
British revelations about Unit 700 of the Quds Forceshould sound the alarm in Western security services
An investigation by the Daily Telegraph claims that Unit 700 of the Quds Force, the special unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is using smuggling networks, including migration routes to the United Kingdom, to bring agents into Europe or position them there. Not all the details can be independently verified. But British, European and American precedents already show that Tehran knows how to combine clandestine services, criminal intermediaries, shell companies and locally recruited operatives. The risk now would be to treat separately signals that belong to a single threat architecture.
A threat that may not come from the sky
The warning reported by the Daily Telegraph is stark. An Iranian official claims that Tehran would not need a missile to reach London, because it already has human proxies who could be activated on British soil. Another source goes so far as to mention individuals capable of approaching government buildings without attracting attention.
These statements come from anonymous sources and should be treated with caution. They may amount at once to intelligence, intimidation and psychological warfare. But Western intelligence services would be making a serious mistake if they dismissed them as mere bluster. The question is not whether every Iranian claim is accurate. It is whether the infrastructure described exists, whether it has already been used and whether it could be activated in the context of a military escalation.
For several years, the British authorities have been documenting a rise in Iranian operations on their soil. London no longer speaks only of the surveillance of dissidents or pressure on Persian-language media. The official vocabulary now refers to potentially lethal plots, criminal networks used as intermediaries, reconnaissance of targets and acts of violence ordered from abroad.
Unit 700, the backbone of a clandestine logistics network
The United Kingdom sanctioned the Quds Force’s Unit 700 on 2 September 2024. The British justification accuses it of facilitating or assisting in the preparation of hostile activities carried out by groups backed by the Iranian state, including operations liable to destabilise the United Kingdom or other countries.
According to the British investigation, this unit is said to organise the networks, select the intermediaries, allocate the missions and ensure the continuity of the routes. Another unit, Unit 190, is reportedly responsible for the actual transport of cargo and personnel. Facilities based in Syria and Lebanon are then said to handle reception, storage and redistribution, notably for the benefit of precision missile programmes and Tehran’s allied organisations.
This exact division of labour has never been published in any official organisational chart of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It nonetheless matches a method that has been observed before: fragmenting responsibilities so that no single seizure, arrest or route closure makes it possible to piece together the whole chain straight away. The system is designed to survive the loss of an operator, a front company, an aircraft, a ship or an overland corridor.
What is actually known about Unit 700
Public information on the organisational structure of Unit 700 remains scarce. The name most often associated with its command is that of Brigadier General Ali Naqi Golparast, also transcribed as Ali Naji Golparast, Ali Naji Gal Farsat or Gol Farsat. An open-source report published by the Alma Center in June 2026 describes him as the unit’s commander, on the basis of information that emerged in 2023 and resurfaced in October 2025. However, this identification has been confirmed neither by Tehran nor by any Western authority. It should therefore be presented as a probable identification, not as a definitively established fact.
The command core is reportedly based in Tehran, but no barracks address or stand-alone headquarters officially bearing the number 700 has been identified. An analysis by the Long War Journal places Brigadier General Ali Naji within Unit 700 in Tehran and names Abul Fazl Salmani Zadegan as a member of the same unit deployed in Syria. These indications point to a coordination centre in Iran supplemented by liaison officers in overseas theatres, rather than a single headquarters operating like that of a conventional military unit.
Its strength is unknown. No sanctions document, parliamentary report or government statement provides a credible figure. The permanent core may comprise only a few dozen officers and logisticians, while the network that can be mobilised may include several hundred associates, drivers, port staff, crew members, brokers, smugglers, front-company agents and members of allied organisations. This range is an analytical estimate intended to illustrate the difference between the headquarters and the network, not confirmed intelligence.
The mission assigned to Unit 700, by contrast, is better documented. It is reportedly responsible for the covert transport of military equipment and resources to the regional branches of the Quds Force and to Iran’s allied organisations. It is said to work with the Lebanon Corps, Unit 190, Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 and officials or intermediaries based in Iraq, Lebanon and, before the fall of the Assad regime, Syria. Several sources also accuse it of exploiting the February 2023 earthquake in northern Syria to move weapons, equipment and personnel under humanitarian cover. This last accusation is drawn from open sources and has not been publicly proven in court.
