
Donald Trump has once again suspended planned strikes against Iran. The White House is presenting the decision as a last chance for a swift agreement on the nuclear issue and maritime navigation. But the pause also reflects a more material constraint: after five months of war, US stocks of Patriot and THAAD missiles have fallen sharply. Washington must protect its bases and its Gulf allies, support Ukraine against Russian salvoes and prevent an attack on Iranian energy from triggering retaliation against Saudi infrastructure. Behind Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb could thus prove the other decisive issue in the negotiations.
Donald Trump had threatened to hit Iran “very hard”. The United States and Israel were considering a new campaign against refineries, power stations and other vital infrastructure. Then the US president announced that the planned attacks had been called off, claiming he had been asked to do so by Iran and several countries in the Middle East. The suspension remains conditional: Tehran would have to agree swiftly to the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and put an end to what Washington describes as the Iranian nuclear threat.
This decision is neither a ceasefire nor a change of doctrine. It extends a method that has become familiar: Trump announces an imminent strike, ramps the threat up to the maximum, then suspends the operation to open a window for negotiation. The next salvo has been postponed; the war, however, remains open.
The fourth pause, at least
Since the war began on 28 February 2026, Donald Trump has already halted or postponed military campaigns against Iran on several occasions. The forms have varied — a negotiated truce, an operational pause, a conditional suspension or a temporary halt to the bombing — but the mechanism remains the same: military action is used to establish a balance of power, then halted in order to test a diplomatic way out.
| Date | Nature of the suspension |
| 7 April 2026 | Bombing suspended as part of the truce that preceded the ceasefire of 8 April. |
| May 2026 | Temporary pause in the operation to reopen Hormuz, as mediators tried to revive talks. |
| 8 June 2026 | Fresh US call for a halt to strikes, swiftly undermined by the resumption of hostilities. |
| 25-26 July 2026 | A bombing campaign halted to give Omani mediation a chance. |
| 1 August 2026 | Planned strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure called off, on condition of a swift agreement. |
This succession of pauses does not prove that Trump is reluctant to use force. Rather, it shows that he is still seeking a political outcome without tipping into the systematic destruction of Iran’s infrastructure. But each new halt also weakens the credibility of an ultimatum presented as final. Tehran may be tempted to conclude that the American threat remains negotiable until the very last moment.
Mohammed bin Salman applies the brakes
The call from the Saudi crown prince probably carried more weight than Washington’s messaging is willing to admit. Mohammed bin Salman is not seeking to protect Iran. He wants to prevent a campaign against Iranian refineries and power stations from turning Saudi Arabia into a priority target for retaliation.
Tehran has warned that an attack on its energy grid would trigger strikes on the oil, electricity and water facilities of the United States’ allies. The threat is credible. Iran possesses solid-fuel ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles capable of altering their trajectory during the terminal phase. These manoeuvres do not make Iranian weapons invulnerable to Patriot or THAAD, but they complicate interception calculations and reduce reaction time.
The main danger lies above all in combined attacks. A salvo combining ballistic missiles, manoeuvrable warheads, drones, low-flying cruise missiles and decoys can saturate radars and rapidly exhaust launchers. Defenders sometimes have to fire several interceptors at a single threat. An Iranian attack involving a few dozen delivery vehicles can therefore result in the expenditure of a far greater number of defensive missiles.
Missile shield wears thin
According to an estimate by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, cited by the Associated Press, the fighting against Iran is thought to have consumed around 65% of the initial US stock of Patriot interceptors and 38% of its THAAD stock. The Pentagon says it retains robust capabilities, but there is little doubt about the trend: munitions are being expended far faster than industry can replace them.
The THAAD situation is particularly telling. No new interceptors are reported to have been delivered since August 2023, and deliveries are not expected to resume until 2027. The United States is increasing its orders and preparing to speed up production, but supply chains cannot rebuild in a matter of weeks stockpiles that took several years to accumulate.
This shortage forces choices. A missile defence system does not protect an entire country in the abstract. It covers a defined area, with a limited number of radars, launchers and interceptors. Saudi Arabia must simultaneously defend Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Jubail, its East Coast terminals, its air bases, its Red Sea ports, its power stations and its desalination plants. Across such a vast territory, not everything can enjoy the same density of protection.
Every Patriot fired in the Gulf is one fewer for Ukraine
The strain extends beyond the Middle East. Patriot missiles are one of the few means Ukraine has of intercepting Russian ballistic missiles. THAAD systems are not deployed in Kyiv, but their growing scarcity has an indirect effect: when Washington has to reserve more Patriots for the defence of its own forces and its allies, the number of interceptors that can be transferred to Ukraine has to be limited.
The same production lines have to supply American batteries in the Middle East and Asia, the systems of Gulf allies and Ukraine’s defences. This is not a mechanical equivalence — not all missiles are interchangeable and the contracts belong to different armed forces — but a single industrial bottleneck.
