By Victoria Gudzenko
Every day of war in Ukraine is changing more than the physiology of the country. It is also redefining political realities. When Russian tanks converged on Kyiv on 24 February 2022, the war not only called into question the very existence of the state but also upended the established political order. What remains of Ukraine’s political system as the nation fights for its survival? Can one still speak of a political system in the classic sense of the term in a country that has imposed martial law, where political actors are forced to redefine their role and where the future of the parties seems to be a labyrinth with no clear way out?

Martial law as the new political reality
The start of the full-scale war pushed political struggles into the background. The Ukrainian people have united around one overriding goal: victory. Only yesterday, political quarrels were dividing parliament, whose rifts now seem insignificant in the face of the threat hanging over the country’s very sovereignty. Martial law, in force since the first day of the invasion, has suspended the usual democratic processes: elections have been postponed and certain political activities have been suspended. The political struggle has taken other forms. Parliament’s role remains essential, even if the activity of political groups has been reduced to a minimum. The most influential parties support the government, giving the impression of seamless national unity. However, cracks can already be detected in this monolith, and they will only widen once the war is over or in the event of serious setbacks at the front.
Ban on pro-Russian parties: purge or threat to pluralism?
One of the most radical transformations since the invasion has been the ban on pro-Russian parties. The most emblematic case is that of the Opposition Platform – For Life (OPZZh), which the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) banned in June. Before the war, the party had a degree of influence in southern and eastern Ukraine. There was a risk that it would spread pro-Russian narratives, considered a threat to national security. The OPZZh never hid its ties with Moscow. One of its chief ideologues and its de facto leader, Viktor Medvedchouk, was regarded as close to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Their relationship, moreover, is not merely political. It also has a personal dimension, since Putin is the godfather of Medvedchouk’s daughter, Daryna, born in 2004.
Charged with high treason even before the invasion, Medvedchuk embodied pro-Russian politics in Ukraine and, under the scenario of Kyiv being taken in three days, he was tipped as the likely future president of a puppet regime. Medvedchuk tried to leave the country but was arrested by the special services in April 2022. In September of the same year, he was exchanged for 200 Ukrainian prisoners of war under a deal between the warring parties. Yuriy Boyko and other OPZZh leaders formed two new parliamentary groups, with 25 members in all, “Platform for Life and Peace” and “Restoration of Ukraine”, but their influence bears no comparison with that of the party before the war.
A majority of the population supported the ban on the OPZZh. It is one of the radical political shifts, since pro-Russian positions are no longer tolerated by a large majority of citizens. Only 15% of those polled (in the Donbas region, Kharkiv and Odesa) believe that relations between Ukraine and Russia could be restored in the coming decades.

However, the ban on the pro-Russian party was criticised by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Right Watch. Some politicians, notably representatives of Petro Poroshenko’s “European Solidarity” party, stressed the importance of political pluralism, even in a crisis. Instead of bans, they propose tightening oversight of parties’ activities and funding, as well as introducing mechanisms to prevent pro-Russian forces from using their position at home to undermine national security.
Concerns have also been raised about the potential consequences of the ban for the democratic process in Ukraine. Yulia Tymoshenko, the leader of Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), stressed that political competition is essential even in wartime, while acknowledging that pro-Russian parties pose a danger.On the whole, “European Solidarity” and other opposition forces are seeking a balance between the need to combat pro-Russian sentiment and respect for democratic principles.
The ruling party “Servant of the People” in wartime
The party’s name, “Sluga Narodu” (Servant of the People), is directly linked to the television series of the same name in which Volodymyr Zelensky, who went on to become President of Ukraine, played the lead role. Broadcast from 2015 to 2019, the series tells the story of an ordinary history teacher who becomes president by accident after a video denouncing corruption strikes a chord with the aspirations of Ukrainian voters. When Zelensky decided to go into politics, he founded a party bearing the same name in 2018, making “Servant of the People” the symbol of a new political culture seeking to break with the old practices of corrupt politicians. This generated considerable interest and the support of 75% of voters, as the party carried hopes of change and the promise of better living conditions.
This link between the party and the series also gave the candidate a high profile, as many people were already familiar with the character played by Zelensky and his ideas, which contributed to the 2019 election victory. It also showed that this new political force was reaching a broad section of the population ready to support the changes the country had long been waiting for. Moreover, according to many Ukrainian analysts, the popularity of the series helped to shape a narrative centred on the fight against corruption and the involvement of young people in politics.
