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The future of peacekeeping runs through Geneva

With the number of armed conflicts at a level unseen since 1945, António Guterres wants a “complete overhaul” of United Nations peace operations. The diagnosis is as simple as it is dizzying: the Blue Helmets model, designed to stabilise wars that were drawing to a close, is increasingly ill-suited to conflicts that drag on, become internationalised and grow ever more technological. Behind this reform lies a more fundamental question: how can an organisation designed to preserve a relatively stable international order act in a world where that order is fragmenting? The answer may lie in Geneva.

There is something deeply symbolic in the assessment made by António Guterres: the world today is experiencing the highest number of armed conflicts since 1945. Yet 1945 is precisely the year that marked the birth of the international order of which the United Nations is one of the main pillars. The San Francisco Charter was conceived at the time on the basis of one conviction: after two world wars, collective security had to prevent a return to all-out conflagration.

Eight decades later, the organisation finds that its strategic environment has changed profoundly. Wars between states are re-emerging, civil wars are becoming internationalised, armed groups have access to ever more sophisticated technologies, and regional or outside powers are intervening directly or indirectly in conflicts that are no longer merely national. The problem is therefore no longer simply one of knowing where to send Blue Helmets. It is one of determining whether the instruments devised in the 20th century still make it possible to build peace in the 21st.

The peacekeeping paradox

Peacekeeping rests on an almost paradoxical principle: an international force can help preserve a balance when the warring parties have agreed, at least provisionally, to stop fighting. But what happens when no such agreement exists? It is one of the fundamental limits that UN operations come up against today. “You cannot keep the peace where there is no peace to keep,” sums up António Guterres.

The phrase may seem self-evident. Yet it marks an important turning point. For several decades, peacekeeping operations were often deployed in the wake of a conflict, with a mandate to support a political process, secure a transition and protect civilians. But peace agreements are becoming rarer, more fragile and harder to negotiate. Today’s conflicts do not necessarily produce a victor and a vanquished ready to negotiate. They can turn into wars of attrition, fuelled by outside funding, trafficking, regional rivalries or the intervention of foreign powers.

In these circumstances, a UN operation risks finding itself trapped: present enough to become a target, but not powerful enough, or not politically backed enough, to impose a solution. The case of Sudan brutally illustrates this difficulty: when the parties to the conflict enjoy outside support and have no interest in halting hostilities, an international presence cannot, on its own, create the will to make peace.

A time for diplomacy, not for peacekeepers alone

The reform proposed by the Secretary-General therefore does not spell the end of peacekeeping. Rather, it means that peacekeeping can no longer be the international community’s default response. The first instrument must once again be political. Preventive diplomacy, good offices, mediation, special envoys, the peaceful settlement of disputes: the vocabulary used by António Guterres is that of a United Nations seeking to step in earlier, before weapons take the place of negotiation. It is a major shift in perspective.

For a long time, the visible power of the UN was embodied by the blue helmets, their vehicles, their checkpoints and their bases. Yet a political mission with strong mediation capacity can sometimes prove more useful than a large military force that arrives too late. The example of Colombia, cited by the Secretary-General, illustrates this logic: the UN’s good offices supported the peace process, the conclusion of the agreement and its implementation. In other words, peace can sometimes be less costly to build than to keep — provided that action is taken early enough.

A reform also driven by budgetary constraints

It would, however, be naive to see this reform purely as a strategic adjustment. It comes at a time when the resources devoted to peace operations are shrinking and military and police personnel numbers are set to fall. The UN must therefore do more with less. Hence the emphasis on missions that are “more targeted, agile, flexible and cost-effective”. The report’s 47 recommendations reflect this drive for rationalisation: more precise mandates, regular assessments, clearer chains of command, stronger technological capabilities and exit strategies prepared earlier.

