By Hassan Hami, former Moroccan diplomat.
“Ceuta querida mia!” “Sebta, Habibati !” How many tears have been shed lamenting your fate! How many knives have been drawn to stab you and abandon your remains in makeshift graveyards! What emotion! What vindictiveness! What vengeful words People talk about everything, and nothing! Everything is spun, yet bar-room geopolitics bears no resemblance to the geopolitics of shared borders.
The storming of Sebta (Ceuta) on 30 July 2026 will go down in the annals of summer. Thousands of people swept into the enclave, swimming or scaling the border fences in the hope of finding refuge there. Most of these adventurers had not heard of the ruling by a Spanish judge stating that pushing back an undocumented migrant who has reached Spanish territory by sea is illegal. The ruling, handed down in the case of an Algerian, is at odds with the government’s decision to regularise thousands of undocumented foreigners who arrived in Spain before 31 March 2025. The exceptional regularisation scheme has in fact been closed since 30 June 2026.
The migration dilemma is compounded by the bill to grant Spanish nationality to the people of the so-called –Spanish– Sahara born before August or September 1977, when Spain withdrew from the territory following the signing of the Madrid Tripartite Agreement in 1975. The law was passed hastily in plenary session on 2 August 2026, although the vote had been scheduled for September.
A coincidence or premeditation?
These “adventurers” have fallen into the trap of people-smuggling networks. They include Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans, Sudanese, sub-Saharan Africans and others. The assault recalls the one in 2021, at the height of a diplomatic crisis between Morocco and Spain over a number of issues, notably that of the Moroccan Sahara. And it is precisely the political and diplomatic dimension that is being put forward to explain the current situation. A far-fetched analysis!
Let us talk about it to see things more clearly! If we can. This is a cocktail blending the sentimental, the sensational, the political, the diplomatic, the security-related, the military, the economic, the legal, the psychological and the social. In short, a geopolitical cocktail relished by analysts who love, in all good conscience, to get themselves in a muddle. And there is a great deal of speculation about the product served up for the consumption of readers and viewers by this summer, more sweltering than in the past, in both the literal and the figurative sense.
First, the sentimental and the emotional. In this respect, I am responding to three types of reaction and comment. The first reaction is that of a friend, well informed though he is, who shouts himself hoarse saying that he is ashamed to be Moroccan. The scenes of the mass flight wound him to the depths of his soul.
The second reaction is that of another friend, from the Doukkala region, a farmer by trade. He complains that the fellahs can no longer find workers to farm the fields and tend the orchards and livestock, even for wages that are attractive compared with past practice. The current situation is making matters worse.
The third reaction concerns the sharing of tweets by Spanish journalists and politicians by a highly respected Moroccan journalist who nonetheless allows himself to be carried away by emotion. The tweets bombard Morocco with accusations steeped in racism and xenophobia.
The common denominator of these three types of reaction and commentary is the question of Morocco’s image. Yet none of the commentators mentioned offers a convincing definition of what he means by image.
Second, sensationalism. A case in point is an interesting podcast revisiting the history of Sebta (Ceuta) and Mellilia. Its host, Mounir Doli, produces podcasts on the history of Morocco that command respect. He revisits the story of the rejection by Sultan Moulay Slimane (1792-1822) of a proposal put to him by the King of Spain to return the two enclaves of Sebta and Mellilia and the adjacent islands to Morocco in exchange for supplying Spain with foodstuffs at a time when his country was at war with Napoleon Bonaparte.
At the time, Morocco was enjoying record harvests that had whetted the appetites of many European countries. Moulay Slimane’s refusal rested on fatwas issued by the ulema stating that coming to the aid of “Christians” was considered inappropriate from a religious point of view.
Doli takes aim at the ulema and offers a biased reading of the geopolitics of the period. He goes further, insinuating that the Moroccan sultan, a great scholar in his day, was more inclined towards theology than politics, and that many murky areas of his reign are deliberately ignored or concealed.
Truncated and disingenuous readings
Doli makes no mention of Moulay Slimane’s refusal in 1880 to supply Napoleon Bonaparte, at his request, with a thousand well-equipped horses during the same war. The Moroccan sultan adopted a policy of neutrality towards the European countries at war with one another. He intended to spare Morocco from becoming entangled in a war that did not directly concern it. He was not as ignorant of the geopolitics of the time as all that.