Unit 190: command, personnel and operational platforms
Unit 190 is better known because its former head, Behnam Shahriyari, had long featured in US and British sanctions files. The United Kingdom sanctioned the unit itself on 27 February 2024, describing it as responsible for the transfer and smuggling of weapons on behalf of organisations, groups and states allied to Iran.
Shahriyari used numerous identities. The US Department of Justice cites, among others, Seyed Aliakbar Mirvakili, Husain, Huseyini Hamid and Seyed Hamid Reza Shahcheraghi. Other open sources also mention Hojjatollah Narimani. These variants are not incidental: they show the need for intelligence services, banks, airlines and port operators to incorporate the various transliterations into their detection and matching systems. The US list is set out in the indictment made public in February 2024.
As early as 2011, the US Treasury had sanctioned him for acting on behalf of Liner Transport Kish, an IRGC-linked shipping company that had supplied weapons to Hezbollah. He also controlled the Behnam Shahriyari Trading Company, then registered at the Ziba Building, 10th floor, Northern Sohrevardi Street, in Tehran. In May 2022, Washington further described him as one of the leaders of an international oil smuggling and money laundering network that had generated hundreds of millions of dollars for the Quds Force and Hezbollah. Unit 190 thus appears not merely as an arms delivery service, but as a hub combining military logistics, clandestine trade and financing. See also the US Treasury’s 2022 financial investigation.
Israel announced that it had killed Behnam Shahriyari on 21 June 2025, in a strike on his vehicle in Qom province. The Israeli military explicitly identified him as the commander of weapons transfer Unit 190. The Israeli announcement establishes who claimed the operation, but it does not, on its own, make it possible to piece together how the succession at the head of the unit was arranged.
The name of Seyed Jabar Hosseini, born in 1955 according to the sources that identify him, emerged in October 2025 as that of Shahriyari’s possible successor. The information originally came from the anti-regime hacker group Lab Dookhtegan. The Institute for the Study of War and the Alma Center picked it up, noting that it could not be independently verified. Hosseini should therefore be described as the probable or presumed commander of Unit 190, never as its officially confirmed head.
A figure of around twenty members has been circulating for several years in connection with Unit 190. It comes from older secondary articles and may refer to the historical core responsible for planning, rather than the entire apparatus. No recent primary document confirms it. Given the use of pilots, crews, freight agents, employees of civilian companies, front companies and foreign intermediaries, the actual network is necessarily larger than this small command staff. Presenting “twenty men” as the total strength would give a misleading impression of precision.
No standalone headquarters of Unit 190 has been publicly identified. The hubs frequently associated with its operations include Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, Imam Khomeini International Airport and the Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas. The US Treasury has documented the use of the Shahid Rajaee terminal in several cases involving exports of weapons and materiel linked to the IRGC. These sites should be regarded as staging or transit points, not as evidence of the physical location of the unit’s command. Networks attributed to the unit have also used relays in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and, before 2024, Syria.
Two complementary units with deliberately overlapping responsibilities
The most plausible distinction is functional. Unit 190 oversees what is to be transferred – weapons, funds, personnel, oil or revenue-generating goods – as well as the recipients, the front companies and part of the financial channels. Unit 700 organises the physical movement: the routes, carriers, cover documents, warehouses, border crossings and local reception.
This separation should not be understood as a watertight administrative boundary. The missions overlap, and the system appears designed to be redundant. Several units, companies and intermediaries can perform the same function in turn. An arrest, a strike, the closure of an airport or the seizure of a ship is therefore not enough to break the chain. For Western intelligence services, the relevant target is not merely the numbered unit but the ecosystem of people, companies, routes and functions it can draw on.
Levels of certainty that must not be confused
Three categories must be kept clearly apart in any analysis. The established facts include the British sanctions against Units 190 and 700, the smuggling missions officially attributed to them, and the sanctions against Behnam Shahriyari and the companies linked to his network. The probable identifications include Ali Naqi Golparast as head of Unit 700 and Seyed Jabar Hosseini as Shahriyari’s successor. The unknowns concern exact personnel numbers, the addresses of headquarters and the day-to-day chain of command. This hierarchy strengthens the warning: it avoids presenting hypotheses as certainties while preventing the absence of a complete organisational chart from serving as a pretext for inaction.
