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Zachary Paikin: “Even Switzerland is not 100% neutral”

Western hegemony, Russia’s Eurasian turn, and a Swiss independence that does not equate to neutrality: the researcher at the American think tank Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft[1] analyses current geopolitical trends in the light of recent academic theories. Interview.

La Tribune des Nations (LTDN): In your 2020 publication on Western hegemony and Russia’s Eurasian turn, you refer to the notion of “international society”. Could you explain what this notion represents and the various theories that help to explain it? 

International society is a concept that comes from the English School of international relations. This theory stands somewhat apart. Generally speaking, and in North America in particular, students are taught that the major theories of international relations are realism, liberalism and constructivism. The English School is different. It dates back a few decades and was founded by scholars such as Hedley Bull, Martin White and Adam Watson, mainly in the United Kingdom. The concept of international society, which was essentially developed by Hedley Bull in his book The Anarchical Society, has two elements. On the one hand, there is a society, which implies rules, norms and expectations about how states ought to behave; on the other, there is the anarchical society, in which there are no laws that can easily be enforced. And this form of anarchy can be found in the world of international relations. Yet it is not the anarchy of neorealism[1]. Bull was writing in 1977 for the English School, at more or less the same time as the American political scientist Kenneth Waltz was developing his theory of structural realism. That theory put forward the idea that relations between states were structured systemically. In other words, if you put a state in a box and it comes under any kind of pressure, it will react in a predictable way. The balance of power would be something that works almost automatically. This is the logic of a system. For the English School, by contrast, the balance of power is more akin to a society. The balance of power is negotiated between the various states, and it is expectations that hold the whole thing in place. 

LTDN: How can this conception be applied to the contemporary world to gain a better understanding of its balances and of relations between states? 

An interesting question one can now ask is how homogeneous a society must be in order to function – homogeneous politically, but also culturally. This question has been raised since the 1980s by scholars such as Adam Watson and Hedley Bull. In their book The Expansion of International Society, published in 1984, they show how the “expansion” of international society began in the 19th century with the domination of the West and Europe across the world. This led to the development of institutions and notions such as the sovereign state, the balance of power, diplomacy and all the rules that states use to manage their relations, which were adopted by the rest of the world. In the process, these institutions, these ways of acting and these rules were diluted, because non-Western states were not organised in the same way as Europe. More recently, followers of the English School have put forward other ideas, according to which all societies are shaped by pluralism and heterogeneity from the outset. Is an international society conceivable that is formed out of the political diversity we see today between states as different as China, the United States, Russia and so on, but which might nonetheless share a few norms and ideas? For now, the answer is unclear  

LTDN: Recent years have shown that the liberal order has failed to become universal. In your view, what are the causes of this failure? 

Before answering that question, I need to qualify what has just been said. Between these great powers there are already shared basic assumptions that help us manage relations. There is, after all, diplomacy, there are institutions such as the United Nations, and there is international law, which is violated from time to time but remains the point of reference. The liberal order is a big question: it is a term that is generally put forward without its meaning being understood. Most people who think and say that the liberal order is threatened by this or that country are, I believe, confusing the liberal order with the international order. The liberal order as it exists today rests on Western power: without it, it will struggle to remain in good health. It encompasses norms and values that are not necessarily shared by everyone. So yes, the liberal order is part of the political normative space within the great tapestry of what exists in the world today, but it is not the same as the international order. The great debate is between the countries that confuse the liberal order with the international order and those that caution that we can agree with the idea that there should be an international order founded on international law, on multilateralism and on the United Nations, but that this does not mean we agree with everything the West wants to do, nor that the Western conception of order is equivalent to the global conception.  

LTDN: You explained in your publication that the China-Russia relationship was not intended to become a military alliance. Yet at the beginning of July the two countries announced joint military exercises. What should we expect from China-Russia cooperation in the coming years? 

First of all, you are right to say that this is not an alliance, since both countries want to retain a degree of strategic autonomy so that they can maintain their own relationships around the world. China does not necessarily want to be forced into a war with NATO if Russia is attacked. It prefers to see this relationship as a strategic partnership rather than an alliance. That does not, however, mean the relationship is any weaker. NATO is an alliance in which there is one great power, the United States, alongside other powers that are in fact junior partners. That is not the kind of relationship that exists between Moscow and Beijing. Secondly, the two powers feel threatened by Western hegemony, for different reasons, and that is one of the factors encouraging them to cooperate, but it is not the only one. Indeed, the two powers share a long common border. China is a rising power, and it is in Russia’s interest, whoever the Russian president may be, to maintain good relations with China.

“China does not necessarily want to be forced into a war with NATO if Russia is attacked. It prefers to see this relationship as a strategic partnership rather than an alliance.”

