Home / Conflicts / The state of the French and European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB)

The state of the French and European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB)

The DTIB refers to all of a country’s industries that take part in defence activities; it is also known as the “defence industry”. Although it is generally associated with companies specialising solely in armaments, such as Rheinmetall in Germany or MBDA and Naval group in France, many companies that supply the armed forces are in fact dual-use and have a civilian role alongside, such as Airbus or Safran. While a question about the boundaries of the DTIB seems entirely pertinent, we will address here the subject of the European DTIB, and particularly the Franco-German relationship in this respect, in light of recent events. 

It is an essential sector for France, which ranks as the world’s third-largest exporter of defence equipment thanks to its 9 groups and 4,000 SMEs, accounting for around 200,000 jobs and €30 billion in turnover. Like the justice system, this industrial base is very much a sovereign domain, in which few states pool their industrial projects so as not to compromise their national security. Sharing information, technological and human capital or, more broadly, knowledge is a major issue for a sector in which the life of every citizen is at stake. At the same time, France reportedly has enough equipment and industry on its territory to produce, almost autonomously, the materiel enabling it to fulfil the six defence functions set out in the 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security (deterrence, prevention, protection, intervention, influence and anticipation).

However, while France advocates this model of a full-spectrum, sovereign armed force, new threats (nuclear proliferation, high-intensity warfare, the polarisation of international relations, etc.) and the rising unit cost of the equipment needed to counter them are pushing some European Union member states to support a more cooperative, intergovernmental DTIB (defence technological and industrial base), with joint funding, projects and procurement. This initiative forms part of a strategy to develop European sovereignty (or, depending on one’s view, to develop national sovereignty with the EU as a tool). The Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) represents an undeniable step forward for European cooperation, having notably managed programmes such as the A400M Atlas (bringing together Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Turkey). Other projects, such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the  Main Ground Combat System  (MGCS) battle tank, are contributing to the development of the European defence industrial landscape. This development necessarily involves seeking industrial synergies, a decision that is highly politicised given the stakes. Airbus Group and MBDA are two examples of successful mergers on a European scale: although they operate in particularly sensitive areas, these mergers were achieved by launching joint projects. It is therefore reasonable to think that the “ Europe of defence ” plan, championed mainly by France, necessarily requires joint work to be carried out. 

Sharing defence industry know-how is no easy matter. Strategic, military and economic interests differ from one state to another, given the financial and social impact of these industries, which drives each country to protect its own interests as best it can.

Recent news has been marked by a fresh wave of doubts over the MGCS project mentioned earlier. Intended to deliver by 2035 a Franco-German main battle tank to succeed France’s Leclerc and Germany’s Leopard 2, the project is in serious difficulty after Berlin signed agreements with Italy, Spain and Sweden for a new version of the Leopard 2 alone, leaving France and the company Nexter on the sidelines. The disagreement essentially concerns expectations about the tank’s design, with Paris wanting a light, mobile tank and Berlin preferring a heavy one. And while last July the German and French ministers Boris Pistorius and Sébastien Lecornu described the project in optimistic terms, “Frank and decisive discussions with Boris Pistorius on the battle tank of the future: we want to do it together” (a tweet from the Minister for the Armed Forces), the latest statement from the Vice-Chancellor and Economy Minister Robert Habeck points the other way: “we do not agree on anything”. Other critical moments in European defence-industry cooperation include Germany’s purchase of 35 American F-35 aircraft rather than betting on French Rafales, and Poland, which has recently been “buying off the shelf” from Korea and the United States. France, too, has walked away from European defence projects in the past, such as the Eurofighter, which was supposed to be capable of carrying a nuclear missile – a needless cost for the other European powers but essential for France. A project as ambitious as an inter-state defence industrial and technological base is bound to be strewn with obstacles and setbacks. Current international tensions seem to be prompting European states to form more and more partnerships; one need only look back a few decades to see the efforts made at European level to that end. The latest images of the FAMOUS project published by Nexter contribute greatly to this effort, showcasing a project that brings together ten European countries and 19 companies to develop armoured vehicles and new-technology communication systems, essential to the interoperability of our armed forces. Ultimately, the major challenge lies in Franco-German rivalry. These two countries, Europe’s largest defence manufacturers, know that the project is feasible, legitimate and profitable, but each wants to preserve its leading position while making as few concessions as possible.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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