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Dismissals in China: a means of preserving power

In partnership with Chine Magazine

For decades, dismissals have served to preserve China’s party-state, because “the durability of the system depends on unity at the top”. Indeed, dismissals are a central political instrument in the management of power, particularly within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the state. Far more than mere administrative decisions, they are intended to control, discipline and consolidate the authority of the leadership. Understanding the reasons behind these dismissals, the figures concerned and their impact sheds light on the inner workings of a political system in which stability rests as much on loyalty as on performance.

In the Chinese system, Party and state cadres are subject to constant evaluation. Officially, dismissals come in response to serious misconduct, corruption scandals or failures in local governance. However, these decisions also serve as a reminder that the central authorities hold ultimate power and that any deviation, whether ideological or administrative, can be swiftly punished.

The anti-corruption campaign launched in November 2012 is a clear illustration of this dynamic. Presented as an effort to clean up public life, it has led to the removal of numerous officials, some of them very highly placed. While the campaign addresses a genuine corruption problem, it also functions as a tool for consolidating the power of the President of the People’s Republic of China and General Secretary of the CCP. By eliminating influential figures, the campaign reduces the risk of internal factions and strengthens cohesion around the central leadership, and above all around Xi Jinping. 

Dismissals also serve as a preventive tool, as they create a climate of uncertainty that compels officials to show unwavering loyalty. In such a context, cadres are encouraged to align their actions with the priorities of the central government, often at the expense of individual initiative. This constant pressure fosters disciplined governance, but it can also stifle innovation and bold decision-making, as reflected in recent years, for example, in the excessive indebtedness of the provinces, which now find themselves in a difficult position. 

Another important aspect lies in the management of public opinion. When a crisis breaks out – whether a natural or industrial disaster, a mishandled public health situation or a local scandal – dismissing officials makes it possible to show that action is being taken. This helps to channel popular discontent by identifying culprits and preventing criticism from being directed at the highest echelons of power. Dismissal thus becomes as much a tool of political communication as an administrative act.

Moreover, these practices are part of a much older political tradition. The history of imperial China already shows the use of sanctions and removals from office to maintain order and assert central authority. The current system, though modernised, retains some of these features, notably the idea that stability rests on a strict hierarchy and on the individual accountability of officials to the central government. 

Under Mao Zedong, dismissals allowed him to retain his grip on power within the CCP, and within the government too, at a time when he was no longer President of the People’s Republic of China and was seeing both his power and his ideological vision for the country weaken. This strategy is not without its limits, however. Excessive use of dismissals can breed a climate of fear and mistrust within the administrative apparatus. Officials, fearing sanctions, may become reluctant to take the initiative or to report problems, which can undermine the overall effectiveness of the system. Moreover, if dismissals are seen as arbitrary or driven by political rivalries, they risk weakening the legitimacy of those in power. 

The Mao era of purges and dismissals 

From 1949 until his death in 1976, Mao Zedong carried out numerous political purges and dismissals in order to eliminate rivals or tighten his control over the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army. Among the best-known cases is that of Marshal Peng Dehuai, a former defence minister, who was dismissed and publicly denounced at the Lushan Conference in 1959 for having criticised the Great Leap Forward policy (1958 to 1960). Mao then launched the movement against “right opportunists”, aimed at ousting liberal activists from the CCP and its affiliated movements. This anti-rightist campaign enabled Mao to condemn him, bringing about his political disgrace. 

Next came Liu Shaoqi, President of the People’s Republic of China (28 April 1959 – 31 October 1968), and a majority of CCP cadres, who refused to support Mao. Mao then launched the Socialist Education Movement in 1962-1965, intended to revive the revolutionary movement and to purge “those in positions of leadership who have taken the capitalist road”, according to Yves Viltard. Mao pressed on with his purge through the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which would brand Liu Shaoqi an “enemy of the revolution”. He was accused of “revisionism” and of following a “bourgeois line”. He was imprisoned and died on 12 November 1969 as a result of mistreatment in Kaifeng prison.

