
Image created with AI.
The 40-day war waged by Israel and the United States has shown, as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022 did before it, that a war fought from a distance does not achieve the first stated objective, which in both cases was the fall of the regime in power. Military and technological superiority did not allow the attacking powers to secure total victory. In Iran’s case, the decentralisation of military command and plans for renewal at the head of the state in the event of the leadership being decapitated thwarted or overcame the attacks. The death of the Supreme Leader did not hasten the end of the regime. The pounding of command centres and weapons sites did not weaken the country’s military capabilities and reserves enough to make it lay down its arms.
The chess player and the poker player
In an article published by “The Policy of the New South”, Iran’s chess-player strategy and the United States’ poker-player strategy explain both the differing approaches of the two adversaries and the failure of the latter. In this asymmetric confrontation, Iran anticipated its adversary’s possible moves in the event of an attack, while Donald Trump bluffed repeatedly, admittedly creating uncertainty about his aims (if indeed there were any!). As a chess player, Iran has not lost the game, despite the death of its leader, the destruction of its naval fleet, the decapitation of its security apparatus, the weakening of its strike capabilities and the temporary degradation of its clandestine nuclear programme. Tehran finds itself in a position to negotiate a peace decided by its adversary, which gives it a slight advantage.
An attack from a distance does not bring down a regime
From this post-war assessment, the authors of the article drew strategic lessons for the future. First, a stand-off attack such as the US Operation Epic, which destroys military capabilities, combined with an economic blockade, fails to impose a political will.
What follows from this is graver still. Trump’s repeated bluffs have stripped the threat of all credibility. While assuring the world that the war would be over in three days, Washington asked Congress for an additional 200 billion. Having never defined what victory would look like, the White House can certainly declare that it has won, but nobody will believe it, since the aims of the offensive have shifted over time and cannot be verified on the ground.
The “Madman Theory” devised by Nixon and Kissinger, which sought to convince the adversary of one’s unpredictability, comes naturally to Donald Trump, who can, within the space of two days, both threaten the Iranian people with perishing in the flames of hell and calmly announce that negotiations are well on the way to achieving peace. This is not a mistake but “poker”.
Decentralisation and low-cost weapons prevail
On the Iranian side, “The Policy of the New South” notes that the doctrine of mosaic defence, defined in 2005 by General Mohammad Ali Jafari and deployed against Israel and the United States, worked: the Revolutionary Guards were organised into 31 command centres. All of them would therefore have had to be destroyed to win. Nor could the strikes on Tehran completely disrupt Iran’s capacity to retaliate.
It is also worth noting that Iran’s targeting of neighbouring Arab states, from which the Gulf monarchies’ oil tankers set sail, added diplomatic pressure on their American ally, which was pushed to agree a ceasefire as quickly as possible. At the same time, the White House was being strongly encouraged by Israel to continue the strikes until the Iranian threat had been wiped out.
As in Ukraine, this asymmetric conflict has also shown that light, low-cost weapons (drones) provide a tactical advantage over an army equipped with heavy, expensive hardware.
When survival is at stake, resistance is stronger
The cohesion of the Iranian apparatus and its fierce determination to stay in power (defeat would have spelt the end of the regime), like the Ukrainians’ certainty that they must defend not only their territory and their democratic system but their very identity, are powerful drivers of resistance and resilience. The attacker is reduced (if I may put it that way) to choosing between escalation and negotiation.
Either way, the risk is great: on the one hand, of losing control of what happens next and its consequences (from this point of view, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which the White House had not anticipated, has not only weighed on the global economy and inflation but will also weigh on the Republicans in the midterm elections); on the other, having to halt operations that are costly in lives and dollars (or roubles and gold) has consequences, at least in the short term: depleted military capabilities and a loss of confidence, or even of support, among one’s own population.
Negotiations without victory or surrender
The negotiations between the two sides that have begun in Bern will have to break new ground. For there has been neither victory nor capitulation on either side. With neither holding a strategic advantage capable of wringing concessions from the other, there is little sign of an agreement that would call into question anything about the Iranian regime: neither its clandestine nuclear programme nor its potential stranglehold on traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
For the United States, the operation has at best been a zero-sum exercise that has in fact handed Iran a further strategic advantage: it can block the strait, threatening the entire world economy, and demand an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon. Tehran also knows that Hezbollah will strike Israel if Washington’s ally fails to abide by the ceasefire the United States wants, which would deepen the strategic rift between the two countries (which would suit Iran) and lead to a breakdown in negotiations.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