Washington also targets the IRGC’s financial infrastructure
This clandestine architecture does not rest solely on the units responsible for transport and transfers. It also depends on front companies, banking channels, procurement specialists and engineers capable of supplying the IRGC with sensitive technologies. The US Rewards for Justice programme is offering up to $15 million for information that disrupts the financial mechanisms of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including those of the Quds Force, as well as the activities of the Iranian conglomerate Beh Joule Pars, known by the acronym BJP.
Four officials or employees of Beh Joule Pars are named: Mahdi, or Mehdi, Abbas Nili Ahmadabadi, co-chair of the board of directors of the Isfahan branch; Mahdi, or Mehdi, Mohammad Farshchi, co-chair of the Tehran branch; Behrooz, or Behroz, Derakhshandeh Haghighi, technical director; and Sara Nemati, head of trade and procurement. The reward is not an individual bounty for their arrest: it targets information capable of disrupting the network’s financing and operations.
According to the US authorities, Beh Joule Pars built a global network of physical and virtual companies to circumvent sanctions and support Iran’s military apparatus. The group allegedly sought sensitive US-origin goods for the IRGC Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organisation, the Aerospace Industries Organisation, Iran Electronics Industries and other entities under Iran’s Ministry of Defence. Washington also accuses it of laundering funds for more than a decade and of moving several million dollars through the US financial system. The locations or connections cited include China, Georgia, Hong Kong, Oman, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
However, no publicly available evidence places Beh Joule Pars under the direct command of Units 700 or 190. Its inclusion in this analysis is therefore not intended to add a new unit to their organisational chart, but to illustrate the ecosystem from which they can benefit: front companies, commercial intermediaries, technical experts, concealed payments and operations spread across several jurisdictions. For Western intelligence services, mapping the IRGC’s networks thus requires linking human intelligence to financial flows, orders for dual-use components and seemingly civilian import-export structures.
Arms routes turned multipurpose routes
Originally, these channels were mainly used to transfer weapons, funds, specialists and military components to Syria and Lebanon. They were subsequently adapted to sanctions: false commercial destinations, front companies, civilian aircraft, maritime shipping, fragmented payments and intermediaries holding European nationality or based in Europe.
The development described by the Telegraph is more worrying still. The same networks are said to have gradually taken on drug trafficking, migrant smuggling and the transport of people deemed reliable by Tehran. An infrastructure created to supply militias in the Middle East would thus become a tool for covert projection into Europe.
This shift is logical. An effective smuggling network does not necessarily carry just one category of goods. It buys accomplices, knows the crossing points, has mastered forged documents, has financial intermediaries at its disposal and knows how to replace a compromised route quickly. What carries narcotics or migrants today can therefore move small arms, surveillance equipment, cash or an operative tasked with a specific mission tomorrow.
The Channel, a blind spot to be examined without lumping everyone together
The investigation claims that some agents were brought into the United Kingdom aboard small boats crossing the Channel, while others are said to have taken flights from Eastern Europe. At this stage, no public account makes it possible to gauge the scale of this practice, or to establish how many people may actually have been inserted in this way.
Most Iranians who flee their country are seeking precisely to escape the regime, repression and war. Many journalists, activists and opposition figures based in Europe are themselves potential targets of the IRGC. Turning all Iranian refugees or migrants into suspects would serve Tehran’s propaganda and cut the security services off from communities that can, on the contrary, provide valuable warnings.
But rejecting conflation does not mean ruling out investigation. People-smuggling networks must be treated as criminal infrastructure that a state may hire or co-opt. The security services must look for indicators of networks, financing, command and behaviour, rather than settling for screening based on nationality.
Foxtrot precedent shows outsourcing already exists
In April 2025, the British government sanctioned the Foxtrot criminal network and its leader Rawa Majid, accusing them of taking part in violence against Jewish and Israeli targets in Europe on behalf of the Iranian regime. London explicitly described at the time the use of criminal gangs as instruments of external coercion.