Third, the political dimension. Opinions differ. But they agree on one essential point, namely the up-and-down relations between Morocco and Spain. There has been a remarkable shift since Spain declared in April 2022 that it officially supported the autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty in the Southern Provinces. Nevertheless, many differences remain. For Madrid’s relations with Rabat, which have always been a domestic political issue in Spain, have become even more so since then.
Fourth, the diplomatic dimension. Spain intends to maintain a balanced relationship with Morocco and Algeria. A risky venture, but an unavoidable one. Pedro Sanchez’s recent visit to Algiers is a case in point. Some commentary, lapsing into the most tedious speculation, talks of a deal struck between the two countries to antagonise Morocco. A reasonable reading of the regional strategic chessboard debunks such an analysis without needing to dwell on it.
Fifth, security. Sebta (Ceuta) and Mellilia are generally seen by Spain (and Europe) as a bulwark and a barrier against migration from Morocco. Spain wants to turn Morocco into a kind of gendarme protecting European interests. For four decades, the Spanish and the Europeans have made commitments without fully honouring them.
It is worth highlighting the bad faith of certain propaganda networks that are recirculating a statement by the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs dating back to May 2021, in which he said that Morocco was not Europe’s “gendarme” or “concierge”. Morocco’s detractors are giving the impression that this is a recent clarification.
Sixth, the military dimension. It naturally carries an undeniable strategic significance. The enclaves of Sebta (Ceuta) and Mellilia are not among the territories that fall under the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the event of aggression under Article 5 of the Alliance’s founding treaty. The Canary Islands, by contrast, enjoy NATO protection under Article 6, because they fall within the geographical area of North America, Europe, Turkey or the islands of the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Such a configuration irks Spain, all the more so because Morocco enjoys the status of a major ally and strategic partner in NATO’s southern neighbourhood . Moreover, on 16 April 2026 Morocco and the United States are signing an agreement setting out a roadmap for defence cooperation for the period 2026-2036. The agreement targets interpolarity, the defence industry, military innovation and cybersecurity. It also covers the creation of a joint military training centre for partner African countries in Tan Tan. This is bound to worry neighbouring countries, Spain among them.
Seventh, the migration tragedy is becoming a pretext for settling scores from a distance between the Europeans and Spain on the one hand, and between the United States and Spain on the other. Already, European countries intend to suspend Schengen visas with Spain. Italy, which suffers from irregular migration, is taking a stand and deciding to do so, much to Spain’s dismay. The United States, for its part, is denouncing Spain’s migration policy and drawing a dramatic conclusion, claiming that Europe will soon be “dead” because of its laxity on migration.
Some interpretations are baffling, including one that puts forward a conspiracy theory. On the face of it, the arguments advanced hold water. Yet nothing could be less certain. Here they are:
- The explanation linking Spain’s position on the question of Palestine and on the war between the United States, Israel and Iran with the timing of the assault on Sebta.
- One explanation suggests that Morocco deliberately encouraged the assault in retaliation for the warming of relations between Spain and Algeria. Some have gone so far as to claim that a dramatic U-turn has already taken place at Morocco’s expense.
- A second explanation, which follows from the first, holds that Spain is irritated by the dramatic rapprochement between Morocco and France. Reports, not officially confirmed, of a possible visit by King Mohammed VI to France before the end of the year lend weight to this narrative.
Moreover, a historic agreement is expected to be signed during the planned visit. The mere announcement is already sending shivers through the Spanish political class across the spectrum. The visit would lay the foundations of a new partnership between Rabat and Paris based on sovereign equality, breaking away from the provisions of the La Celle-Saint-Cloud Declaration of 6 November 1955 on Moroccan independence, which followed the Aix-les-Bains talks (22-25 August 1955).
Should this materialise, it would be a slap in the face for Spanish interests or, at the very least, would call into question the arrangements reached in the spirit of the 1975 tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.
- Still on the subject of Spanish apprehensions, and lending support to the analysis of the conspiracy theorists, there are two historical facts. First, the forceful reaction of the Spanish political class in the wake of the establishment of the Arab-African Union between Morocco and Libya in 1984. At the time, prominent voices across the political and military spectrum protested and called for Morocco to be placed under watch.