So yes, the West is encouraging these two powers to grow ever closer, but that does not mean one can attempt what Henry Kissinger did, namely to drive them apart. Yet even though there is common ground, and significant dynamics that encourage them to cooperate, there are major differences in how they conceive of the international order. Russia has long been more comfortable with the idea of mounting a direct challenge to the West, politically and strategically. China is starting to be, but it seems more hesitant so far. It prefers, and needs, an open international order in which to trade its goods and to develop economically and technologically. Russia is more autarkic. These differences are, however, a secondary consideration today, given the pressures, at least as perceived, faced by these two powers.

LTDN: In the face of the war in Ukraine, NATO and the West do not appear to be offering clear responses. Is the West failing to protect the “rules-based international order”, as the Biden administration feared? 

To return to terminology, the “rules-based international order” is a widely used notion today. The question is how to define those rules. If one wishes to speak of international law, one might as well simply say international law. However, if, for example, the United States declares itself “in favour of international law”, it will be easy for Russia and others to point to all the instances in which the Americans violated international law in the post-Cold War period, such as the invasion of Iraq. The United States uses such terminology because it is deliberately opaque and allows recourse to a supposedly neutral term which, in reality, is not used by other countries. Those countries tend instead to declare themselves in favour of an international order based on international law, on the UN system or on multilateralism, which entails political relations between states. Differences must be settled peacefully, without starting wars.

Multilateralism carries the possibility of change on the normative and political scale at the global level, whereas the idea of a “rules-based international order” protects the status quo. This shorthand allows Western hegemony to continue, even if we are somewhat blind to that reality. The term is no longer perceived as neutral and, for the Americans, that is clear. In the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, this order represents a bloc of countries led by the United States, made up of democracies and of other countries that are not, such as Saudi Arabia. The revisionist countries are Russia and China, because they oppose the American vision of the world. 

“In the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy (…) the revisionist countries are Russia and China, because they oppose the American vision of the world.”

LTDN: What do you make of the fact that Ukraine appears to be moving further away from membership of the European Union or NATO? 

The question of Ukraine’s membership of the EU or NATO cannot be answered without addressing the question of its place in the European security order. That can only be settled by adopting a degree of neutrality. But neutrality covers a broad family of traditions and does not necessarily mean strict neutrality. There could be some form of affiliation between Ukraine and NATO, but not one including Article 5 of the Washington Treaty [Editor’s note: the principle that an attack against one or more of its members is considered an attack against them all]. Indeed, the article is interpreted strictly today, but the reality is more complex when you read it. If you put this traditional assumption into practice and add the fact that NATO explicitly remains a nuclear alliance, the reality is that if Russia attacks a member state, it could lead to nuclear war. Another consideration arises: if Russia were to invade Estonia, for example, and Moscow had some way of denying it by blaming someone else, such as the population of Narva, there could then be an unofficial occupation of part of Estonia. If Estonia invoked Article 5 and the member states failed to respond, the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence would be undermined. 

LTDN: At the end of the Cold War, the Western order seemed ready to integrate Russia. Now we are witnessing a Russian turn to the East. How do you explain this shift, and in your view, is Russia’s “Greater Eurasia” project destined to become an alternative to the West? 

I think Russia’s “Greater Eurasia” project is not really clear. It has been around for a decade already; it is a way for Russia to assert its autonomy vis-à-vis the West. Indeed, Russia is not isolated from the world despite its invasion of Ukraine. The main reason Russia was not integrated into the West lies in the fact that we were unable to find it a place in the European security order commensurate with Russia’s status. NATO and the EU became the principal institutions of that order, which was not necessarily a given after the Cold War. There was an alternative vision, perhaps an ambiguous one, but one championed by Moscow, which sought to make the OSCE Europe’s principal institution. This more inclusive institution, which includes all European states, operates on the principle of consensus, which gives Russia a veto. Russia will never be able to join the EU or NATO. Whether deliberately or simply through inertia, we created institutions that cannot accommodate Russia, which is a problem because it is one of the most powerful countries on the continent…

“The main reason Russia was not integrated into the West lies in the fact that we were unable to find it a place in the European security order commensurate with Russia’s status.”

LTDN: In your publication, you set out in particular Canada’s position in the face of this new world order. Can you explain how Canada is trying to set itself apart from the West, and what its future international ambitions are? 

I think one of our great challenges is to take international relations more seriously. Unfortunately, the Canadian electorate is not very interested in foreign affairs. As a result, we end up with politicians from all the major parties, from the Liberals to the Conservatives, who have little reason to spend on defence or diplomacy, which is a problem given that we now live in an unpredictable world. The NATO Alliance nonetheless remains a very important cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy. We were one of NATO’s founding members, and it was Louis St-Laurent who, in the late 1940s, encouraged its creation for two reasons. First, to guarantee the United States’ involvement in the world. Second, it gave Canada an opportunity to sit at the table not only with the United States but with the United Kingdom, France and, after a few years, West Germany, and thus to broaden its diplomatic relations. But the world is now much bigger than Europe, and it is important for us to be able to settle and manage our relations with China, India and so on. We have just launched our Indo-Pacific strategy, but our relations with China and with India are both in crisis[2]. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joly, is in Beijing trying to renew our relations with China. How can you develop an Indo-Pacific strategy without well-developed relations with China and India, which are not only the two great powers of the region but also the world’s second and third powers? NATO remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy, but almost by default, and 90% of what Canada does comes down to the three Ns: NATO, No ad, NAFTA. In all three cases, these are relations with Europe and the United States.