In the United States, the courts have also established that Iranian officials recruited members of an Eastern European criminal organisation to assassinate the journalist Masih Alinejad. Two leaders of the network were convicted in March 2025. The case is crucial: it shows that Tehran does not need to deploy its own officers systematically. It can supply the target, the funding and the order, then hand the execution over to criminals already established in the West.
This outsourcing reduces the political cost of an operation and makes it harder to attribute. The person carrying it out may not know who is really behind it. The intermediary may believe they are working for a trafficker or a businessman. Payments can pass through several countries, be converted successively into different currencies and make use of cryptocurrencies, so as to obscure the origin of the funds, make them harder to trace and circumvent banking controls. The link to the Iranian state emerges only at the end of a lengthy investigation, sometimes after the operation has failed or been carried out.
Britain no longer speaks of a hypothetical threat
In May 2025, the British Home Secretary said that the police and MI5, Great Britain’s domestic intelligence service, had responded to twenty Iran-backed plots presenting a potentially lethal threat. Three Iranian nationals had at that point been charged under the National Security Act with activities likely to assist a foreign intelligence service and with reconnaissance linked to a plot to commit serious violence.
On 13 July 2026, the British government announced the designation of the IRGC under the new provisions against state threats. London then pointed out that at least twenty potentially lethal Iran-linked plots had been identified in a single year and that the Quds Force had long used criminal proxies to target dissidents, media outlets, Jewish institutions or Israeli interests.
This is therefore no longer a theoretical scenario built on a single press report. The Telegraph’s investigation adds a new dimension to an already weighty case: the possible use of migrant-smuggling routes to pre-position people who would receive their mission only after their arrival.
Fairford and the risk of activation during escalation
The reported threats have emerged since the use of RAF Fairford by US B-1 bombers engaged in operations against Iran. Iranian officials then portrayed Britain as a party to the conflict and warned that its bases were within range of Iranian capabilities.
The change in scale is significant. As long as clandestine networks are used to monitor a dissident or prepare a targeted operation, they form part of a strategy of transnational repression. When a European country is accused of directly supporting military strikes, those same networks can be conceived of as a capability for asymmetric retaliation. The shift from surveillance to action may then hinge on an order conveyed in a few words, with no visible military movement and no detectable missile launch.
The West’s real blind spot: administrative silos
The strength of the Iranian apparatus lies less in exceptional technological sophistication than in its ability to exploit the boundaries between government agencies. An agency responsible for immigration sees a people-smuggling ring. The criminal police see drug trafficking. Customs see trade fraud. Financial intelligence sees a shell company. Counter-intelligence sees a suspicious contact. Each can handle its own case properly while missing the shared architecture.
Unit 700, as described, operates precisely in these gaps. It does not depend on a single route, a single country or a single organisation. It temporarily brings together actors who have no need to know the overall plan. A smuggler gets someone across a border. A logistician books accommodation. An intermediary hands over a phone. A criminal carries out reconnaissance. Another receives the payment. The sponsor remains at a distance.
Western services must therefore turn their approach on its head, starting not only from individuals but from functions. Who provides the funding? Who supplies the documents? Who arranges the travel? Who provides accommodation? Who passes on the instructions? Who selects the targets? It is the connections between these functions that will make it possible to identify a state operation concealed within a mass of ordinary criminal activity.
Five urgent priorities for Western security services
The first urgent priority is intelligence fusion. Cases linked to the IRGC must be examined jointly by counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism police, border agencies, customs, organised crime units and financial intelligence. Joint cells must not be set up after an attack, but before any activation of the networks.
The second priority is European. The routes in question cross several jurisdictions, notably Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Balkans and the western seaboards. A piece of information that seems insignificant in one country can become decisive when matched against a financial transfer, an arrest or surveillance carried out elsewhere. Europol, national services and North American partners must have rapid mechanisms for cross-referencing data, as well as shared watch lists of entities, companies and intermediaries.
The third priority concerns logistics networks. The transport companies, charterers, port intermediaries, travel agents, financial structures and front companies already linked to Units 700 and 190 must be mapped. Sanctions should not merely freeze assets once they have been identified. They must serve to shut down bases of operation, deter facilitators and make every replacement more costly.
