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Russia’s gas diplomacy: history, methods and loss of influence (part 2)

The European Union: a rift over gas

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia gradually became the European Union’s main gas supplier. For decades, European states regarded this energy cooperation as mutually beneficial and economically rational. Three major factors contributed to this dependence: Russian gas was considerably cheaper than the alternatives, notably liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States or Qatar. The pipelines linking Russia to Europe allowed direct, large-scale deliveries. The Kremlin long convinced European leaders of the “reliability” of its gas, in particular by strengthening its ties with Germany.

The main pipelines handling these deliveries were Nord Stream 1 (linking Russia directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea), Nord Stream 2 (a similar project, completed but never brought into service because of sanctions), Yamal-Europe (running through Belarus and Poland) and the Ukrainian network – historically the main transit route to Europe.

The first signs of Russia’s gas pressure were felt as early as 2006-2014. Long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow was already using gas as a political instrument. In 2006 and 2009, it cut off supplies via Ukraine owing to disputes with Kyiv, affecting several European countries in the process. From 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia stepped up its use of gas as a means of blackmail, seeking to force Europe to accept the violation of international law. Just before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin deliberately reduced gas deliveries to Europe, triggering a surge in energy prices. This strategy was part of the preparations for the aggression, aimed at weakening Europe and influencing its decisions on sanctions.

After the war began in 2022, Russia gradually cut its gas exports. Gazprom reduced deliveries via Nord Stream 1, citing “technical reasons”. Supplies via Poland (the Yamal-Europe pipeline) were halted, and transit via Ukraine was reduced. In September 2022, explosions on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines put these supply routes permanently out of action.

Despite the Kremlin’s efforts, Europe managed to pivot swiftly to alternative energy sources and to cut its dependence on Russian gas considerably. Diversifying supplies was a priority. Norway increased its exports to the EU. Imports of LNG (liquefied natural gas) from the United States, Qatar and other countries rose sharply. Azerbaijan and Algeria became key suppliers. LNG terminals were built in Germany, Poland and elsewhere, enabling liquefied gas to be imported.

At the same time, Gazprom was hit by sanctions. In 2022, the EU imposed restrictions on imports of Russian gas and introduced a price cap. Europe also accelerated its shift towards renewable energy. In the end, gas blackmail did not help the Kremlin. On the contrary, it dealt it a severe blow. Russia lost its main customer, which reduced Gazprom’s revenues. The sanctions and the price cap further reduced Moscow’s earnings from gas exports. China and Turkey, although major buyers, cannot make up for the loss of the European market.

Russia’s gas wars against Europe were intended to weaken the EU, but they ended up backfiring on the Kremlin. Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian gas, while Moscow has lost key markets and considerable revenue. Today, Russian gas is no longer a “weapon” and Moscow’s energy blackmail has failed.

However, some EU countries do not rule out a possible return of Russian gas as part of a peace deal to end the war, according to the “Financial Times”. The idea is backed by Germany, Hungary and a handful of other states, which believe that resuming imports could stabilise the energy market and ease the pressure on prices.

Many countries, however, are flatly opposed, arguing that it would weaken sanctions against Russia and bolster its economy. The disagreement highlights the complexity of European energy policy. Most of the states that depended on Russian gas are now seeking to diversify their sources of supply. These divisions could complicate the search for a consensus, particularly if the gas question becomes part of peace negotiations that could alter the balance of power in Europe.

Countries such as Slovakia and Hungary remain heavily dependent on Russian gas. The Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, known for his pro-Russian rhetoric, has sought to maintain gas imports from Russia, even after Ukraine halted transit in 2025 following the expiry of its contract with Moscow.

This has raised suspicions of secret negotiations between his government and the Kremlin. Bratislava has nevertheless tried to reassure the public, saying it has sufficient gas reserves and alternatives for 2025. The state-owned company SPP said it held 20% more gas in its underground storage than the previous year and was diversifying its international suppliers.

The government sought alternative solutions but did not rule out cooperation with Moscow, provoking strong opposition within Slovak society. The continuation of contracts with Russian energy companies, despite European sanctions, could also be concealing corruption. Robert Fico has, moreover, used the gas crisis to criticise EU policy and call European integration into question, further widening the divide between pro-Europeans and pro-Russians.

In Hungary, too, the situation has shifted since transit via Ukraine was halted. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to block new European sanctions against Russia unless gas transit via Ukraine was restored. He stressed that the interruption had driven up gas prices in Central Europe and urged the EU to act. Hungary continues to receive Russian gas via TurkStream, which partly offsets the loss of Ukrainian transit. Nevertheless, Budapest remains vulnerable and is actively seeking to secure its energy supply.