This tension comes as Russia steps up strikes combining drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. A fresh Russian campaign against Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure would force Washington to choose between several theatres. Every resumption of the war against Iran risks triggering salvoes that will use up dozens more interceptors. These will then be lacking in the Gulf, at American bases or in Ukraine.
Hormuz in the communiqué, Bab el-Mandeb at the negotiating table
Donald Trump presents Hormuz as the official heart of the negotiations. The strait controls access to the Persian Gulf and carries a significant share of global exports of oil and liquefied natural gas. But for Riyadh, Bab el-Mandeb has become almost as important.
Saudi Arabia has an East-West pipeline linking its eastern oilfields to the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea. This infrastructure is meant to allow it to bypass Hormuz. Yet it loses much of its value if the Houthis can block or threaten Bab el-Mandeb, attack Saudi tankers and strike installations on the west coast.
On 23 July, Houthi attacks on two Saudi tankers opened a second maritime chokepoint in the war. Reuters had also reported that Tehran had asked the Houthis to stand ready to close Bab el-Mandeb if the United States struck Iran’s power grid. In that scenario, Iran would not only threaten Gulf exports through Hormuz; it could also neutralise Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea bypass route.
It would therefore be going too far to claim that Bab el-Mandeb has replaced Hormuz in the talks. Hormuz remains the public, formal issue. But Bab el-Mandeb could be the less visible, Saudi part of the negotiation. Mohammed bin Salman is probably not seeking only the resumption of shipping in the Persian Gulf. He also wants Tehran to make the Houthis stop their attacks on Saudi ships, ports and installations.
| “Trump is talking about Hormuz. Mohammed bin Salman may be negotiating both straits.” |
Is the Iranian threat credible?
Iran boasts of possessing “devastating” weapons capable of getting round American defences. This portrayal is partly propaganda. No Iranian missile is guaranteed to get past the Patriot, THAAD or Israeli systems. But Tehran does not need an invincible weapon to trigger a major crisis. A refinery, a power station or a desalination plant can be crippled by a handful of precise strikes on its pumps, electrical substations, control systems or pipelines. The industrial geography of the Gulf concentrates vital facilities on a limited number of sites. Even a high interception rate therefore offers no guarantee against strategic damage.
The credibility of the Iranian threat rests less on a miracle missile than on a combination of four factors: the number of delivery vehicles available, the diversity of trajectories, the capacity for saturation and the inherent vulnerability of energy targets. The depletion of Patriot and THAAD stocks automatically strengthens each of these factors.
A pause dictated by arithmetic
Donald Trump presents the suspension as proof that his military pressure forced Iran and the states of the region to seek a diplomatic way out. This reading is not entirely wrong. Tehran knows that its refineries, power stations and port facilities remain exposed to a far more destructive campaign.
But the constraint cuts both ways. The United States knows that every attack on Iran will trigger fresh salvoes of missiles and drones. Riyadh knows it would be among the first targets. Kyiv knows that the interceptors used in the Gulf cannot be delivered to it. And the Pentagon knows that production is not yet keeping pace with consumption.
Trump’s suspension is therefore both an ultimatum and an admission of caution. Washington retains the capacity to strike Iran, but can no longer guarantee that it will simultaneously protect, with the same density, American bases, Saudi refineries, shipping lanes and Ukraine. The next salvo was suspended because, in a missile war, offence can no longer be separated from the cost of defence.
Four key figures
| 65% | estimated share of the initial US stock of Patriot interceptors used during the war against Iran. |
| 38% | estimated share of the initial THAAD stock used. |
| 2027 | year in which deliveries of new THAAD interceptors are expected to resume. |
| 2 straits | Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, the two chokepoints that can simultaneously threaten Gulf exports. |
Further reading from La Tribune des Nations
• Iran–United States: who can still stop the war?
• After Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb: the land front that could reshuffle the deck
• After Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb: the new front in the energy war
• Egypt’s port of Damietta: the energy war reaches the Mediterranean
Main external sources
• Reuters — Trump suspends new strikes in hope of a swift deal (1 August 2026)
• Axios — Mohammed bin Salman voices concerns over planned strikes
• Associated Press — Fighting has sharply depleted US stocks of Patriot and THAAD
• CSIS — Status of key munitions after the first months of war
• Reuters — Houthis attack Saudi tankers in the Red Sea
• Reuters — Iran tells Houthis to be ready to close the Bab el-Mandeb
Editor’s note
The figures for Patriot and THAAD stockpiles are CSIS estimates, not data officially broken down by the Pentagon. The passages on Bab el-Mandeb are presented as a strategic hypothesis supported by Houthi threats, Saudi overtures and reporting by Reuters; they should not be framed as the confirmed content of an agreement that has yet to be published.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.