With Russia, there are still disputes over the Arctic, maritime boundaries and the Northwest Passage, a sea route that runs between several Canadian islands. The waters surrounding these islands are regarded by the rest of the world as international waters, whereas Canada claims them as its own. In my view, as we are an increasingly limited power, making the Arctic one of our international priorities would be a very good idea. We can of course do so with our allies, particularly now that Sweden and Finland have joined NATO since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As a result, all the members of the Arctic Council except Russia belong to NATO and are our allies. According to our Department of National Defence, if we are secure on our own territory in the Arctic, we will have more room for manoeuvre to engage in Asia and Europe. The question we have to answer is to what extent we want to maintain that room for manoeuvre and our national capabilities in Asia and Europe, or whether we should accept not being a power, even a middle power, in Asia. Of course, we must protect our own region, the North Pacific, but that does not mean it makes sense to take part in deterrence missions against China to which we contribute little, for example in the Taiwan Strait. 

LTDN: Let us now turn to the BRICS. Relations between East and West, as well as the world order, are being profoundly reshaped by the growing role of the BRICS. The BRICS are a heterogeneous group, made up of countries that are culturally very different. Do you think they can speak with one voice to defend their strategic interests despite their diversity? 

It depends on their aims and on whether they want to rewrite or rebalance the international order. If they want to rebalance the order, that is feasible, but rewriting it is more complicated because, as you said, this is a very heterogeneous group. Some countries have good relations with the West, while others, such as Russia and China, position themselves rather against the West. It also depends on whether the group wants to expand. If it keeps expanding, that will dilute the influence of Russia and China, and it will become less and less anti-Western. 

LTDN: On 11 July 2024, at the BRICS forum in St Petersburg, Vladimir Putin floated the idea of creating a BRICS parliament. Some also believe there could be a kind of BRICS United Nations. Do you believe in this institutionalisation of the BRICS, and what will its consequences be for the world order? 

I do not have enough information to answer the question fully. In any case, these are countries that want to protect their national sovereignty, so it will not be a form of national integration of the kind the EU represents. I do not know how far they want to deepen their relations at the political level, but if they create some kind of institution, it will be more than symbolic, though it will not fundamentally change their world view. Would it symbolise the creation of an increasingly post-Western international order? Possibly. But that is something that is already under way. 

LTDN: Switzerland has been criticised by some for moving away from its historic neutrality, notably with regard to Russia. The UN world also appears weakened. Do you think International Geneva is in decline? 

During the Cold War, several states were neutral: not only Switzerland, but also Austria, Sweden and Finland. It was important to find places where East and West could meet and talk in confidence. The Helsinki Final Act could not have been signed without the role played not only by Finland but also by Switzerland. Many negotiations took place here in Geneva. Today, there are no longer any neutral countries, which is a pity. Even Switzerland is not 100% neutral. The country insists on maintaining an independent foreign policy, but independent does not mean neutral. Of course, neutrality is a great family tradition, and there are several possibilities. But even so, organising an international conference to promote President Zelensky’s Ukrainian peace plan without inviting the Russians, even if the conference did not become anti-Russian, is not something a neutral country would do. We now see that, by default, a great deal of money and negotiation is shifting to other regions of the world, such as Istanbul or Dubai, for example, where neutrality is somewhat more in evidence today. ”

Moreover, Vietnam shows the extent to which it is possible to maintain good relations, or at least working relations, with both the United States and Russia or China. So yes, of course, this will pose a problem for International Geneva. We are already seeing that the Russians are less and less willing to come to Geneva for negotiations. I do not know to what extent this will threaten the integrity of International Geneva in the long term, but it is not a good thing. Official discussions here are still full of grievances, but that has already been the case more or less everywhere for a decade, and it will not help the cause of restoring a functioning international and continental order. 


[1] “The Quincy Institute is a newly formed public policy think tank in Washington, D.C., whose mission is to promote ideas that move US foreign policy away from endless war and towards vigorous diplomacy in the pursuit of international peace. It envisions a world in which peace is the norm and war the exception. The Institute is transpartisan and operates independently of any political party.” https://www.linkedin.com/company/quincyinst/about/

[2] A school of thought founded by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics, based on the idea that the behaviour of states is determined by the anarchy of the international system.

[3] In 2018, Meng WanZhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer, was arrested by the Canadian authorities at the request of the US justice system, under a bilateral treaty between the two North American states. Shortly afterwards, the Chinese authorities arrested the “two Michaels”, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, on charges of espionage. These events triggered an unprecedented diplomatic crisis between China and Canada. 


Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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