruptive and relies on his determination and his capacity for work to resolve problems. But that is not enough, as when he finds himself facing seasoned political old hands, as in Algeria or Lebanon.
Fild: In September 2020, Emmanuel Macron confronted you in public. How did you take that outburst?
Georges Malbrunot : At the time, you are a little thrown. He is the President of the Republic, after all. What’s more, until then my relations with him had been rather good. I was confident in my work. There was no error in what I had written. I think he wanted to please the Lebanese leaders who had complained about my article, which described the mechanisms of the corruption that Emmanuel Macron himself has denounced. He clearly felt that I was getting in the way of what he was doing, and so he flew into a rage. He is a fairly authoritarian president, including in his dealings with the press. He finds it hard to tolerate dissent. I told his entourage that I was not the spokesman for the Élysée and that his reaction was unacceptable.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