An exceptional strategist and tactician, Lin Biao, long the heir apparent and Vice-Chairman of the CCP, vanished from the political stage in the first weeks of autumn 1971. First a ghost, he then became a traitor to the nation, until the day when Premier Zhou Enlai, addressing the 10th Congress of the CCP in August 1973, revealed that Lin Biao had allegedly sought to kill Chairman Mao. Zhou Enlai announced that he had died on board an aircraft on 13 September 1971 at Öndörkhaan, in Mongolia. He was apparently heading for Russia. The Lin Biao Affair remains an enigma to this day, so unclear are the reasons for his downfall and so mysterious his death. 

Finally, the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 triggered a power struggle. Hua Guofeng, a fervent Maoist, prevailed and became Chairman of the CCP from 7 October 1976 to 28 June 1981. He ended the influence of the far left within the CCP and had Chiang-Ching, Chang Chung-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hong-wen (the Gang of Four), who opposed him, arrested. 

They were accused of being directly responsible for the persecution of “729,511 people” and the deaths of 34,800 of them during the Cultural Revolution, and then of “conspiring to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally of conspiring against Mao Zedong”. Their trial, along with that of a handful of other, lesser-known defendants, took place in late 1980 and ended on 25 January 1981. The verdicts were harsh: long prison terms and two death sentences, for Chiang-Ching and Chang Chung-chiao, which were eventually commuted to prison sentences.

These purges brought an end to the political and institutional chaos that the Cultural Revolution had fuelled. The authorities now present the Cultural Revolution as a “catastrophe” for which the Gang of Four bears the main responsibility, allowing the blame to be placed on a few individuals rather than on Mao himself. Above all, the trial strengthened the legitimacy of the new leadership without completely destabilising the Party, made a break with the most radical Maoist orthodoxy, and prepared the transition towards a China more oriented towards the market economy while preserving the Communist Party’s political monopoly. 

These political purges reveal Mao’s determination to hold on to power, eliminate rivals within the CCP, impose absolute loyalty and reassert his personal dominance after political failures such as the Great Leap Forward. However, the trial of the Gang of Four, in October, marked the end of radical Maoism and the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, who would launch the Four Modernisations, economic reforms that Mao had regarded as capitalist. 

Ideologically, the purge enabled the government to prioritise Deng Xiaoping’s “Boluan Fanzheng” programme, which dismantled Maoist policies and condemned the Cultural Revolution as “the most severe setback” suffered by the country since 1949. It laid the foundations of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and steered the CCP towards the “Theory of the Three Represents” under Jiang Zemin, as it became the party of the whole nation, entrepreneurs included. 

Beyond the CCP cadres who opposed his political and ideological vision, Mao Zedong encouraged campaigns of criticism and “re-education” during the Cultural Revolution, which led to large numbers of local cadres, factory managers, teachers and intellectuals being sent down to the countryside or subjected to “reform through labour”. This period forced Zhou Enlai to place China’s space programme under the protection of the army, in order to preserve the progress already made and, in particular, to avoid excesses that would have cost the programme dearly. 

At the same time, Mao encouraged the Red Guards, drawn from urban school and university youth. They formed a mass paramilitary social movement, led by students and operating with complete autonomy. They were free to act as they saw fit in the struggle against “revisionists” and “bourgeois” cadres. 

Amid violence and barbaric acts, they ran amok, prompting Mao to disown and sideline them. The Red Guards had been Mao’s political and ideological instruments, but they gradually became “troublemakers” who had to be re-educated in rural areas. The government thus sought to break up the structures of political mobilisation built around them, cut them off from the cities and subject them to manual labour. The main local and regional leaders of the Red Guards were arrested and then paraded before hostile crowds. Some were caught up in campaigns to “cleanse the class ranks”, which resulted in purges and a great many deaths across China. 