The Servant of the People party thus emerged on the political scene as an extraordinary phenomenon, beginning its activity without a clearly defined ideological platform. Its success in the 2019 parliamentary elections rested mainly on Volodymyr Zelensky’s high popularity ratings. A centrist, populist, pro-European party, it has more than 35% support in the polls and has 213 MPs. This is also why, once in power, Servant of the People struggled to establish a strategy for the country. Ukrainian political analysts have also noted that the party brought together figures with varied, sometimes opposing, political views, which complicated its internal cohesion and undermined the coherence of its actions.
The war has changed the party’s priorities. Its original goals of structural reform, fighting corruption and social progress have been pushed into the background in favour of short-term management: national defence, support for the armed forces and resource management in a time of crisis. Yet it is precisely during this period that the party has faced a decline in support: whereas in 2022 it enjoyed the backing of around 37% of the population, according to the latest surveys that figure has fallen to 26%. Its harshest critics point out that “Servant of the People” MPs have not been immune to scandals or unjustified actions, which reveal their lack of preparation and professionalism. The party has also been criticised for its lack of a clear strategy in the war.
Moreover, the concentration of power in the hands of the president, backed by an absolute majority of MPs (*213 out of 423 at present) in the Verkhovna Rada, has altered the balance of power in Ukraine. Officially, Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic, which means that power is shared between the president, the prime minister and parliament. In practice, the strengthening of the Office of the President relative to the government and parliament has weakened parliament’s power of independent oversight of state action. The president wields significant influence over the legislative process and over appointments, bringing Ukraine closer to the model of a presidential republic, in which the president, rather than parliament, holds most decision-making power. This situation undermines the democratic principle of the separation of powers. This concentration of power is raising concerns about a possible drift towards authoritarianism.
Old faces and new challenges
Despite the political changes in the country, some familiar faces continue to dominate the political scene. One of them is Petro Poroshenko, with his party Yevropeyska Solidarnist (European Solidarity), a centre-right, reformist, pro-European party that has 21.8% support in the polls and 27 deputies in the Rada. Despite the controversies that arose during his presidency, Poroshenko now presents himself as an experienced politician with a clear national-patriotic stance, marked by his support for the armed forces and resolutely anti-Russian rhetoric. After the Revolution of Dignity and the 2014 elections, Petro Poroshenko was elected head of state at a time when Ukraine faced several challenges: military action in the east, the annexation of Crimea, the collapse of the economy and an enormous political crisis. His five years in power were marked by difficult decisions, each of them decisive for the very existence of Ukraine as an independent country.

European Solidarity therefore appears to be the party best prepared for a state of all-out war following the Russian aggression. Today, Poroshenko actively supports all the state’s efforts to defend that independence, and the wealthy oligarch even provides substantial assistance to the army. To his supporters he has become the symbol of the “home front”, while retaining the capacity for constructive criticism, highlighting weaknesses in governance when necessary. This approach, which combines support for the defence effort with criticism, notably of the slowness of decision-making by those in power, is a delicate balancing act that could just as easily strengthen or weaken him in the long run were it to become too confrontational towards Zelensky. Will European Solidarity remain as influential in future? It is hard to say, as Ukrainians may change their views after enduring the ordeal of war.
Fatherland: the decline of the populist era
Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) once embodied populism in Ukraine. This moderate left-wing, social democratic party won 25 seats in the parliamentary elections and has the support of 8-9% of the public. Its slogans (price controls, support for vulnerable people) met the expectations of a large part of the population, particularly older generations. In peacetime, it readily adapted its message to socio-economic themes. But the war has radically changed priorities, making national security, military support and national unity the central issues.
Today, Batkivshchyna seems more muted than ever. Tymoshenko’s populist rhetoric resonates less and less with a population whose priority is supporting its soldiers and defending the national interest. A certain scepticism towards figures from the past has weakened the party in particular. If the war drags on, it can be expected to lose further support, having failed to adapt its message to the circumstances. Tymoshenko remains a gifted orator, a figure who has kept loyal followers and may still wield some influence. But her promises seem outdated in the context of a war that demands sacrifices from everyone. It is conceivable that the war will mark the end of Tymoshenko’s populist era.
Holos: missed opportunities and the mirage of an alternative
Holos (Voice), a pro-European reformist party with 12% support in the polls and 20 MPs, has occupied a particular position in Ukraine’s political landscape. It emerged as an alternative to the old guard of Ukrainian politics. From its inception, Holos sought to embody a modern reformism: a party of new leaders with new ideas, speaking to young people. Svyatoslav Vakarchuk, the party’s former leader, was seen as a potential rival to Zelensky in the 2019 presidential election. As a musician who had gained fame, Vakarchuk was a frequent guest in the media and was presented as capable of offering a credible alternative to the traditional parties. In the end, however, he did not stand in the presidential election, preferring to focus on building his party. In the parliamentary elections, Holos won around 6% of the vote, which secured it representation in parliament.
