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Globalisation is driving crime offshore

Article written with AI.

Homicides are falling worldwide, but organised crime is thriving. In a report published in September, UNICRI (the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) describes crime shifting from the streets to ports, free trade zones and screens, while states respond with force and surveillance.

The global homicide rate fell from 5.9 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 to 5.2 in 2023, and could drop by a quarter by 2030. Yet the report “Crime and Justice in a Changing World”, just published by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), paints a far bleaker picture. Drawing together nine regional studies conducted since 2025, it describes a world in which crime is falling on one side and soaring on the other. There is no contradiction, its authors insist: criminal profit has simply changed address. It is generated less through local predation than on transnational markets, through online fraud and through the exploitation of legal trade.

Two regions, two-thirds of victims

The global average masks stark inequalities. Latin America and the Caribbean, together with sub-Saharan Africa, account for around two thirds of the world’s homicide victims. In these regions, violence is often fuelled by gangs and transnational criminal groups. Elsewhere, “conventional” crime (theft, assault) is falling. But drug trafficking, cybercrime, environmental crime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling are on the rise.

Trafficking in cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine is now merely a starting point. Latin American cartels have expanded into agriculture, mining, fishing and the sale of alcohol and cigarettes. In Oceania, motorcycle gangs are involved in drugs, extortion, illegal gambling and trafficking. In Europe, Europol estimates that around 18% of criminal networks are “poly-criminal”.

According to analysts cited, Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel and the CJNG have even adopted a “foreign policy”: they forge ties with brokers and corrupt officials to open up new routes, much as a state would with its trading partners.

Cambodia: when crime accounts for as much as 60% of GDP

The report refers to “convergence zones”: territories where criminal opportunities, absent oversight and organised networks meet. The most striking example is in South-East Asia, in certain areas of Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, often special economic zones. Thousands of people there are trafficked and forced to carry out online scams, including the notorious romance and bogus investment scams known as “pig butchering”, as well as cryptocurrency fraud.

In Cambodia, illicit revenue linked to these activities and to illegal gambling is estimated at between $12.5 billion and $19 billion a year, or up to 60% of GDP. The criminal economy, the report notes, has “started to overtake” the legal economy. And the model is being exported: it has already been observed in southern Africa.

Ports, mines, property: legal trade infiltrated

This is the common thread running through the report: the line between legal and illegal markets is fading. The ports of Antwerp, Cape Town and Guayaquil are targeted by networks that plant accomplices there to smuggle cocaine through. In the Sahel, terrorist groups prefer to “tax” the movement of motorbikes, fuel, gold and drugs rather than traffic them. In Haiti, gangs target the commercial areas through which goods pass. Property and construction are used to launder the proceeds of drugs and corruption, from Oceania to West Africa. The consequences go beyond security. When traffickers take new routes, transit countries become consumer countries. Oceania, West Africa and southern Africa are seeing addiction rise, even though they have the fewest resources to tackle it.

Crime on the cheap

Technology has slashed the cost of entry. Generative artificial intelligence, “cybercrime as a service”, commercially available drones, encrypted messaging, digital assets: a criminal group no longer needs to be sophisticated to strike on a large scale.

The scale of the damage remains hard to quantify. Estimates of the cost of cybercrime range from $172 billion in 2017 to $8,000 billion in 2021, and up to $10,500 billion for 2025. On scams alone, the Global Anti-Scam Alliance reports that 57% of adults surveyed in 42 countries have fallen victim to one, and that 23% lost money over a twelve-month period.

The overall bill is staggering: the economic impact of violence reached $21.8 trillion in 2025, or 10.5% of global GDP. In Latin America, crime costs 3.44% of GDP, equivalent to 78% of the region’s spending on education.

States tighten the screws

In response, governments are taking a tougher line. UNICRI describes a post-Cold War consensus, that of policing which respects rights and the rule of law, as “fraying”. Militarised police, armies deployed against crime, more punitive prisons, rising pre-trial detention: security is taking precedence over freedoms.

Minors are on the front line. Several countries in Oceania, East Asia and Latin America have lowered the age of criminal responsibility, even though the studies cited show no deterrent effect. On migration, the report stresses that research finds little link with crime, but that public perceptions have hardened and are fuelling increasingly security-driven policies.

Surveillance is following suit: number-plate readers, AI cameras, facial recognition. The report highlights a mismatch: states are acquiring equipment faster than they are putting safeguards in place. It cites the risk of errors in police reports drafted by AI, or of predictive policing supplanting community policing.

Every man for himself, or nearly

International cooperation is fragmenting. Providers of assistance for justice reform (training, equipment, technology) are multiplying, with differing models of policing. For recipient countries, that means more choice and less dependence. But the common foundation, made up of UN standards such as the Nelson Mandela Rules, is crumbling.

Cooperation between states is becoming more “transactional”, driven by economic or commercial interests rather than by the fight against crime. Regional organisations are partly filling the gap. In West Africa, a network of prosecutors handled more than 1,000 requests for mutual legal assistance between 2013 and 2023, although cases rarely reach a conclusion.

Five angles, one mechanism

The report sheds light on these trends through five cross-cutting themes.

Conflict and terrorism. Armed groups live off illicit economies: weapons, gold, kidnapping, timber, methamphetamine. Purely military responses often fail, because these economies support entire communities, as migrant smuggling does in the Sahel.

Environment. Climate does not directly create crime, but poverty, displacement and resource scarcity provide fertile ground for it. Fishermen deprived of resources turn to drug trafficking or migrant smuggling.

Cities. Urbanisation is not criminogenic in itself: everything depends on governance and inequality. The report praises municipal initiatives such as Alto al Fuego in Mexico City, and the fall in homicides in São Paulo, linked to data-driven policing, restrictions on firearms and prevention.

Gender-based violence. It worsens in conflicts and along migration routes. Statistics vastly underestimate the reality, and online harassment and sexual deepfakes are soaring, notably in South Korea and China.

Youth. Armed groups recruit children: 371 cases were verified in Colombia in 2025, and nearly 900 in Haiti. In Ecuador, the homicide rate among children and adolescents soared by 640% between 2019 and 2023.

Figures to be handled with caution

The study acknowledges its limitations. Only 9 of the 18 institutes in the UN crime prevention network responded, a rate of 50%. It draws on 26 interviews, two written contributions and more than 300 sources, including press articles where data were lacking. Its coverage therefore reflects the availability of experts more than the reality of crime: Europe and North Africa are under-represented, and Central and South Asia, home to more than a quarter of the world’s population, has no institute in the network. Definitions and statistics vary from country to country, which makes comparisons fragile.

What next?

UNICRI offers no ready-made solutions but five lines of research: how criminal models spread from one region to another; when and where convergence zones form, and whether they can be dismantled before they become entrenched; what long-term effects “securitisation” has on crime and on the legitimacy of institutions; what difference more transactional cooperation makes; and how multipolar justice reform is transforming practices on the ground

Read the full report here:

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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