Austria, for its part, has also felt the impact of the halt to transit via Ukraine. However, the Austrian gas operator AGGM has given assurances that supply to consumers remains stable. In November 2024, the Austrian oil and gas company OMV won an arbitration case against Gazprom worth €230 million over irregular deliveries. In retaliation, Gazprom suspended deliveries to Austria, but OMV seized Russian gas to offset its losses.

Gas: a pressure tool Moscow still wields

Despite its losses on the European market, Russia continues to use gas as a political and economic lever in several regions.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia)

These breakaway regions of Georgia, recognised by Moscow after the 2008 war, are under its energy influence. Russia supplies gas to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ensuring their economic dependence and strengthening its political control. This also prevents Georgia from contemplating membership of NATO or the EU.

Ukraine (occupied territories)

Moscow uses gas to consolidate its authority over the occupied territories of Ukraine, notably the Donbas, Crimea and certain areas in the south of the country. Russia supplies these regions by bypassing Ukraine, thereby propping up the occupation administrations and deepening their dependence.

Since annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia has integrated the peninsula into its gas system via a pipeline across the Kerch Strait. In the territories seized after 2022, it has also established a direct gas supply to consolidate its grip. The Kremlin’s aim is clear: to integrate these territories into the Russian economy and weaken Ukraine’s energy independence.

Serbia and Hungary: manipulation through gas

Russia actively uses gas as a lever of influence over governments, selling gas to Serbia at reduced prices to keep the country within its orbit. Dependent on Russian gas, Serbia takes a pro-Russian stance on many international issues, including sanctions. Viktor Orbán’s Hungarian government, mentioned earlier, also enjoys favourable terms from Gazprom. Hungary is blocking several EU decisions on energy sanctions against Russia. Moscow’s aim is to divide the European Union and hinder a unified policy on sanctions and energy independence.

Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

Russia is seeking to establish a “tripartite gas union” with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Turkmenistan having turned down the offer) to make up for the loss of the European gas market. It is also trying to retain control over Central Asian gas exports in order to reduce competition in its own markets. Russia buys Turkmen gas at discounted prices and then resells it.

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are seeking to avoid monopolistic energy cooperation with Moscow, confining their relations to bilateral trade commitments and negotiations. Thus, although these countries still import Russian gas, they are actively working to diversify their sources of energy supply and to reduce their dependence on Russia. The Kremlin’s aim is to preserve its monopoly on gas supplies to Europe and to secure its influence in Central Asia.

The future of the gas market for Russia

The future of the gas market for Russia looks uncertain owing to shifts in global energy policy, Western sanctions and the gradual reduction in dependence among its main customers. Russia has long used its energy resources as a tool of influence, but recent events show that this strategy is beginning to lose its effectiveness.

Europe, once the main export market for Russian gas, is actively reducing its dependence on it. The introduction of sanctions, the halting of projects such as Nord Stream 2 and the rise in alternative imports (LNG from the United States and Qatar, along with closer cooperation with Norway) have significantly reduced Gazprom’s revenues. Despite Russia’s attempts to maintain its cooperation with Hungary, Serbia and certain other countries, its position in Europe will never return to its pre-war level.

Russia is trying to redirect its exports towards Asia, chiefly China and India. China, however, is in no hurry to replace Europe: it buys Russian gas at steeply discounted prices and refuses to become dependent on Russia, diversifying its supplies instead (purchases from Central Asia, LNG imports from the United States and the Middle East). The Power of Siberia 2 project remains uncertain: despite Moscow’s efforts to speed up construction of the pipeline to China, Beijing has given no clear guarantees on its financing or on purchase volumes.

The countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) are actively seeking to export their gas to Europe and Asia independently, which reduces Russia’s ability to control the regional market. Turkmenistan is supplying more and more gas to China, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are refusing full cooperation with Moscow within a “gas union”, preferring to retain a degree of autonomy. Western sanctions are restricting Russia’s access to the advanced technologies needed to extract and transport gas, which complicates the development of new projects and the modernisation of existing infrastructure.

Falling revenue from gas exports is forcing Moscow to draw more heavily on its financial reserves to prop up its budget, which will lead to economic difficulties in the long run. Russia is gradually losing its status as a gas giant because of sanctions, Europe’s disengagement and growing competition in the Asian market. Although it is trying to find new outlets and to use gas as a geopolitical lever, its room for manoeuvre is shrinking considerably. In the long term, Moscow will face financial challenges, a technological lag and increased dependence on China, which will considerably weaken its position in the global energy sector.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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