Less than a year later, Vakarchuk left the political stage and, de facto, the party he had founded, Holos, to resume his career as a musician and frontman of the band Okean Elzy (Elsa’s Ocean). His departure (unlike the hero of his popular song, who says “I will not surrender without a fight”) left a void and dashed the ambition of mobilising the younger generation, with Holos at risk of disappearing. The party is nevertheless trying to reposition itself by focusing on support for anti-corruption initiatives and reforms, but it remains a long way from the potential that Vakarchuk had managed to mobilise.
The nationalist parties
Across Ukraine’s political spectrum, there are parties that openly display their nationalism and place the emphasis on questions of national identity, national heritage and the fight against external threats, such as VO Svoboda (Freedom), Natsionalnyi korpus (National Corps) and Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector). Their influence and the reality of their ideology are a far cry from what Moscow’s propaganda would have people believe, conflating nationalism with extremism or speaking of a neo-Nazi government in Kyiv. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, none of these parties reached the 5% threshold required for representation in the Rada. Little inclined towards radicalism, Ukrainians may embrace a nationalist ideology, but within the framework of the constitution, the limits of the law and democratic pluralism.
More than any others, the nationalist parties have adapted to the new reality. The “National Corps” and its affiliated structures immediately positioned themselves on defence issues. The military experience of many party members, notably through their links with the Azov Regiment, made famous by its resistance in Mariupol, proved decisive. Members of “Right Sector” also went to the front. The Ukrainian Volunteer Army, created by Dmytro Yarosh, remains active on the front line. Likewise, supporters of VO Svoboda (Oleh Tyahnybok) have become involved in humanitarian work or have gone off to fight.

In reality, these parties have temporarily dissolved themselves into the National Volunteer and Defence Movement. Their leaders remain visible, but their activities are geared more towards practical support for the army and society than towards the political arena. Is this silence temporary? Are they ready to return to the political fray after the victory they hope for, which could open a new chapter in the country’s history? For the nationalist parties, this will represent both an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, their ideas could appear outdated, because the notions of national identity and of combating the ideology of the “Russian World” (Russky mir), in opposition to an imperial domination that threatens freedom, democracy and the international order, have already become a widely shared political norm in Ukraine. On the other hand, they could play an important role by reminding everyone of the need to stay the course, to refuse any compromise on national security and to pursue the “decolonisation” of the state. What this war has clearly shown is that nationalist ideas not only command a consensus within the country, but are also necessary to build solid foundations for the state.
Their future and their political role will depend on their ability to adapt to new realities. Even if they disappear as such, these parties will have played an essential role in resisting the invader. And that is worth more than a mere parliamentary mandate, forming part of a broader struggle by Ukrainian society, driven by a concern for freedom, cultural identity and a passion for democracy.
The peace party: a strategic threat in the post-war period
The war has united Ukraine around the idea of national independence, but it has also exposed the weaknesses and strengths of each political party. After the war, in an optimistic scenario, Ukraine will need to renew its political class in line with the new demands of society: reconstruction, unity, transparency and genuine reform. Parties able to adapt to these new conditions and put forward constructive solutions will stand a chance of occupying key positions in the post-war political process. Those that fail to do so, by contrast, risk becoming a thing of the past.
But there is another scenario that represents the greatest threat to the country during this period. According to Ukrainian analysts (Oleksiy Haran, Ihor Koliushko, Volodymyr Fesenko and the journalist and analyst Vitaliy Portnikov), it is the possible emergence of a so-called “peace party”: a political force that could appear at the end of the war, focused on the idea of reconciliation with Russia and ending the conflict at any cost. There is a serious risk that such a grouping would betray the national interest, exposing the country to the danger of a revanchist Russia, or even becoming a catalyst for external pressure to secure a compromise at Ukraine’s expense.
This would be a scenario similar to that of Georgia, where after 2008 some political forces began promoting the idea that concessions must be made to the powerful Russian neighbour! A rift would then open up in Ukraine between those who want integration into the European Union and those who seek peace with Russia at the cost of concessions. This would create serious internal difficulties and undermine the country’s stability and independence. The question of the “peace party” is therefore not merely a political issue but also a strategic one, and will prove decisive for Ukraine’s future. History teaches us that in the face of an external threat, it is crucial to maintain unity and a clear strategic direction in order to defend national interests, without yielding to the temptation of quick fixes, such as peace at any price, at the expense of long-term security guarantees.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






