The time bomb that has been hanging over the Middle East for several weeks increasingly resembles a threat that never materialises. Indeed, the death of Ismail Haniyeh two weeks ago has still not been avenged by Iran, even though its domestic security services were very much caught out in a display of weakness. Perhaps Iran is no longer quite ready to put itself at risk for one of its “proxies”, especially at a major turning point in American history. Nor is it as powerful as its enemies. What is the connection ? The Supreme Leader knows that in November, a return of Donald Trump to power would do his cause no good at all. An unconditional ally of Israel, which he has encouraged to go all the way in Gaza, and the chief architect of the break with the JCPOA agreement signed by Obama in 2015, Trump would be far less accommodating than the Democrats towards the regime in Tehran.
Destabilising the region still further, by dragging the Democratic administration into a quagmire from which it is highly doubtful it would emerge before the elections, would therefore play into the hands of Iran’s sworn enemy. That is how, in recent days, despite a complicated domestic situation with a new President already criticised for having substantially scaled back his campaign promises, Iran has inserted itself at the heart of the negotiations on the ceasefire in Gaza that everyone has been awaiting for months like the Messiah. Tehran is quite evidently seeking to “save face” by negotiating the idea of not striking Israel too hard in retaliation for Haniyeh’s death (and, in a sense, for form’s sake). A regional conflagration would weaken the US Democrats, who have the wind in their sails and whose continued hold on Washington, through the election of Kamala Harris, the Tehran regime privately prefers. Provoking chaos would also, at this juncture, torpedo the new agenda of “cautious” overtures currently being pursued by the European Union and the United States. But a genuine breakthrough on the Palestinian issue will then be needed for the Iranian regime to agree to “calibrate” any retaliation.
This is probably the first time that Iran has sought to bring its full diplomatic weight to bear on the Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese issue, rather than relying solely on its traditional capacity to cause trouble. If American and European diplomats are clear-sighted, they would do well, given the strategic sophistication of the Mullahs, to seize this “momentum” and thereby encourage a favourable shift in the Iranian leadership, benefiting first and foremost the Iranian people themselves, but also the Arab states of the Gulf, the Mashriq, Europe and America, across a broad range of issues, including, of course, the nuclear file.
The regime knows that society is permanently on the brink of implosion, and that improved relations with the West, accompanied by agreements in return for which sanctions would be gradually lifted, is today the best way to buy a measure of social peace, short of repression, through the hope of an economic recovery. Ninety per cent of today’s Iranians were born after the death of Khomeini, the grand ayatollah of the Islamic Revolution. This is a unique opportunity, before a possible return of Trump that would doom these historic advances, for the mullahs, the Pasdaran and the Basij alike to shed their fossilised ways and finally give some ground. In the name of a transhistorical Iran that has always been a major pivot of the region, but also a bubble of modernity and civilisation. That was before 1979, of course…
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of La Tribune des Nations.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






