
Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrives in Kuwait City.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Kuwait was not merely a diplomatic stopover on his tour of the Gulf states. Through its timing and the messages it conveyed, it carries a strategic significance that extends far beyond bilateral relations between Washington and the capitals of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It comes just days after the end of hostilities between the United States and Iran, as the two sides prepare to resume technical talks, amid growing questions about what shape the Gulf’s future security system will take in the post-war period.
From Kuwait, Marco Rubio was keen to send an unambiguous message to the United States’ partners in the region. He said Washington “will take no decision that could compromise the security of its Gulf allies” and would remain “fully coordinated with its Gulf partners” in any future agreement with Iran. He also announced that technical talks between the two sides would resume at the end of the month, suggesting they could once again be held in Switzerland, although no official announcement has yet confirmed the venue.
These statements show that the US administration is aware that the success of any agreement with Tehran will not be judged solely by progress on the nuclear file or by sanctions relief. It will also depend on its ability to reassure the Gulf states that their security will not be used as a bargaining chip and that any rapprochement with Iran will not come at the expense of the regional balance.
From war to the battle for a new regional order
Although the preliminary agreement reached between Washington and Tehran brought four months of conflict to an end, it did not resolve the most sensitive issue: the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The real question now is no longer simply how to avoid another war, but which authority will be tasked with managing one of the most strategic sea passages on the planet. Will the freedom-of-navigation rules that have governed the Gulf for several decades remain unchanged, or has the war created the conditions for this balance to be redefined?
Iran has announced a sixty-day suspension of the fees it had planned to levy on ships transiting the strait. This is, however, a temporary suspension rather than a definitive abandonment, suggesting that the issue will remain at the heart of forthcoming negotiations. At the same time, Tehran and the Sultanate of Oman have announced their intention to jointly examine the future management of the strait, including the possible introduction of fees for services rendered, while reaffirming their sovereign rights over their respective territorial waters.
Such an approach marks a genuine strategic turning point. It shifts the debate away from the universal principle of freedom of navigation towards the regional management of strategic sea lanes, with potentially major consequences for global trade and energy markets should this development set a legal or political precedent.
Washington defends the principle of freedom of navigation
The United States categorically rejects this vision. Rubio reiterated that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway on which no state may impose taxes or transit fees. In his view, calling this principle into question would undermine one of the essential foundations of the international maritime order.
The American position is not solely a matter of international law; it also reflects strategic considerations. Washington knows that allowing Iran to levy charges on ships would give Tehran permanent leverage over global energy markets and would turn this strategic waterway into a lasting instrument of political and economic influence, even in peacetime.
For Iran, the war has changed the rules of the game
In Tehran, events are read in a radically different way. The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, declared that the Strait of Hormuz “will never return to what it was before the war”, arguing that the agreement reached with the United States was the result neither of pressure nor of concessions, but enshrined a new strategic reality imposed by the conflict.
These statements show that Iran does not regard the ceasefire as a mere return to the status quo. On the contrary, it sees it as the starting point for a redistribution of the balance of power in the Gulf, intended to give it a greater role in managing the strait and to enshrine what it considers to be the sovereign rights of the coastal states.
Why was Kuwait an essential step?
The significance of Marco Rubio’s visit to Kuwait lies precisely in the choice of that country, which sits at the heart of this new strategic equation. Kuwait is not merely a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It also came under direct Iranian attack during the recent conflict. Its water supply depends almost entirely on its desalination plants, whose security is closely bound up with that of the Gulf. Its economy, moreover, relies on the stability of oil exports and shipping routes.
Against this backdrop, Marco Rubio’s choice of Kuwait as the place to declare that the United States will conclude no agreement that undermines Gulf security carries a twofold meaning. The message is aimed first at Iran: Gulf security will be an integral part of any future regional architecture. It is aimed secondly at the Gulf partners: they will help shape the new regional order and will not be mere bystanders to the negotiations.
The move also reflects Washington’s determination to address the lingering concerns of the Gulf states, which had largely felt sidelined when the 2015 nuclear deal was concluded, despite its direct consequences for their security.
The Gulf between Washington and Tehran
The Gulf states now face a particularly complex equation. They do not want a return to war, but nor can they accept the Strait of Hormuz becoming an instrument of political or economic pressure that can be wielded in every regional crisis. They also know that any change to the strait’s legal status would have direct repercussions on their hydrocarbon exports, their desalination plants, maritime trade and foreign investment, as well as on insurance and shipping costs.
The message from the Gulf countries thus appears clear: peace is desirable, but it cannot be achieved at the expense of strategic security or freedom of navigation.
What next?
The real issue at stake in the forthcoming negotiations is no longer solely nuclear centrifuges or economic sanctions. It concerns the rules that will shape the Gulf’s regional order for decades to come. The United States is seeking to preserve a system founded on freedom of navigation and the security of sea lanes as international public goods.
Iran, for its part, intends to capitalise on the consequences of the war in order to redefine that order, by giving states bordering strategic straits a greater role in managing them and by turning their geographical position into a lasting source of political and economic influence.
Seen in this light, Marco Rubio’s visit to Kuwait goes far beyond a mere diplomatic tour. It sends a strong signal that the future of the Gulf will not be decided solely in the negotiating rooms between Washington and Tehran. It will also depend on the ability of the Gulf capitals to defend their interests during one of the most decisive periods in the region’s contemporary history.
The forthcoming negotiations will therefore not only shape the future of US-Iranian relations. They could also define the contours of the Gulf’s future security and economic order, and determine whether the Strait of Hormuz remains an open international waterway governed by the principle of freedom of navigation, or enters a new era in which strategic passages are administered according to a logic of regional sovereignty and the balance of power.
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