The Red Guards had profound political consequences in China. The violence paralysed the CCP, the state and local institutions, with torture chambers set up in cinemas and a Red Terror that killed hundreds of thousands of people. It shattered the Party elites – from Party cadres to intellectuals – fuelled internal factional struggles and isolated China internationally, drawing criticism from other communists. After the Red Guards were disbanded in 1968, post-Mao China became more pragmatic under Deng Xiaoping. The era was marked by the rejection of pure ideology in favour of centralised authority. 

Xi Jinping’s fight against corruption 

Historically, corruption in China has its roots in the unifying Han dynasty, and later in the economic transition that began in the late 1970s. The gradual opening up to a market economy, launched under President Deng Xiaoping, generated rapid growth but also greater opportunities for embezzlement, favouritism and abuse of power. The relative weakening of centralised controls, combined with the rapid enrichment of certain local elites, contributed to the spread of corrupt practices at various levels of the administration. In response, the Chinese authorities gradually put in place oversight and control mechanisms. 

For these reasons, the fight against corruption in China is one of the main pillars of President Xi Jinping’s governance. He has stated on several occasions in recent years that “corruption is the gravest threat to the Party, and the fight against corruption is the most thorough form of self-revolution”. Indeed, in July 2024, the CPC leadership strengthened “the mechanism for combating corruption in line with the formula ‘not daring, not being able, not wanting to’, and making every effort to eliminate the breeding ground and conditions that can give rise to corruption”. 

Overall, this anti-corruption campaign is at once a political, economic and social issue, and forms part of a broader strategy of consolidating power, maintaining stability and strengthening the legitimacy of the CPC. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the fight has taken on unprecedented proportions, combining institutional reforms, disciplinary campaigns and political communication.

The fight against corruption therefore aims to root out “tigers” (senior officials) and “flies” (lower-ranking officials) alike, a formula symbolising a declared determination to leave no level of power beyond the reach of investigators. At the heart of this apparatus is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC, which is tasked with monitoring Party members and punishing misconduct. The commission wields extensive powers, notably to conduct internal investigations, often outside the conventional judicial system, to impose sanctions and to publicise typical cases of breaches of discipline. Suspects may be subjected to specific disciplinary procedures before possibly being handed over to the judicial authorities.

The anti-corruption campaign has brought about the downfall of many high-ranking officials, leading some of Xi Jinping’s critics to believe that it gives him the power to sideline political rivals and to seek a fourth term at the helm of the People’s Republic of China and the Communist Party of China. For his supporters, the campaign makes it possible to establish irreproachable and effective governance. 

Among the most emblematic cases is that of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, who was convicted of corruption, abuse of power and disclosing state secrets. His conviction marked a significant break at the summit of the state and the CPC, as it showed that even the most senior leaders are not untouchable. Other prominent figures have also been targeted, thereby reinforcing the image of a far-reaching and systematic campaign at every level. 

Another figure caught up in the purge is Fu Zhenghua, former head of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, Vice-Minister of Public Security and Minister of Justice, who was found guilty of corruption and abuse of power in September 2022 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Meanwhile, Tang Renjian, former Governor of Gansu Province, former Vice-Chairman of the Guangxi Autonomous Region and former Minister of Agriculture (2020-2024), was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in 2025 for accepting bribes in cash and goods totalling more than 268 million yuan (€32 million) between 2007 and 2024. 

Tang Renjian’s downfall follows similar corruption investigations targeting the former Ministers of Defence Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe. Li Shangfu was removed from office seven months after taking up the post, and was then expelled from the CPC for violations including suspected corruption. Wei Fenghe, a former Minister of Defence who also served as a member of the Central Military Commission and as a State Councillor, was stripped of his status as a delegate to the 20th National Congress of the CPC for serious violations of Party discipline and the law. 

