Home / Focus / Ukraine: why Russian forces can no longer encircle Ukrainian units

Ukraine: why Russian forces can no longer encircle Ukrainian units

The large pincer offensives that once allowed Russian forces to trap sizeable Ukrainian units in “cauldrons” have all but vanished from the maps. Yet Russia has not given up on outflanking enemy defences. It has had to change both scale and method: small infiltration groups, drones, strikes on roads and partial encirclements are replacing sweeping armoured breakthroughs. This shift reveals the new constraints of the Ukrainian battlefield, but also the persistent limitations of the Russian army.

The pincers have not disappeared: they have changed scale

At first glance, recent maps give the impression that Russian forces are now advancing head-on, without seeking to close vast pincers around Ukrainian units. This reading is partly correct. Large mechanised operations capable of creating an encirclement spanning several dozen kilometres have become rare. But the aim of envelopment remains, notably around the urban belt of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

The Russian plan nonetheless remains recognisable. One arm was to advance from Lyman, cross the Donets and bypass Sloviansk to the north; the other was to push up from Pokrovsk and Dobropillia towards Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk. But the Ukrainian counter-offensive has all but eliminated the Russian salient north of Lyman and pushed the fighting back towards the Zherebets river. The northern arm of the pincer was thus broken before it could link up with the south-western arm. ISW, 12 September 2026. Likewise, on 15 September, Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps announced that it had cleared another area of Russian infiltration and retaken several localities in the north of the Donetsk region as part of Operation “Vivaldi”. These results, which are difficult to verify independently, confirm that this arm remains under pressure. Reuters, 15 September 2026.

Advancing in the open

A classic pincer manoeuvre requires tanks, mechanised infantry, engineers, artillery and logistics convoys to be concentrated along two axes. Yet such concentrations are now very hard to conceal. Reconnaissance drones, acoustic sensors, electronic intercepts and imagery shared in real time make it possible to detect preparations for an offensive well before the column reaches the line of contact.

The area on either side of the front line has become a “kill zone”. According to commanders interviewed by Reuters, heavy vehicles are spotted so quickly that the Russians can no longer repeat the rapid advances made by long armoured columns in 2022. Any grouping intended to exploit a breakthrough becomes a target for FPV drones, artillery and scatterable mines.

Above all, Russia lacks an exploitation force

Breaching a first line is not enough to create a cauldron. Fresh units must be committed immediately, capable of advancing in depth, protecting their flanks, linking up with the other arm of the pincer and keeping a logistics corridor open. Russia still achieves tactical penetrations, but struggles to turn them into operational breakthroughs.

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) points out that persistent surveillance and the proliferation of fibre-optic drones complicate resupply, the evacuation of the wounded and the concealment of major equipment. A Russian spearhead that advanced too quickly would therefore risk finding itself cut off, short of ammunition and attacked from the rear.

Who is fighting on the front line

There is no single type of Russian frontline soldier. Assaults are mainly entrusted to small groups formed within motor rifle brigades and regiments, supplemented by assault detachments, contract soldiers drawn by signing bonuses, mobilised men and sometimes former prisoners. Quality varies widely from one sector and one rotation to the next. Units with an elite reputation — paratroopers, naval infantry and special forces — still exist, but many have been worn down and replenished. They are often used as infantry or as cadres for other units, rather than as an intact reserve capable of exploiting a breakthrough. ISW, October 2025.

The large number of soldiers from Siberia, the Far East, the Caucasus and the outlying republics stands out clearly in casualty records. This is explained in particular by the weight of military bonuses in poor regions and by a recruitment drive that long sought to spare the major cities. It does not mean, however, that Moscow is sending homogeneous “Siberian units” to the front: after successive rounds of recruitment and reconstitution, formations generally mix soldiers of different origins and levels of experience.

The fighting value of these formations is further reduced by their internal shortcomings. Command remains highly top-down, junior officers and NCOs are in short supply, and commanders have an incentive to overstate their numbers or combat readiness in order to satisfy the level above. Corruption, the diversion of equipment, alcoholism and indiscipline are regularly documented, though their extent varies from unit to unit. These failings can turn a battalion that is theoretically available into a handful of groups genuinely fit for combat. They compound the inability to assemble a coherent exploitation force, without calling into question the central explanation: drones, mines, firepower and fragile logistics.

