In the aftermath of the attack on Israel carried out by Hamas on 7 October, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, with broad backing from the United States, responded to the attack by warning that he “will change the Middle East”. In a region currently beset by several conflicts (Israel against Hamas and Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis against Western ships, a crisis between Iran and Pakistan), only two countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council stand out for their meteoric rise, politically and economically as well as culturally and in terms of security: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Could Israel’s threat to change the Middle East affect or slow their rise?
These two Gulf states play a leading role not only in the Arabian Gulf but across the wider Arab and Muslim world. With two young, visionary leaders in power and increasingly diversified national wealth, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are heading towards a prosperous and promising future that will take shape around 2030. For while the crises in Ukraine and Gaza have upended events on the world stage, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have managed to maintain, and even expand, their activity in the region, wielding an influence that increasingly extends to global politics and the world economy. This effectiveness has been reflected in their strengthened position at the helm of OPEC+, in their invitation to join the BRICS intergovernmental organisation, and in the United Arab Emirates’ successful hosting of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in 2023. The current year thus paves the way for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to take their place at the negotiating table of the major powers debating the crucial issues facing the international community today.
The first global crisis of this decade, which erupted after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, demonstrated the ability of these two Arab Gulf states to handle, with patience and caution, the political crises of friends and foes alike. Unlike Kuwait, which was quick to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 for historical reasons of its own, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have remained resolutely neutral on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Thanks to this neutrality, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have managed to keep diplomatic channels open with both Moscow and Kyiv. Recently, Abu Dhabi even succeeded in playing an important role by brokering an exchange of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine. However, this neutrality has its limits, for on the eve of NATO’s forthcoming military manoeuvres, this conflict is taking on an increasingly global and crucial dimension, making the neutral stance of these two Gulf states difficult, if not untenable.
For in the conflict between Israel and Hamas, the situation between the two belligerents has become more dramatic and highly critical. While the United Arab Emirates established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020, Saudi Arabia was, before Hamas’s attack on 7 October, on the verge of opening negotiations on normalising relations with the Jewish state. Today, Saudi leaders face strong pressure, both at home and abroad, to take firm positions on the current war, as well as in the debate over the future of Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Speaking through its foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Riyadh has recently set out its position on two occasions: first at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he announced that his country remained open to an agreement with Israel, while stressing the need for a ceasefire and a two-state solution; then in an interview with CNN, in which he stated that normalising relations with Israel was not conceivable without resolving the Palestinian issue: “That is the only way we are going to get the benefit. So, yes, because we need stability and stability will only come through resolving the Palestinian issue,” he insisted.
Since the start of the Gaza war, US diplomatic activity in the Gulf region (including several visits by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken) has reflected the growing influence of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Washington’s eyes. The Biden administration appears increasingly to need the support of its partners in the region to achieve its objectives. While Qatar is involved in the hostage issue and Oman is playing its traditional role as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are regarded by the White House as essential partners in the effort to find a solution once military operations have ended: stabilising Gaza, tackling critical humanitarian challenges, meeting governance and security needs, and potentially paving the way for a return to negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.
Yet Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have both avoided discussing publicly the future governance of Gaza and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. They have confined their public statements on the matter to three themes:
1. Working towards de-escalating the conflict, with Egypt likely to play a key role, since it has an interest in reviving shipping through the Suez Canal, which has been hit by attacks from the Houthis, who support Hamas – the canal provides it with a considerable stream of foreign-currency revenue for its economy.
2. Calling for the return of the hostages, with Qatar seeking to influence Hamas in order to remain a major player in the Middle East, indispensable in the negotiations between the West, Israel and the Palestinians.
3. Providing humanitarian support to the Palestinian people, particularly in Gaza, where the international community, through the voice of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, has repeatedly called for help for the civilian population.
As a result, the future diplomacy of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will be less likely to lean towards a neutrality that both are seeking to preserve, even as the two countries try to keep their ambitious economic programmes at the forefront. Their diplomacy will probably follow the recent joint statement by the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union, which called for “restraint” to end the conflict unfolding between Israel and Gaza. Issued at the close of a meeting of the two blocs in Muscat last October, the statement read: “The Joint Council expressed its deep concern at the grave developments in Israel and Gaza and condemned all attacks against civilians. It called for the protection of civilians, reminding the parties of their obligations under the universal principles of international humanitarian law. It further called for restraint, the release of hostages and access to food, water and medicine in accordance with international humanitarian law, stressing the urgent need for a political solution to the crisis to prevent this vicious circle of violence from recurring. The EU and the GCC are determined to deplore violence and to call on all parties to exercise restraint and calm, and agreed to continue consultations and remain engaged “.
For while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are aware of their importance to the future of the Middle East, the leaders of both countries are wary of appearing to provide cover for an Israeli government pursuing an aggressive policy and military operations that the UN Secretary-General has described as unacceptable. These military operations are regarded as anathema by the vast majority of Arabs, including the populations of these countries.
Saudi and Emirati leaders are aware that public opinion is a highly sensitive matter when it comes to the Palestinian cause. A poll published on 21 December 2023 by the “Washington Institute for Near East Policy” on Saudi attitudes towards the ongoing conflict showed that 91% of Saudis believe that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a victory for Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims”. For its part, the government of the United Arab Emirates is also aware that the country’s positioning as a “voice of reason” would be neither heard nor accepted, as national and pan-Arab social media in the country show. Admittedly, the leaders of the United Arab Emirates have indicated that economic ties between Emiratis and Israelis would continue, as the Minister of State for Foreign Trade, Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, made clear: “We do not mix economics and trade with politics”, but on the ground this position looks difficult to sustain in the long term if the war in Gaza continues with so many Palestinian civilian casualties.
Whether the current war remains confined to the Gaza Strip alone or spreads across the region, the question that arises with regard to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is this: is the two countries’ stance towards Israel based on each one’s own interests, or on interests the two countries share?
The Gaza war could bring the two countries closer to a unified position, particularly after the Houthi rebels’ attacks on Israel-bound ships in the Bab al-Mandab and their rocket fire towards Israel. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fear fresh Houthi attacks on Saudi and Emirati territory, which would threaten their booming development, aimed at diversifying their economies and infrastructure. Before the Gaza war, Riyadh moved closer to Iran in a bid to halt Houthi rocket attacks on its territory. Today, while waiting for the American project of the century, IMEC, to materialise in the region, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi alike are trying to use their dialogue with Iran while at the same time calling on the United States and the West to prevent the Houthis from turning the Gaza war into a wider conflict, which could seriously threaten their economies and slow their booming development.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