- The timing of the incidents. Here, too, there are two reference points. On the one hand, the incidents on Leila Island coincided with King Mohammed VI’s celebration of his marriage (21 March, and 12 and 14 July 2002). On the other, the recent incidents coincide with the commemoration of the 27th anniversary of the Sovereign’s accession to the throne.
- On the other hand, there is the virulence with which the Spanish government handled the crisis between Spain and Morocco during the incidents around Leila Island on 11-18 July 2002. Not only did José María Aznar, the head of government, resort to the threat of military force, but he signed a treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation with Algeria in October 2002, just two months later. That treaty was suspended by Algeria in March 2022, after Spain recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara. It is said to have been reactivated de facto following the Spanish head of government’s visit to Algiers on 21 July 2026.
Eighthly, the economy. Morocco’s development is viewed with disfavour by certain shadowy interests in Europe, and more particularly in Spain and France. The ports strategy adopted by Morocco has set teeth on edge. The success of the Tanger-Med port and the promising prospects of the ports of Nador in the north and Dakhla in the south are reshuffling the cards of international maritime trade in Morocco’s favour on both its Mediterranean and Atlantic flanks.
Likewise, the new configuration raises the question of maritime sovereignty. Undersea resources, notably the narrative surrounding Mount Tropic, are whetting appetites. They pose a dilemma for Spanish decision-makers on numerous issues, not least that of maritime sovereignty under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
This is the case with the definition of the territorial sea and its relationship to the notion of archipelagos that do not enjoy the status of fully sovereign states. Spanish apprehensions grew in the wake of Morocco’s adoption of Law No. 37.17 on Maritime Delimitation of 30 March 2020, supplementing and amending Law No. 1.73.211 of 2 March 1973 to set the limit of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles.
Ninth, the strengthening of the American presence in the Sahara opposite the Canary Islands, and the military interest the United States is taking in West Africa and the Sahel, are causing sleepless nights for traditional powers such as Spain and France. While France expects not to be sidelined in the new strategic configuration vis-à-vis the United States, with a view to signing a new agreement with Morocco, the same cannot be said of Spain.
The United States reaffirmed its position on the Sahara on the eve of and on the day of the Throne Day celebrations. President Donald Trump thanked King Mohammed VI for doing him the honour of naming the Tiznit-Dakhla expressway after him. In his message of congratulations, he reiterated the United States’ recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Southern Provinces.
American recognition above all carries an overarching security and strategic dimension. It is in this light that the reference to the Sahel region in the American head of state’s message should be interpreted. All of this is linked to the Africa-Atlantic gas pipeline project, which is moving towards completion following the signing, on 19 July 2026, by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of the Intergovernmental Agreement governing the development of the pipeline.
Tenth, the legal dimension. This is the explanation that deserves greater attention and rigour. It is time to take the bull by the horns and ask the central question: the status of the two enclaves of Sebta and Melilla. Are they territories included indefinitely under Spanish sovereignty, whatever the circumstances? Or are they, as Morocco claims, two Moroccan cities and Moroccan islets that must inevitably be returned to Morocco? The two claims have been colliding for ages. Mindsets, however, must evolve.
The status of the enclaves is the real problem
That is why the two countries consult each other so as not to provoke the irreparable. Several solutions have been put forward since the 1980s.
ONE, the proposal by the late King Hassan II, on 3 March 1987, to set up a joint multidisciplinary unit for structured, diplomatic, discreet and ambitious reflection on the future of the two cities and the adjacent islets. TWO, the joint management of the affairs of the two enclaves and the adjacent islands, either permanently or for a reasonable transition period to be set by the two countries, away from political and diplomatic pressure.
It is certain that the two enclaves cannot endure isolation and economic strangulation for ever. They have been a burden for Spain ever since Morocco put an end to the smuggling trade.
Sebta and Melilla are not an isolated case. The enclaves raise the broader question of the overseas territories and departments of many European and North American countries. So much so that voices, still timid, are beginning to grow alarmed in Spain, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
The incidents in Ceuta call for a rethink of the narrative and policies on migration and immigration in Europe. Migration, whether selective or random, must not vindicate those who want to turn Europe into a fortress while acknowledging that its population is ageing. You cannot have your cake and eat it.