According to an assessment by Ukrainian military intelligence cited in September by The Times, Russian generals have reportedly asked Vladimir Putin for up to 800,000 additional men after the parliamentary elections in September. This figure, which Moscow has not confirmed, does not mean that Russia could immediately double the roughly 700,000 troops already deployed in the war zone. Some of the recruits would serve to offset losses and expiring contracts. Above all, the Russian army is thought to be capable of absorbing, equipping and integrating only 300,000 to 500,000 men at a time. A fresh mobilisation could therefore intensify the war of attrition without automatically providing the mechanised, well-led and trained force that Moscow lacks to exploit major breakthroughs and close large pockets.

Small infiltrations rather than a major breakthrough

To reduce this vulnerability, Russian forces disperse their assaults. Groups of a handful of men advance on foot, on motorbikes or on quad bikes, using woodland, ruins and periods of poor visibility, then try to dig in in a cellar, a building or a tree line. Other teams gradually join them. The method is slow and costly, but it presents far fewer targets than a mechanised column.

These infiltrations also exploit Ukraine’s shortage of infantry. Between two strongpoints, some sections of the front are not permanently manned. For lack of personnel, the links between positions can be tenuous, even when the gaps remain under drone surveillance. The Russians therefore try to slip through undetected, then force the Ukrainians to reveal their positions when they open fire.

Glide bombs pulverise strongpoints but fail to deliver a breakthrough

Russian glide bombs have nonetheless profoundly changed the battle. The FAB-500, the FAB-1500 and, more occasionally, the FAB-3000 can demolish a building, rip open a fortification or bury its defenders. The FAB-3000 designation, however, refers to the weapon’s total mass, not to three tonnes of explosive. The use of glide bombs of this mass is documented; by contrast, the publicly available sources do not establish that five-tonne glide bombs are used regularly in Ukraine. Reuters, 9 January 2025.

These weapons force a dilemma on the Ukrainians: staying in a shelter protects them from drones and artillery but exposes them to destruction by a heavy bomb; dispersing reduces that risk but leaves the men more vulnerable to FPV drones. They therefore make it easier to force the evacuation of a strongpoint and for Russian troops to infiltrate afterwards. On their own, however, they do not produce an operational breakthrough: ruins, mines and enemy surveillance still slow the infantry, while a fresh force is still needed to exploit the breach quickly.

Ukraine’s defence is a network, not a wall

Ukrainian resistance does not rest solely on a continuous line of trenches. It combines urban strongpoints, minefields, drone teams, dispersed positions, artillery and strikes on logistics routes. An area that looks empty on a map may therefore remain under observation and under fire.

Since the end of 2025, Ukraine has also been striving to hit Russian drone operators and launch sites. The ISW believes that this local superiority has slowed certain offensives and that temporary dominance of the tactical airspace has become a prerequisite for the return of mechanised manoeuvre. ISW, May 2026.

Encirclement by fire replaces the closed cauldron

Moscow does not necessarily need to close a cauldron completely. Its forces can advance on the flanks of a position, bring supply routes under the threat of drones and artillery, and then make rotations and evacuations too dangerous. The Ukrainian garrison theoretically retains a way out, but it gradually becomes impassable.

This form of partial encirclement has another advantage: it sometimes leaves the Ukrainians the option of withdrawing before they are taken prisoner. Russia then gains ground without having to sustain two offensive prongs strong enough to close and hold a complete perimeter. The “cauldron” gives way to gradual strangulation.

Terrain matters, but it does not explain everything

The Donbas combines industrial towns, slag heaps, railway lines, canals, rivers, reservoirs and strips of woodland. These obstacles channel attacks and favour defenders. The seasons of deep mud (Rasputitsa) also restrict movement off the roads. But the terrain does not in itself rule out a pincer manoeuvre. The main factor remains the impossibility of concentrating and sustaining a manoeuvre force over time under drone surveillance.

