
For several months now, the Libyan economy has been showing signs of suffocation, and the population has grown weary of the deteriorating performance of the country’s political, security and economic institutions. The Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, Issa Naji, has managed to secure the signing of a national unity budget between the two governments: in the east, the Government of National Stability (GNS), under the command of Marshal Haftar Khalifa and backed by the House of Representatives in Tobruk, and in the west, the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Dbeibah Abdel Hamid, supported by the High Council of State in Tripoli and recognised by the United Nations.
This duality of rival governments does not make it any easier to implement the country’s fiscal policy effectively. Fighting has intensified in the west of the country, and political demonstrations have persisted for fifteen years without the democratic aspirations so longed for by the population being realised.
Since the attack on 8 August 2026 by Ukrainian-made drones on the Zawiya refinery, which destroyed a power station as well as a tank containing thirteen million litres of petrol, according to the Brega Company, which is responsible for the oil complex, suspicion has been directed at the Dbeibah government, which remains silent on the findings of the investigation.
Two days after the attack, the head of military intelligence in Marshal Haftar’s army, Brigadier General Al Mansouri Fawzi, was assassinated in Benghazi by a car bomb. These two events mark an escalation of the conflict and threaten to derail the Boulos Plan put forward by President Trump and, above all, the roadmap of the Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Hanna Serwa Tetteh.
At a UN Security Council meeting on the country held by videoconference in 2025, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya said that she could not overemphasise the harmful effects of parallel institutions, in which the slightest appointment or reform can become a pretext for confrontation. The coexistence of two judicial systems, two budgets and a myriad of autonomous authorities, she said, undermines the very legitimacy of the state. The Libyan people deserve political stability and lasting peace, but for that the international community, too, must speak with one voice (UN, 2025).
The Boulos Plan
The Trump administration has sought to help Libyans unify their security, financial and administrative institutions, proposing in particular the creation of a new, inclusive executive authority to govern until elections are held. Massad Boulos, Tiffany Trump’s father-in-law and the president’s senior adviser on Arab and African affairs, Jeremy Berndt, chargé d’affaires, and representatives of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) have travelled to Libya on several occasions since 2025, encouraging an agreement in April 2026 on Libya’s first unified national budget […]
The United States has strengthened trade ties, notably through oil and gas agreements concluded in 2026 with Chevron and a $20 billion production enhancement agreement with Conoco Phillips and Total Energies (Blanchard, 2026). According to the White House spokesperson’s statement of 18 April 2026, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States of America welcomed the signing, on 11 April, of a unified budget for Libya for 2026. The agreement is likely to foster greater stability and prosperity for Libya (US Department of State, 2026).
Examining a number of reactions from political analysts, we note that the risk of deepening divisions within Libya’s elites is increasingly evident, since the plan delays the holding of elections and places at the forefront of the political stage an arrangement between three major families: those of Trump, Dbeibah and Haftar.
President Trump’s policy is basic: it does not rest on seeking the legitimacy that elections confer, but focuses on negotiation between families – one in Washington, which controls international financial flows and certain oil companies; another in Tripoli, which manages the representation of Libya’s administrative and financial institutions; and the last in Benghazi, which runs the production chain and the oil and gas export terminals. Ultimately, this model of conflict settlement amounts more to a deal between three owners – Dbeibah, Haftar and Trump – without the participation of the people. One question now arises : will this Boulos Plan survive in the future ?
The tangle of foreign interference
Inspired by the Tunisian Revolution, Libyans had begun openly challenging the regime. Gaddafi had responded in the most brutal manner imaginable, unleashing a full-blown civil war with the support of mercenaries recruited from Sahelian Africa […] As the capital of Cyrenaica threatened to fall to the Gaddafi loyalists’ counter-offensive, aircraft of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came to the rescue of the insurgents to prevent a massacre.
After several months of indecisive fighting, and at the cost of several thousand lives, the insurgents eventually seized Tripoli. Gaddafi and his last hard core of loyalists held out for a time in Sirte, the dictator’s home town. A NATO air strike killed him on 20 October 2011 as he attempted to flee the city (Roman-Amat, 2020).
After this success for the democratic coalition, anarchy took hold in the country. Western powers fled the disorder they had helped to create. Owing to widespread insecurity, oil production collapsed from 1.5 million barrels a day in 2011 to 200,000 in 2014. The country fell prey to gang leaders who sought to seize its oil resources or profited from the transit of African migrants to Europe (Dignat, 2021). After the killing of President Gaddafi, chaos reigned in Libya before it took on the appearance of a frozen conflict that from time to time gave rise to periodic crises, contained by warlords and the representatives of the two rival governments, the GNU and the GNA, but also by foreign interference.