This financial constraint could, however, have a paradoxical effect. It forces the UN to question the relevance of its missions rather than indefinitely extending arrangements that have become difficult to fund. But it also risks reducing the organisation’s capacity to intervene precisely when collective security needs are growing. The question, then, will be whether the reform genuinely makes it possible to concentrate resources where they are most useful, or whether it simply becomes a way of managing scarcity.

Warfare enters the age of drones and artificial intelligence

Another aspect of Guterres’s assessment is particularly telling of how the battlefield is changing. Peace operations were designed in a world where military technology remained essentially conventional. They must now contend with drones, autonomous systems, cyber technologies and the prospect of lethal weapons incorporating artificial intelligence. This shift changes the very nature of the protection of civilians.

A UN peacekeeper can control a road or protect a camp for displaced people. It is far harder to guard against a remote drone attack, or against systems capable of identifying and striking a target without direct human intervention. The technological transformation is therefore not simply a matter of equipment. It raises a fundamental legal and ethical problem: who will be held responsible when a machine takes part in the decision to kill? The UN thus finds itself facing a contradiction: it must modernise its operations to remain relevant while helping to set limits on military technologies whose rules of use are still largely being worked out.

Peace cannot be imported

The report also emphasises a principle that could become one of the cornerstones of the UN’s new doctrine: “Peace cannot be imported”. An international operation can secure, protect, monitor or provide support. It cannot permanently take the place of national institutions. This shift is leading to stronger partnerships with host countries and regional organisations.

The African Union holds a special place in this respect. The continent is home to several of the crises in which the question of peacekeeping has become most complex. Closer cooperation between the UN and African organisations therefore emerges as one of the key strands of the reform. The reasoning is pragmatic: regional actors often have a better grasp of political and social realities and can intervene more quickly. The UN, for its part, can provide international legitimacy, diplomatic capabilities and a legal framework.

The future of peacekeeping may therefore lie less with a UN acting alone than with a collective security architecture shared more widely between international and regional organisations.

The Geneva paradox

This transformation gives International Geneva particular importance. Geneva is not the political seat of the Security Council, nor is it where the UN’s main military operations are decided. But it remains one of the world’s great centres of multilateral diplomacy, humanitarian action, international law and conflict prevention.

The reform proposed by António Guterres rests precisely on these dimensions: more diplomacy, mediation, regional cooperation, protection of civilians and coordination between international actors. In this new model, peace is no longer reduced to the deployment of a force. It requires diplomats, mediators, lawyers, humanitarian workers, human rights experts, development specialists and representatives of civil society.

In other words, the future of peacekeeping could paradoxically strengthen the importance of International Geneva, even as the UN’s military operations face cuts to their resources.

A UN at a crossroads

The reform announced by António Guterres is ultimately less a technical reform than a strategic admission. The UN can no longer assume that conflicts will follow the script that prevailed for much of the post-war period: a civil war, an agreement, then the arrival of the Blue Helmets to accompany the transition.

Today’s world is far more fragmented. Conflicts may pit states, armed groups, militias, criminal organisations and foreign powers against one another. Drones are blurring front lines. Transnational networks are financing wars. Autonomous technologies are upending the balance of power. And civilians remain the first victims. Against this backdrop, peacekeeping must become more political, more flexible and more targeted. But institutional reform alone will not be enough.

The real problem remains a political one: are states still prepared to invest in multilateralism at a time when the international balance of power is hardening?

For while the UN can modernise its missions, review its mandates and improve its technology, it cannot substitute for the political will of states to negotiate, to put pressure on the warring parties and to fund peace mechanisms. That, ultimately, is the paradox of this reform: just as wars are becoming more numerous and more sophisticated, the UN has fewer and fewer resources with which to prevent them.

The challenge in the years ahead will therefore be less about how many peacekeepers to deploy than about rebuilding the political conditions that make deploying them unnecessary. And that is perhaps where the real lesson of this review lies: in a world where war is once again a central reality of international relations, diplomacy is not the alternative to peacekeeping. It is its prerequisite.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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Les dernières analyses de nos universitaires et journalistes sur la Genève internationale, la diplomatie et les conflits.

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