Beyond leaders of the Party, the army and the state, Bai Tianhui, former general manager of China Huarong International Holdings (a major state-controlled asset management company), was convicted in 2024 of accepting more than $156 million in exchange for preferential treatment in the acquisition and financing of projects between 2014 and 2018. He was executed in December 2025 following a vast corruption case that also implicated several other Huarong executives, as well as other figures from China’s financial world. Yi Huiman, former head of China’s main financial markets regulator, was placed under investigation for corruption in September 2025. 

In March 2026, Li Xiaopeng, former head of the state-owned banking giant Everbright Group, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for accepting substantial bribes of 17.88 billion yuan. Liu Liange, former chairman of the Bank of China, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in November 2024 on the same grounds. Dismissals in the economic sector mainly affect the heads of state-owned enterprises and private giants, consolidating the CCP’s control over the economy. These purges, which attract less media attention than those in the military, aim to align economic elites with national priorities such as technological self-reliance and “dual circulation”.

On the institutional front, China has also strengthened its legal arsenal. The creation of the National Supervisory Commission in 2018 marked a major step. Established by the National People’s Congress, this political institution (neither judicial nor administrative) merges several oversight bodies and extends supervision to all public officials, whether or not they are Party members. It works in close coordination with CCP structures, illustrating how intertwined the Party and the state are in enforcing discipline.

The fight against corruption serves several purposes. Politically, it strengthens the authority of the central government and limits the risk of internal dissent. By removing influential officials, some of them linked to factions rivalling Xi Jinping’s, it helps to consolidate the position of the current leadership. It thus acts as an instrument for centralising power, curbing the autonomy of local elites and tightening discipline within the Party.

Economically, the anti-corruption campaign aims to make the system more efficient. Corruption can hold back investment, distort competition and erode the confidence of economic actors. By tackling such practices, the authorities are therefore seeking to create a more transparent and more stable environment, conducive to growth. This is particularly important at a time when China is seeking to modernise its economy and attract foreign capital.

On the social front, corruption is a major source of public discontent, particularly when it affects sensitive areas such as healthcare, education and housing. By punishing abuses, the government seeks to meet the public’s expectations and shore up its legitimacy. Anti-corruption campaigns are often accompanied by extensive media coverage that highlights the penalties imposed on officials found guilty of wrongdoing.

Yet this policy has also drawn criticism. Some observers believe that the fight against corruption is being used as a political tool to eliminate opponents or tighten the central government’s grip on power. The lack of transparency in the proceedings and the absence of a fully independent judiciary fuel these doubts. In some cases, investigations may be seen as selective, targeting particular factions rather than applying uniform rules.

Moreover, the campaign’s effects on the workings of the administration are mixed. While it has curbed certain corrupt practices, it has also fostered a climate of caution, even paralysis, among some officials. Fearing accusations of corruption, they may hesitate to take decisions or launch projects, which can slow down public action. This phenomenon, sometimes described as “bureaucratic laziness”, now poses a challenge for the authorities.

China’s fight against corruption also has an international dimension. The country has stepped up its cooperation with other states to track down fugitive officials and recover embezzled funds. Dedicated operations have been set up to pursue fugitives abroad, reflecting a determination to give this policy a global reach.

Chinese authorities thus begin by putting pressure on the target’s family and relatives who have remained in China. If that fails, they send “agents posing as tourists” to put pressure directly on the person in the country to which they have travelled. China has given its global manhunt programme a legal framework. Established in 2014, it is entrusted to a team of 20 people operating under Operation “Fox Hunt”. A year later, these “hunters” were folded into the Sky Net programme, run by the National Supervisory Commission.

Finally, it should be stressed that the fight against corruption in China is not limited to repression. It also includes preventive efforts, such as stronger transparency rules, the rotation of cadres and the promotion of ethical values within the Party. Education and awareness campaigns are regularly organised to reinforce the principles of discipline and integrity.