The gap between messaging and reality is also evident north-east of Kharkiv. The Russian commander of the 71st Motorised Division claimed on 12 September that ten Ukrainian battalions were encircled in a pocket of more than 400 square kilometres. Yet the map released by a Russian source showed an opening of about eleven kilometres between Russian positions. The ISW concludes that no Ukrainian unit is encircled in this area. The announced “cauldron” therefore amounts, at best, to a threat to withdrawal routes, not a closed pocket.

The northern front: a threat to reserves more than to Kyiv

Kyiv is taking seriously the possibility of a new Russian offensive from the north, but it should not be confused with a repeat of the march on the capital in February 2022. General Oleksandr Syrsky has identified Russia’s Bryansk region, opposite Chernihiv oblast, as the most likely starting point for any attack. By contrast, he considered an offensive launched from Belarus unlikely. Reuters, 30 June 2026.

A limited operation in the north could above all force Ukraine to stretch a front of some 1,250 kilometres even further and to hold back brigades that would then be lacking in the Donbas. Belarus thus retains a role as a source of pressure, a rear base and a diversion, even without taking a direct part in the offensive. A major attack on Kyiv would, moreover, require a concentration of troops, fuel, engineering assets and field hospitals that would be difficult to conceal. Forests, marshland, the small number of road routes and the rasputitsa would further complicate any deep mechanised advance.

North Koreans: a sectoral reinforcement, not a breakthrough force

The main firmly established North Korean ground deployment took place in Russia’s Kursk oblast, against the Ukrainian bridgehead. After that fighting, contingents were also used for demining and restoring the region. However, there is no sufficiently robust public evidence to support the claim that large North Korean units are regularly fighting in the Donbas or on the Zaporizhzhia front. Reuters, 14 November 2025.

Their conduct has changed. Initially deployed in highly aggressive and at times overly concentrated infantry assaults, the North Koreans suffered from their unfamiliarity with drone warfare and from language-related coordination problems with the Russians. They then learnt to disperse, to camouflage themselves better and to use drones. Their discipline and endurance make them a useful reinforcement in a given sector, but they solve neither Russia’s problems with combined-arms command and logistics nor the absence of a mechanised mass capable of exploiting a breakthrough and closing a large encirclement.

A shift that also limits Putin’s ambitions

This transformation sheds light on Russia’s territorial claims. Moscow can still gain ground in Donetsk and threaten some of the towns in the fortress belt. Conquering the annexed regions in their entirety, however, would require far more than an accumulation of small advances. It would mean, in particular, reaching the city of Zaporizhzhia and, in Kherson oblast, crossing the Dnipro to retake the right bank.

As of 12 September, the ISW estimated that Ukraine had held Russia to almost zero net gains since March 2026. Russian forces had made limited but significant progress around Kostiantynivka and east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, without managing to retain the initiative along the whole front. Vladimir Putin’s gamble therefore appears to rest as much on the future exhaustion of Ukraine and its allies as on the present capabilities of his army.

Manoeuvre warfare has not disappeared, but it must be prepared differently

Major breakthroughs could return if either side managed to neutralise the enemy’s drones temporarily, disrupt its communications and strike its reserves deep behind the lines. Ukrainian mechanised counter-attacks observed in 2026 suggest that a window for manoeuvre remains possible when local air superiority has been prepared in advance.

For now, however, the war remains dominated by dispersal, infiltration and attrition. Russia still seeks to outflank Ukrainian positions, but it is choking them village by village and road by road, rather than closing around them the vast pincers drawn up by the general staffs of the last century.

Read more in La Tribune des Nations

 

External sources

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

La Tribune des Nations dans votre boîte mail

Les dernières analyses de nos universitaires et journalistes sur la Genève internationale, la diplomatie et les conflits.

Gratuit. Désabonnement en un clic. Voir notre politique de confidentialité.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

La Tribune des Nations

La Tribune des Nations dans votre boîte mail

Les dernières analyses de nos universitaires et journalistes sur la Genève internationale, la diplomatie et les conflits.

Gratuit. Désabonnement en un clic. Voir notre politique de confidentialité.