“The properties of semiconductors lie at the root of all modern electronics” (Pierre Gille de Genne).
In an increasingly digital and connected world, semiconductors play a crucial role in the making of electronic components. We use tens of thousands of them every day, even millions, without even realising it. During the Covid pandemic, an unprecedented shortage hit many sectors around the world and made us realise just how important they were. These materials act as both insulator and conductor and today form the basis of every electronic component in space, medical, military and telecommunications devices. They allow us to get to work more quickly, to communicate with our loved ones, to read this article online or to intercept an intercontinental missile. At the heart of this industry lies Taiwan, which has emerged as a major player in the manufacture and innovation of these components, to the detriment of its Chinese neighbour. With the Indo-Pacific gripped by sharp geopolitical tensions in recent years, Taiwan’s dominance of the semiconductor market is helping to exacerbate them.
But how did this material become so precious to our digitised societies? Although work on the conductivity of metals was already under way in the 18th century, the major theoretical and practical advances came between the 1930s and the 1950s, when the semiconductor industry was born. These discoveries brought exceptional gains in size, weight, energy consumption, durability, efficiency and ease of production, replacing the vacuum tubes used until then. Put briefly, semiconductors are materials with a dual electrical conductivity that sits between conductors (such as metals) and insulators (such as glass). Made mostly of silicon, they allow precise control of electric current, which is essential for building complex circuits (processors, integrated circuits and so on). They make it possible to miniaturise electronic components, increasing circuit density and improving the energy efficiency of devices. These properties explain why the major powers aspire to self-sufficiency in the research and development of such materials, which they place at the heart of all their electronic ambitions.
Taiwan occupies a strategic position at the heart of the three links in the semiconductor manufacturing chain (chip foundries, advanced integrated-circuit design and component packaging). It is in the first of these that it dominates, with 58% of the global semiconductor foundry market held by TSMC (followed by South Korea’s Samsung, which has a 15% market share). This success is the result of a policy geared towards exporting high value-added products, notably semiconductors, launched as early as the 1970s by the then Minister of Economic Affairs, Sun Yun-suan. As Taiwan is a small country, the strategy it adopted is similar to that of Switzerland, which, given the size of its domestic market and its access to raw materials, chose to focus on exporting processed goods with high added value. The strategy has been a genuine success: in 2022, Taiwan generated 66% of the revenue from global production of these microchips (56% of it from TSMC alone). From a geostrategic standpoint, this dominance is helping to rekindle tensions in the region that were already considerable.
China, which harbours ambitions towards its island neighbour, is investing massively in the sector so as to no longer be dependent on it. Indeed, one of the reasons currently preventing China from attacking or invading Taiwan is the risk of halting the production of and trade in semiconductors, which would paralyse the global economy and endanger our digitised societies, including its own. A first large-scale shortage during the Covid pandemic revealed the impact these components have on our daily lives. As demand for household appliances rose sharply with the spread of remote working, Taiwanese foundries and the entire manufacturing chain were severely affected during that period. Alongside the rivalry between China and Taiwan, the United States, China’s biggest economic rival, has imposed sanctions on it, prohibiting US companies (Applied Materials, Lam Research and KLA) from exporting the machines used in the etching process (sanctions followed by the Netherlands and Japan, which are among the largest players in the market). Joe Biden signed the “CHIPS Act” at the beginning of the year, aimed at reviving the semiconductor industry in the United States and providing around 40 billion dollars in subsidies for production and research in the field. The Chinese response was swift: the government plans to invest the equivalent of 40 billion euros to boost its production, so as to no longer depend on its competitors and to meet the demand of its own domestic market, which accounts for a quarter of final global demand for chips. It is important to recognise that the Western production apparatus is doing everything it can to isolate China so that it does not become independent, and so that the West can continue to benefit from the size of its market and its growing demand.
Aware of the strategic stakes, the European Union is also adopting a new investment plan in the sector, injecting more than €100 billion into European territory. Some 70 factory projects in 19 countries have been announced in recent months, including TSMC’s first plant in Germany. The European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, justifies the initiative by the need to create a competitive and lasting European infrastructure that would help reduce Europe’s dependence on other global players. Ultimately, the exponential digitalisation of our daily lives will continue to heighten the importance of these materials, placing them at the heart of the major powers’ current geostrategic considerations.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






