Home / History / Kyivan Rus’: the war over origins (Part 3: two models of statehood)

Kyivan Rus’: the war over origins (Part 3: two models of statehood)

Painting of Pylyp Orlyk holding the 1710 Constitution.

If the Hetmanate became the political heir to the Ukrainian tradition of statehood in the early modern era, the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk was its most accomplished intellectual synthesis. In 1710, after the defeat of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the Battle of Poltava, part of the Ukrainian political elite found itself in exile. One might have thought that this was precisely the moment when the Ukrainian tradition of statehood would lose its political voice. Yet the opposite happened. It was then that one of the most remarkable politico-legal documents of its time came into being: the “Pacts and Constitutions of the Rights and Freedoms of the Zaporozhian Host”, concluded by the new hetman, Pylyp Orlyk.

Original of the Pacts and Constitutions of the Rights and Freedoms of the Zaporozhian Host

At the beginning of the 18th century, this was a remarkably modern political conception. The state was understood not as a sovereign’s personal domain, but as a community in which power was bound by law, by mutual obligations and by a political contract. It would be simplistic to claim that the Orlyk Constitution was actually put into practice. It remained the programme of a state that had lost control of its territory. But the historical significance of a document is not always measured by what it changed immediately; it is also measured by what it bore witness to.

And it is precisely here that history takes a particularly revealing turn. In Bender, in 1710, as the new hetman Pylyp Orlyk was drafting his “Pacts and Constitutions…”, Peter I was completing, to the north-east, an entirely different state project. In 1721, the Tsardom of Muscovy officially became the Russian Empire. The tsar took the title of emperor, while the new state proclaimed itself heir to the great historical tradition of Rus’. Autocracy thus received its full ideological justification.

History rarely offers such telling parallels. Almost at the same moment, on the same historical foundation of ancient Rus’, two different models of statehood were taking shape. One rested on the idea that power must be bound by law, representation and political agreement. The other asserted that the might of the state rested on centralisation, the concentration of power and the supremacy of the monarch. Both states were products of their time. But their political ideals were already moving in different directions.

Drawing of a Zaporozhian Cossack in the 18th century.

The Ukrainian model was not a democracy in the modern sense. It remained based on social estates and was limited in scope. But the very idea that power must be bound by law, election and political agreement was fundamentally different from the one developing in the Russian Empire. And for the Russian Empire, this Ukrainian autonomy began to pose a problem that was not only political, but historical too.

In the second half of the 18th century, the Russian Empire set about systematically dismantling Ukraine’s autonomous institutions. In 1764 the Hetmanate was abolished; in 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed; and then, step by step, the regimental and company system was abolished as well. This was not merely an administrative reform. It was the suppression of an alternative political model which, by its very existence, contradicted the imperial vision of a single path of development for the Ruthenian world.

With the autonomous institutions went the mechanisms through which Ukrainian society could organise its own government. The former Cossack elite was gradually absorbed into the imperial system, local institutions were replaced by administrative models common to the whole Empire, and the space for a distinct Ukrainian political self-government shrank ever further. Yet the disappearance of political institutions did not mean the disappearance of historical memory.

And it is precisely here that another struggle begins — a struggle not only for territory, but also for the right to name one’s own past. For the Empire did not seek merely to incorporate the Ukrainian lands into its territory. It sought to convince the world that a distinct Ukrainian political tradition had never existed.

That is why the questions of Rus’, the Cossacks, the Hetmanate and the Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk have not merely become subjects of historical research. They have turned into a field of confrontation between two different visions of the past: on the one hand, a tradition in which Ukraine appears as an autonomous historical actor; on the other, an imperial conception that seeks to present it as no more than a part of other people’s history.

Translated from French. The French original prevails.

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