The army, prime target of the purges 

Like Mao before him, Xi Jinping is purging the military (the People’s Liberation Army, PLA) to tighten his grip on the Party’s instrument of force, secure his political power and build an army aligned with his strategic objectives (Taiwan, confrontation with the United States, territorial disputes, etc. In 2013, he launched a sweeping reform of the PLA, followed by a military anti-corruption campaign to ensure that the army remains “loyal to the Party” – in other words, to himself – rather than to clans or old networks. The recent purges (including those of powerful generals such as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli in 2026) aim to eliminate officers seen as too independent, resistant to his reforms or too close to rival factions. They also serve to get rid of generals deemed too cautious or too focused on “technical” modernisation rather than on the ability to obey political orders. 

By purging hostile elements, Xi Jinping is seeking to guard against the emergence of new factions. However, “this is not simply about eliminating rivals, but a systematic effort to remould the PLA into an ideologically pure, operationally effective force, strictly shielded from any foreign influence. As China sets itself modernisation targets for 2040, the CCP is making it clear that, in this new era, only absolute loyalty counts”, according to Bhim Bhurtel, executive director (2009-2014) of the Nepal South Asia Center, a Kathmandu-based think tank on South Asian development. 

The most surprising case is that of Zhang Youxia, first vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, the body that controls the People’s Liberation Army, who was dismissed in January 2026 for “serious violations of discipline”, a common expression used to refer to corruption. Above all, the case affects one of President Xi Jinping’s close allies, illustrating the deep internal tensions within the Chinese military. 

Indeed, the 75-year-old general, a long-standing companion of Xi Jinping and an influential member of the Politburo, had nonetheless seemed untouchable. For Joseph Torigian, a China specialist and member of the American think tank the Council on Foreign Relations, the situation remains unclear. For the general “demonstrated enormous power in helping Xi Jinping to root out corruption and build a modern army. But despite everything, the Chinese president decided that he was ultimately not trustworthy”. 

Joseph Torigian told RTS that the case reveals the opacity surrounding the workings of China’s People’s Army, “because they have neither the rule of law nor a free media, it is difficult to control this corruption, especially as there is a lot of money in the People’s Liberation Army”.

Indeed, the purge has continued and has proved more extensive over the past three years. For Emmanuel Lincot, Research Director at IRIS and co-head of its Asia-Pacific Programme, “these purges may be a forceful reaction by Xi Jinping against the decision taken against him by the Central Committee on 30 June to return to collective leadership within the Party’s bodies”. Moreover, a year before the centenary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (in August 2027) and the 21st CCP Congress (late 2027), Xi Jinping is seeking to hold on to power, in particular his posts as General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. 

In February 2026, nine senior army officers were forced to step down, along with ten members of the National People’s Congress. Among the officers dismissed is Ding Laifu, commander of the PLA’s 73rd Group Army, a unit that would be crucial in the event of an invasion of Taiwan and which, according to several experts, has sharply stepped up its training in recent years. Yang Guang, commander of Base 64 of the Rocket Force; General Liu Zhenli, a well-known close ally of Xi Jinping and until then Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the CMC; Li Qiaoming, commander of the Ground Force; and the political commissars Bian Ruifeng, Wang Donghai and Li Wei have also been removed from power. 

Since 2012, more than 20 generals (including eight former members of the CMC) and nearly 100 senior officers have been summarily removed from their posts. In this way, Xi Jinping is seeking to “impose absolute loyalty in the run-up to major political and military milestones”, according to the geopolitical analyst Olivier Guillard. The associate researcher at the Institut d’études de géopolitique appliquée (IEGA) told AdExtra that the army’s top brass “expect, in the very short term, a severe storm warning for the inner circles of the two most recent victims (Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli). This prospect is dreaded by those concerned and by the entire military hierarchy, which is also worried about the countless shock waves set off by this fall from grace and the resulting nervousness”.

By decapitating the leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and shrinking its size, Xi is concentrating command of the army almost entirely in his own hands, weakening the internal checks and balances that could stand in the way of a fourth term. 