Indeed, in late 2019 and early 2020, Turkey intervened decisively to prevent the fall of Tripoli during Marshal Haftar’s offensive. By deploying drones, electronic warfare systems and advisers, and by facilitating the transfer of Syrian fighters, Ankara shifted the balance of power, broke the siege of Tripoli and pushed the forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) back to the Sirte line.
Turkey has thus strengthened its strategic influence through military access, training partnerships and maritime and economic agreements […] Moscow has strengthened the operational capabilities of the Libyan National Army and consolidated its military presence in strategic areas around Sirte, Jufra and the Oil Crescent. Libya thus offers Russia leverage over Europe’s southern flank and a platform for access to North Africa and the Sahel (ASA, 2026).
Kremlin-backed private military security companies first arrived in Libya around 2016, when a military consultancy, Russian Security Systems (RSB-Group), carried out demining operations in north-eastern Libya, a region under LNA control.
In May 2018, a separate Russian private military company, known as the Wagner Group, began assisting LNA operations during the Libyan civil war. By May 2023, the Wagner Group had established a presence at no fewer than four Libyan air bases. Following the death of Wagner’s chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023, the Kremlin announced that Wagner’s African networks would be replaced by Africa-Corps (Chapman et al., 2026).
President Trump’s administration, for its part, is seeking to reverse a decade of American disengagement from Libya following the killing of US Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012, by imposing the appointment of Saddam Haftar, son of Field Marshal Haftar, as the future Head of Libya’s Presidential Council.
Washington thus has two main objectives : one geostrategic, which consists of reducing the presence of Russia’s military forces through AFRICOM’s activities, and the other geo-economic, involving the development of the energy market and the promotion of the activities of American oil companies. Saddam Haftar’s visit on 29 June 2026 to the seventh floor of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s department, as part of his preparation as a military leader for the presidency of Libya, was not well received by some politicians, notably those in Dbeibah’s circle. This American initiative is rekindling discontent among the Libyan population and worrying the UNSMIL team. Are the people the real problem, or is it the system in which they operate?
Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Italy and France are actors with less geostrategic influence than Turkey, Russia or the United States of America.
The international dimension is another crucial aspect of migration management in Libya. Owing to its strategic position, the country attracts various regional and international actors, each with its own interests. The European Union has played a major role in trying to limit the flow of migrants to Europe through financial aid, training for the Libyan coastguard and development projects. These initiatives have, however, drawn criticism, as they prioritise border control at the expense of migrants’ rights (Monyani, 2024).
Calls for the withdrawal of foreign military forces are popular and frequently reiterated in national and international forums, but to no effect.
An impasse
The existence of a dual executive and the stalled negotiations between rival parties on the adoption of a unified military framework that would pave the way for a new election point to an impasse. Neither government exercises authority over the whole of the territory, and both rely on armed groups and foreign support to stay in power and pursue wealth in a rentier economy where corruption is endemic.
Libya finds itself trapped between the interests of Western and Eastern foreign powers and the fragmentation of internal political and military forces. This situation weakens African regional cooperation and may lead to conflicting alignments among neighbours grappling with flows of weapons, mercenaries and migratory pressures, and it risks degenerating into a new conflict with consequences reaching far beyond Libya’s borders, into Chad, Egypt, Algeria, Niger and Sudan, or ending in the partition of the country.
References
- ASA, African Security Analysis, La crise libyenne en 2025 : fragmentation, influence étrangère et perspectives de stabilité, 2 January 2026, https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/libya-s-crisis-in-2025-fragmentation-foreign-influence-and-prospects-for-stability
- Blanchard, Christopher M, Libya and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 21 July 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11556/IF11556.36.pdf
- Chapman, B, Word, C , Coffey, S , O’Brien, S and al., Libya: Russia develops air base infrastructure likely to enable it to consolidate its military presence in North Africa and the Sahel, from the University of Texas at Austin, 3 June 2026. https://www.tearline.mil/public_page/libya-russia-develops-air-base-infrastructure-likely-to-secure-military-foothold-in-sahel-region
- Dignat, Alban, 20 October 2011: Gaddafi is killed by his opponents and NATO, 22.10.2021. https://www.herodote.net/20_octobre_2011-evenement-20111020.php
- Monyani, Margaret, Shifting Sands: Migration Policy and Governance in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, Institute for Security Studies, 2024, https://issafrica.org/fr/recherches/rapport-sur-afrique-du-nord/sables-mouvants-politique-et-gouvernance-migratoires-en-libye-en-tunisie-et-en-egypte
- UN, United Nations, Libya: two governments, the same deadlock, UN News, Global perspective Human stories, 14 October 2025. https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/10/1157675
- Roman-Amat, Beatrice, 1 September 1969: Gaddafi overthrows King Idris I in Libya, 25.08.2020. https://www.herodote.net/1er_septembre_1969-evenement-19690901.php
- U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on Libya Unified Budget Agreement, 18 April 2026. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-on-libya-unified-budget-agreement/
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