The mapping must take account of name variants and business links. Ali Naqi Golparast, Ali Naji Golparast, Ali Naji Gal Farsat and Gol Farsat may refer to the same alleged official. Behnam Shahriyari also appears as Behnam Shahryari, Behnam Shahriari, Seyed Aliakbar Mirvakili, Huseyini Hamid and Seyed Hamid Reza Shahcheraghi. Seyed Jabar Hosseini and Abul Fazl Salmani Zadegan should be treated as leads for cross-referencing, with the appropriate degree of caution. The companies Liner Transport Kish and Behnam Shahriyari Trading Company, their directors, their past addresses and their business partners are also entry points for financial and logistical intelligence.
The fourth priority is protecting potential targets. Persian-speaking journalists, Iranian dissidents, Jewish institutions, Israeli missions, military installations, energy infrastructure and certain government sites must be regarded as part of a single threat spectrum. Unusual surveillance, an attempt to gain access, an innocuous-looking delivery or photographic reconnaissance must no longer be assessed in isolation.
The fifth priority is judicial. Western states must prioritise prosecuting facilitators, financiers, recruiters and criminal intermediaries. Dismantling a network requires striking at its support functions, not merely at the final perpetrator. The new British provisions go in this direction by making it easier to prosecute those who provide material assistance to an organisation designated under state threats legislation.
Fear must not become an Iranian weapon
An effective security policy must hold to one red line: no collective suspicion of Iranians living in Europe. The Islamic Republic has long sought to portray its opponents as traitors, to intimidate diasporas and to convince people that it can reach anyone, anywhere. An indiscriminate Western response would strengthen this psychological grip and weaken cooperation with the regime’s first victims.
The alarm must therefore be precise. It concerns the IRGC, the Quds Force, their logistics units, their front companies, their criminal intermediaries and those acting under their direction. It does not concern refugees, asylum seekers or Iranian communities, which have often alerted the authorities long before the threat was officially recognised.
A war below the threshold has already begun
The West still often measures the Iranian threat in numbers of missiles, drones, centrifuges or ships. That yardstick is incomplete. Over decades, the IRGC has built a parallel capability made up of commercial networks, smuggling operations, false flags, front companies, proxy groups and paid criminals. This infrastructure is not separate from Iran’s military power. It is one of its extensions.
The Telegraph’s revelations should therefore be treated as an operational warning, not as a media episode. They will need to be verified, cross-checked and, where appropriate, challenged. But the absence of public evidence on every detail no longer justifies inaction. The precedents are too numerous, the official British statements too serious and Tehran’s methods too consistent.
The danger would be to wait for a successful attack before admitting that the routes used for drugs, weapons, money and migrants can be exploited by the same paymaster. If agents really have been pre-positioned in Europe, the time to sound the alarm is not when they are activated. It is now.
Further reading from LTDN
• Iran–United States: war redraws the strategic architecture of the Middle East
• Hormuz: negotiation has given way to armed intimidation
• After Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb: the new front in the energy war
External sources
• The Daily Telegraph — Unit 700: The elite Iranian force with Britain in its sights
• United Kingdom — sanctions against Unit 700 of the Quds Force, 2 September 2024
• United Kingdom — sanctions against Unit 190 of the Quds Force, 27 February 2024
• US Treasury — Behnam Shahriyari, Liner Transport Kish and Shahriyari Trading Company
• US Treasury — Quds Force and Hezbollah oil-smuggling network
• US Department of Justice — identities used by Behnam Shahriyari
• Israeli military — announcement of the death of Behnam Shahriyari, 21 June 2025
• Institute for the Study of War — Seyed Jabar Hosseini, possible successor as head of Unit 190
• Alma Research Center — structure of the Quds Force, Units 190 and 700
• Long War Journal — Unit 700 personnel identified in Tehran and Syria
• Rewards for Justice — Beh Joule Pars and a reward of up to $15 million
• UK Government — designation of the IRGC under state threats legislation
• UK Government — sanctions against the Foxtrot criminal network
Translated from French. The French original prevails.