The purge raises doubts over the Chinese military’s ability to conduct large-scale military operations. Some observers, however, believe the turmoil within the armed forces will have no bearing on their effectiveness. James Char, a specialist in the Chinese military at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the army would “continue to function normally”. That view is shared by Niklas Swanström, director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), a Stockholm-based research body, who acknowledged that there is “an immediate disruption to command cohesion”. But there are also “potential long-term structural benefits” if “the government is sincerely seeking to eradicate” corruption, he added. 

However, Hua Po, an independent Chinese commentator based in Beijing, told Le Quotidien du Luxembourg that “the army will obey no one but Xi: wherever he points his finger, it will strike”. Even so, a degree of stability in military operations may set in, as the Chinese military is not yet in a position to rival a leading military power such as the United States.

Dismissals in China are not mere disciplinary measures but a key lever of governance. They serve to maintain discipline, strengthen central authority and manage crises, while sending a clear signal about what those in power expect. 

However, their effectiveness depends on their being used sparingly and on how they are perceived by political actors and the public. Both an instrument of control and a source of risk, they illustrate the complexity of a system in which holding on to power rests on a delicate balance between authority, legitimacy and performance.

As part of his anti-corruption campaign, the president and general secretary of the CCP has had officials in the People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese Communist Party dismissed, in order to consolidate his power, reduce any competition and impose absolute loyalty to his leadership. 

Numerous senior officials have been removed (generals, Politburo members, provincial leaders), as many belonged to networks or factions within the party, making them potential rivals to Xi Jinping. By publicly accusing them of corruption or of betraying the party, Xi Jinping justifies their removal without having to acknowledge an open political conflict. 

In the army, the purge affects a huge proportion of high-ranking generals, allowing family or clan loyalties to be replaced by a generation of trained officers whose loyalty is centred on Xi Jinping and the CCP. The dismissal of figures such as Zhang Youxia and He Weidong shows that Xi Jinping is acting above all to prevent alternative centres of power from forming within the army. 

Overall, the dismissals in the army and the CCP serve less to fix a dysfunctional system than to eliminate potential rivals, impose loyalty to Xi Jinping and his clan, and lock in Xi Jinping’s power for the long term. 

Bibliography 

Agence France Presse, 28 January 2026, Une purge dans l’armée en Chine, Le Quotidien, https://lequotidien.lu/monde/une-purge-dans-larmee-en-chine/ 

C.T., 27 February 2026, Xi Jinping limoge neuf officiers supérieurs de l’armée, La Libre, https://www.lalibre.be/international/asie/2026/02/27/xi-jinping-limoge-neuf-officiers-superieurs-de-larmee-UFMI4FMFXBHGPIC3U46COL7VEM/

DAVIS J., 29 January 2026, What is happening at the top of the Chinese army after its highest-ranking general was dismissed for corruption?, RTS, https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/2026/article/purge-au-sommet-de-l-armee-chinoise-le-n-2-limoge-pour-corruption-29131097.html 

GUILLARD O., 30 January 2026, New military purge in China: shock waves in Beijing, muted satisfaction in Taipei, AdExtra, https://adextra-mission.com/nouvelle-purge-militaire-en-chine-onde-de-choc-a-pekin-satisfaction-contenue-a-taipei/ 

SEIBT S., 20 January 2022, All over the world, China hunts down “fugitives” and forces them to return home, France 24, https://www.france24.com/fr/asie-pacifique/20220120-partout-dans-le-monde-la-chine-traque-et-force-des-fugitifs-%C3%A0-revenir-au-pays

VILTARD Y., 1975, Le système politique chinois dans le mouvement d’éducation socialiste (1962-1966) [The Chinese political system in the Socialist Education Movement (1962–1966)], Presses Universitaires de France (digital reissue by Fenixx), Publications de l’Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne series – Political Science

XINHUA, news agency, 6 January 2025, Xi Jinping stresses the need to win the tough, protracted and all-out battle against corruption, https://french.xinhuanet.com/20250106/34acdf12a4c04d89be238ef6369542c6/c.html 

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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