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Iran choosing dialogue with the West over war? A credible scenario

Despite its influence over armed groups in the region, Iran appears to be taking a cautious approach to the escalating tensions since Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.

It will be recalled that Tehran had not been consulted by Hamas before the launch of the terrorist operation against Israel on 7 October 2023. Clearly, the Iranian regime also seems somewhat overtaken by the conflagration in southern Lebanon and by Hezbollah’s “resistance” to Netanyahu’s relentless war to defeat the Islamist organisation. Two of the Islamic Republic’s many “proxies” in the region appear to be in difficulty at a time when the regime led by Masoud Pezeshkian since 28 July could opt for dialogue rather than war. A victory for Donald Trump in the forthcoming US presidential election would sound the death knell for any hope on the part of Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution since 1989, of playing for time and rejoining the concert of nations.

According to many current experts, the more “moderate” Iranians are said to be pushing for a resumption of nuclear talks, even as Israeli bombs continue to rain down on southern Lebanon and Hezbollah rockets continue to fall on northern Israel. The Iranian regime remains in the grip of the “hardliners”, but it must be acknowledged that since 7 October 2023 Tehran has shown considerable restraint, despite the blows and humiliations it has suffered. Beyond its somewhat improved relations with Saudi Arabia, this could mean that the Iranian regime wants to secure better economic conditions – which does not rule out maintaining the more or less long-term goal of having the guarantee of a nuclear weapon.

“According to many current experts, the more ‘moderate’ Iranians are said to be pushing for a resumption of nuclear talks, even as Israeli bombs continue to rain down on southern Lebanon and Hezbollah rockets continue to fall on northern Israel.”

Iran, an old, strategic and sophisticated empire

The “Khomeinists” inherited this, even amid the revolution and the mafia-like theocracy. There is no denying that Tehran thinks in geostrategic terms and about preserving its role as a regional power: that famous “balancing power”, necessary and indispensable, as Jacques Chirac rightly said of Tehran. In Western eyes, it is a disruptive power for as long as it feels the West is denying it the role it considers its own, namely that of a fundamental power, should it normalise its relations. In Chirac’s day, the European Union conducted a “critical dialogue” with Iran, which it unfortunately abandoned under pressure from the administration of George W. Bush: one more act of submission, one more error, one more blunder.

There is no doubt that Iran’s strategic goal is a nuclear weapon. Everyone knows that it is the ultimate life insurance, not only for regimes but for states too. That is all the more true now that, after the American wars, Putin’s war and his blackmail under a nuclear umbrella make having the bomb even more indispensable. Clearly, Saudi Arabia will surely set about acquiring it too. In Iran, a deeply nationalist country, the civil and military nuclear programme commands a consensus.

Former Prime Minister Mousavi, leader of the “Green Wave” of protests, is the father of Iran’s nuclear programme: the opposition and the mullahs agree that the national interest is sacrosanct. But the regime knows that the economic situation must be turned around and that it will not be able to control for ever a society of almost 90 million people who are so young, that is to say a population more than 80% of which was born after Khomeini’s death. That is why Ali Khamenei has authorised the new President, Pezeshkian, to renegotiate with the West, which is what is currently happening at the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

Between nuclear ambitions and economic crisis

The bomb is a vast debate that can veer into culturalism, but that only makes it all the more understandable. Nuclear deterrence has changed, and religious nuclear power must now be considered in relation to the other “bombs” on the planet: the extremist Christian bomb among American evangelicals, the Islamist bomb among Pakistani Sunnis, the messianic Zionist bomb among ultra-Orthodox Jews. So, to preserve the fundamentals of MAD (“Mutual Assured Destruction”, as theorised by McNamara and General Lucien Poirier), some would consider it normal for the Iranian world to want a Shia bomb. This may seem even truer today, now that Israel is in the hands of an apocalyptic far-right movement and the US increasingly is too. André Malraux was right, but too early: it is indeed the 21st century that has become ultra-religious, not the 20th.

All this would hold up in Iran if one could be certain of the real weight of the famous “moderates”. The unknown quantity in Iran is the mafias of the Pasdaran and the Basij, which appear to have eroded, if not obliterated, the absolute power (now merely a façade?) of the Supreme Leader. The state mafias have an interest in international sanctions, because the trafficking used to circumvent them strengthens their control over the country’s wealth and its people. A country under sanctions is a country in the grip of the authorities, who end up with a monopoly on trade and financial flows. During the ten years of US sanctions on Iraq, which killed more than 500,000 children through famine and lack of medical care, Saddam Hussein’s family had 54 more palaces built for themselves on top of those already at their disposal…

“André Malraux was right, but too early: it is indeed the 21st century that has become ultra-religious, not the 20th.”

So does the Iranian government that wants to negotiate actually hold power? At bottom, Iran’s fundamental interest is to negotiate an economic upturn with the West and to obtain nuclear assurance, while playing a key role as a regional power that is either harmful or constructive depending on how it is treated. That is why Tehran supports Hezbollah without really supporting it, and has never pushed for the widening of the conflict so feared for months, something to which Benjamin Netanyahu, for his part, is sparing no effort.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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