Better still, Europe is urged to move beyond its ideological dogmatism and its supposed cultural ascendancy : foreign populations from Africa and the Middle East seek, in good conscience, gradual integration rather than arbitrary assimilation.
Eleventh, the psychological dimension. Between Morocco and Spain there are legacies and scars that create deadlock whenever incidents occur. Relations are highly charged. The psychological dimension shapes diplomatic relations. It is present in two contemporary historical episodes.
The Rif War (1921-1926) and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) on the one hand; the Spanish withdrawal from the so-called –Spanish– Sahara in 1975 on the other. In both cases, the Spanish political landscape was dominated by the imperatives of transition ; this led the decision-makers of the time to make concessions in Morocco’s favour. Yet every cloud has a silver lining. In a broader sense, this echoes Cervantes’ line in Don Quijote de la Mancha: “Confia en el tiempo, que suele dar dulces salidas a muchas amargas dificultades.”
In fact, the answer is to let time take its course and work towards a win-win solution in the spirit of the proposal made by the late King Hassan II and in keeping with the broader reflection on the strategic partnership between the two countries, now that the psychological barrier of Spain’s recognition of the Moroccan character of the Sahara has been lifted.
Twelfth, social issues and the cultivation of pessimism. Self-flagellation is a troubling attitude because those who engage in it are aware of doing so. Self-flagellation goes hand in hand with bad faith. Bad faith fuels denial and the refusal to acknowledge the progress made by Morocco, despite the difficulties encountered.
The lessons to be drawn from these dramatic events can be summarised as follows.
- The harmful role of media outlets serving particular interests and of social media, which distort information, fabricate stories and work, knowingly or unknowingly, for domestic and foreign agendas.
- It is time to dare to adopt a coherent legal framework to clean up the mass media. Such a demand may meet with objections on the grounds of freedom of expression. A legal means would then have to be found to reconcile this freedom with neutralising the voices that thrive on discord.
- The bad faith of political actors and civil society movements. They exploit tragedies on the scale of those of recent days to advance partisan political agendas. The forthcoming legislative elections will undoubtedly change, to a large extent, the traditional perception of the political game.
- A transition is under way in the right direction. It is the logical continuation of the transitions taking place at regional and international level. Diffuse, even shadowy, interests are stirring. They are seizing on the situation to reposition themselves. This ambition is legitimate, but it must be reasonable.
- The question of migration and immigration. Europe is becoming a fortress. For at least three decades, the admission of foreigners has been highly selective. The incidents in Ceuta offer some European Union member states the perfect pretext to demand that borders be closed to illegal migration. They are calling for the adoption of draconian laws and for the issue to be removed from domestic political calculations.
- The failure of the Moroccan security forces to react at the time is reportedly explained by security considerations. The narrative that Morocco orchestrated the incidents in Ceuta, in response to Pedro Sánchez’s visit to Algiers, is baseless and must be condemned in the strongest possible terms. Had the security forces responded with force, they would have provoked clashes with groups manipulated by clandestine migration networks. Such a scenario would have been condemned by defenders of human rights and of the right to freedom of movement, at the height of the summer season.
The incidents in Ceuta challenge society and the state over the image they hold – and project – of living together, of social mobility and of ever-widening disparities. However, one must beware of fostering manipulative rhetoric, such as that of those who, waking up after a good long lie-in, call for the creation of an independent commission of inquiry into possible complicity (implicitly on the part of the government) in what has just happened.
Equally, it is dangerous not to warn against rhetoric calling for a witch-hunt against individuals or groups whose rapid enrichment supposedly raises questions. There are legal procedures for this. They must be respected, and irregularities must be reported if they are found. That is all.
Blatant hypocrisy can be seen at every level of Moroccan society. The most astonishing are those who belong to groups less in need than the majority of their fellow citizens. They voice their solidarity in words, but balk at paying their taxes, honouring their family obligations and behaving as model citizens.
During a discussion about this kind of behaviour, a friend suggested, to ease the tension, that those around the table who, thank God, own villas of 500 m² to 1,000 m², in which they have no longer lived since the children left home, convert them into social housing and offer them to people in need. Deathly silence.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






